Waddle v. Lucky Strike Oil Co., Inc.
Citation | 551 S.W.2d 323 |
Parties | Fannie WADDLE, Petitioner, v. LUCKY STRIKE OIL COMPANY, INC., Respondent. |
Decision Date | 18 April 1977 |
Court | Supreme Court of Tennessee |
R. L. Johnson, Gainesboro, for petitioner.
John E. Acuff, Crawford, Barnes & Acuff, Cookeville, for respondent.
This action was instituted by plaintiff, as lessee, seeking a declaration that an oil and gas lease remains in full force and effect and for other relief. The Chancellor denied the relief sought and the Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the writ of certiorari.
The issues are whether lessee was in default in failing either to drill or to pay delay rental, and, if so, whether the lease terminated by its own terms, without the necessity of "a final determination" of default, followed by a reasonable time within which to comply.
The oil and gas lease was entered into on December 3, 1971, between defendant, Fannie M. Waddle, as lessor, and Mid-Western Petroleum Corporation 1, as lessee. Plaintiff is an assignee of a successor corporation of Mid-Western. John Kramer of New York, Pennsylvania, an officer of the original lessee and of its successor, represented the corporation in the negotiations with lessor, and the lease bears the hand-written notation that it was prepared by him. A "cash bonus" 2 of fifteen hundred ($1,500) dollars was paid for a primary term of ten (10) years.
The obligations imposed upon the lessee by the terms of the lease that involve the issue of termination follow:
(1) " . . . this lease shall terminate . . . unless . . . lessee shall . . . " begin operations for the drilling of a well within six months of December 3, 1971, or pay $75 per annum for the privilege of deferring drilling operations;
(2) In the event of a dry hole, or holes, prior to the discovery of oil or gas, " . . . this lease shall not terminate, provided . . . " operations for the drilling of a well were commenced, or $75 per annum paid, as delay rental, by the next rental paying date;
(3) If production ceased for any cause, " . . . this lease shall not terminate, provided . . . " operations for the drilling of a well were commenced or $75 per annum paid, as delay rental, by the next rental paying date;
(4) To pay $50 damages before drilling each well.
Lessee drilled well number one on lessor's land within six (6) months of December 3, 1971. It disclosed traces, but no commercial oil, and was declared a dry hole and plugged. A few months later well number two was drilled and "demonstrated a surplus of oil" sufficient to cause lessee to go forward with the installations necessary to begin commercially pumping oil. However, the Tennessee Oil and Gas Board "red-tagged" the well before any oil was pumped. According to Kramer, the drilling contractor encountered a boulder, and moved the location of the well twenty-one (21) feet "in the middle of the night." Instead of being moved west, it was moved south and east, too close to property owned by Wesley Flatt, Jr. and others, in violation of State regulations. Kramer's interpretation of the consequences of a well too close to adjoining property was that, if the owner of more than a fifty (50%) percent interest therein would not consent to removal of the red-tag, a hearing before the State Board could be requested and "it has been their custom to allow you to pump it."
Kramer's only explanation of why the red-tag had not been removed, or of lessee's efforts to do so was the following:
Parenthetically, the record reveals that Kramer's corporation had a fifty (50%) percent interest in an oil lease on the Flatt property, and plaintiff corporation also procured an assignment of that lease. No further details of that transaction were developed, nor does either party assert that it had any impact on the issues in this litigation.
On March 8, 1974, lessee 3 assigned its interest in the Waddle oil and gas lease to plaintiff, Lucky Strike Oil Company, Inc. in consideration of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars.
Fred Hull, President and owner of plaintiff corporation, and Ray Bostick, who was representing John Kramer, called on Mrs. Waddle at her daughter's home on March 13, 1974. Hull testified they went, "to see where (sic) she objected." She informed them, in essence, that the lease was terminated because Mr. Kramer had not done what he had promised. They returned the following day, and either handed her or merely left on a table with other papers a Bank of Celina receipt showing a deposit of two hundred fifty ($250) dollars to the credit of lessor. Lessor testified that she did not learn of the deposit until after they had left. Under date of March 15, 1974, her check for two hundred fifty ($250) dollars payable to plaintiff was mailed with a covering letter stating in part, that: "My lease is out and I do not want to lease again."
No further drilling was commenced on lessor's property after November 27, 1972, and no delay rental was paid lessor until the deposit to her account on March 14, 1974. Hull and Bostick had slightly different versions of what the sum of two hundred fifty ($250) dollars represented. Kramer said that it represented two years delay rental and fifty ($50) dollars damages or "clean-up" for each of the wells drilled on lessor's property. As a witness, Kramer insisted that nothing was due lessor, because the lease was "held by production," and that lessee was entitled to notice or a "determination" and reasonable time thereafter to pay rental or "to do whatever is wrong (sic)."
Defendant insists that the lease terminated by its own terms when lessee failed to drill or to pay delay rental after well number two was red-tagged.
In this Court, plaintiff relies entirely on the reasoning of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that the only specific obligation imposed on the lessee was that either of commencing operations for digging a well within six (6) months or of paying seventy-five ($75) dollars per year; that having drilled a well within six (6) months the rights of the lessee were fixed without further payment for a period of ten (10) years.
We disagree with that interpretation.
First, we agree with the majority of courts that have passed upon the term "production" in this context, and hold that it is equivalent to the phrase "production in paying quantities" and also embraces the ability to market the product at a profit. See Gulf Oil Corporation v. Reid, 161 Tex. 51, 337 S.W.2d 267 (1960); W. Summers, Oil and Gas (1959) § 293.
Thus, in our opinion, well number two is in the same category as a dry hole as long as the red-tag placed thereon, prior to any pumping or production, remains in force.
The dry hole clause of this lease is prefaced by the phrase, "if at any time prior to the discovery of oil or gas . . . " It is a fact, under this record, that oil, in apparent commercial quantities, was discovered on lessor's land. But, we are not disposed to allow that expression to thwart what we believe to be the obligation...
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