Wade v. Calcasieu Paper Co.
| Decision Date | 20 February 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 42650,42650 |
| Citation | 86 So.2d 540,229 La. 702 |
| Parties | Hampton WADE v. CALCASIEU PAPER COMPANY, Inc. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Julius T. Long, Shreveport, for plaintiff, appellant, and relator.
Plauche & Plauche, S. W. Plauche, Jr., Lake Charles, for defendant-respondent.
Hampton Wade was injured in the course and scope of his employment on October 19, 1951, while working at his regular position as a chipper feeder for the Calcasieu Paper Company, Inc. Medical examinations made shortly after the accident disclosed that Wade had injured his brachial plexus, which is the plexus of nerves from the spinal canal which supplies the arm. An orthopedic surgeon who made this examination reported to the company that Wade had sustained a peripheral nerve injury which prevented him from doing his regular work, and accordingly Wade was paid compensation of $30 a week for 101 weeks. Two orthopedic surgeons examined Wade more than two years after the accident and concluded that he had recovered and was able to return to his regular work. Calcasieu Paper Company accordingly stopped compensation payments. Wade then instituted this suit, alleging that he was totally and permanently disabled as a result of the injury he received in 1951, and asking for compensation for 400 weeks at $30 a week less the amount of compensation already paid.
After trial in the district court there was judgment dismissing his suit. The trial judge says in his reasons for judgment that, although he gave due consideration to the well established judicial policy of construing the law liberally in favor of an injured workman, he-concluded that the plaintiff had failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was unable to return to work after the payments of compensation ceased. The trial judge found that, even though the evidence disclosed that plaintiff had suffered a serious injury and had had an extended convalescence, this evidence also clearly showed that he had finally recovered.
From this judgment plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. After reviewing all the evidence and testimony adduced, that court in a unanimous opinion with Judge Tate as its organ affirmed the district court's judgment on the ground that there was no manifest error in the trial judge's conclusion that Wade was no longer disabled as a result of the accident. 82 So.2d 117, 119. In the course of this opinion the Court of Appeal said: '* * * We regret very much, as we are sure the District Court did, that a neurological or neurosurgical opinion regarding the alleged nerve damage is not available to aid in determination of disability; but we feel the burden of producing such evidence falls upon the plaintiff-employee, rather than upon the defendant-employer. * * *'
Wade timely filed an application for a rehearing in the Court of Appeal. However, after the time fixed by law for filing applications for rehearing had elapsed, he filed what he terms a supplemental or amended application for rehearing, and in answer to the Court of Appeal's expression of regret quoted above he attached to this application a written report of a physician specializing in surgery of the central and peripheral nervous system. This neurosurgeon had examined Wade after the opinion of the Court of Appeal was handed down. In this supplemental application Wade petitioned the Court of Appeal to remand his case for the taking of additional testimony and particularly the testimony of the neurosurgeon whose report he had attached to his application. The court refused a rehearing, with Judge Tate dissenting, and plaintiff applied to this court for writs, which we granted.
The report of the neurosurgeon attached to plaintiff's supplemental application for a rehearing states that it is never possible to determine whether a patient is exaggerating his complaints, but that the examiner did not feel that plaintiff was doing this or was a malingerer; that the examiner could not say with certainty that Wade's symptoms and disability were as severe as Wade described them, but that he personally believed they were, and...
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Page v. Department of Labor and Industries
...Co. v. Mannhalter, Tex.Civ.App., 290 S.W.2d 360; Blackstock Oil Co. v. Murtishaw, 184 Okl. 312, 87 P.2d 308; Wade v. Calcasieu Paper Co., 229 La. 702, 86 So.2d 540, 542. The legislature made the court or jury the trier of the facts, not physician Nor does Wissink v. Department of Labor and ......
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...In compensation cases, due to the paternalistic purposes of the remedy, a more liberal policy is followed. Wade v. Calcasieu Paper Co., 229 La. 702, 86 So.2d 540 (1956); Robinson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 181 So.2d 318 (La.App.3d Cir. ...
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