Wade v. Castillo
| Decision Date | 15 September 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 07-cv-462-bbc.,07-cv-462-bbc. |
| Citation | 658 F.Supp.2d 906 |
| Parties | Ivory WADE, Plaintiff, v. Dr. Marcelo CASTILLO and Dr. Joseph Drinka, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
David L. Anstaett, David J. Harth, Emily Jane Lee, Jeff J. Bowen, Perkins Coie LLP, Madison, WI, for Plaintiff.
Francis X. Sullivan, Wisconsin Department of Justice, Patricia J. Epstein, Bell, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., Madison, WI, for Defendants.
In this civil action for monetary relief, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Wisconsin state law, plaintiff Ivory Wade contends that defendants Marcelo Castillo and Joseph Drinka committed medical malpractice and exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, plaintiff argues that defendant Drinka failed to meet the minimum standard of care for a psychiatrist and was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's medical needs when he discontinued plaintiff's prescriptions for psychiatric medications on January 23, 2007. Plaintiff argues that defendant Castillo also committed medical malpractice and violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to thoroughly evaluate plaintiff's mental health and psychotic symptoms and failing to prescribe anti-psychotic medication.
Both defendants have moved for summary judgment, and these motions are presently before the court. Jurisdiction is present under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.
Defendant Drinka argues that plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed because (1) plaintiff did not have a serious medical need in January 2007; and (2) even if he did, Drinka was not deliberately indifferent to the need. I find, however, that plaintiff's recent diagnosis of a psychotic disorder and his history of mental health issues are sufficient to raise a material issue about whether he had a serious medical need of which Drinka was aware and knowingly or recklessly ignored.
Defendant Drinka argues that the state medical malpractice claim against him should be dismissed for two reasons. First, plaintiff failed to comply with Wis. Stat. § 893.82, which requires prisoners to file a notice of claim with the attorney general's office and either wait 120 days or receive a denial before commencing a civil action against a state employee. Alternatively, defendant argues that plaintiff's state claim should be dismissed because he has failed to show a causal connection between Drinka's actions and plaintiff's alleged harm. Because I conclude that plaintiff's medical malpractice claim must be dismissed for his failure to comply with Wis. Stat. § 893.82, I do not address Drinka's arguments on the merits. Therefore, defendant Drinka's motion for summary judgment will be denied with respect to plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim and granted with respect to plaintiff's state law claim.
Defendant Castillo argues that plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against him should be dismissed because (1) plaintiff did not have a serious medical need; and (2) even if he did, Castillo was not deliberately indifferent because he relied on professional medical judgment. Because the undisputed facts do not support a finding that Castillo failed to use medical judgment, Castillo's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim will be granted.
As to plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against defendant Castillo, Castillo contends that it should be dismissed because (1) plaintiff fails to show that Castillo's treatment fell below the standard of care for a psychiatrist in a similar position; and (2) plaintiff fails to establish any causation between Castillo's refusal to prescribe anti-psychotic medication and plaintiff's alleged injuries. However, the evidence plaintiff has adduced, including his own testimony, his medical reports and his expert's opinion, creates a material issues for the trier of fact on both the standard of care and causation. The standard for medical malpractice is significantly lower than that for the Eighth Amendment. Although a reasonable jury could not infer deliberate indifference, it could find that Castillo was negligent. Therefore, defendant Castillo's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's medical malpractice claim will be denied.
From the parties' proposed findings of fact, I find the following to be material and undisputed.
Plaintiff is incarcerated at Green Bay Correctional Institution in Green Bay, Wisconsin. During the time period relevant to this case, he was in the custody of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections at Dodge Correctional Institution and Racine Correctional Institution. On November 30, 2006, while plaintiff was housed at Dodge, a Department of Corrections psychiatrist evaluated him and made a diagnosis of psychotic disorder NOS ("Not Otherwise Specified"). At this time, plaintiff had prescriptions for the anti-psychotic medication Seroquel and the anti-depressant Paxil. In December 2006, another Department of Corrections psychiatrist at Dodge, Dr. Laurence Trueman, evaluated plaintiff, made a provisional diagnosis of psychosis NOS and increased plaintiff's Seroquel prescription. Dr. Trueman also made a diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder and polysubstance dependence and continued his Paxil prescription.
Seroquel is an antipsychotic medication with the generic name quetiapine. Paxil is an antidepressent with the generic name paroxetine. Under Wisconsin Department of Corrections policy, Seroquel should not be used for a patient starting new treatment for a psychotic disorder, though the policy allows patients with existing Seroquel prescriptions to continue taking the medication. Department of Corrections policy also recognizes the right of competent inmates to stop taking medication and otherwise refuse treatment.
When plaintiff was admitted to Racine on January 8, 2007, he was still taking Seroquel and Paxil. He described to the Racine psychiatric staff his history of hearing voices, past experience with depression and numerous hospitalizations. The Racine staff received plaintiff's medical chart on January 11, which confirmed plaintiff's recent treatment for psychosis and depression. Later in January, plaintiff reported to the staff that he was doing well and asked to be taken off his medication and removed from clinical monitoring.
Defendants Joseph Drinka and Marcelo Castillo are psychiatrists who were employed by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections at all times relevant to this case. Defendant Drinka worked as a psychiatrist at Racine Correctional Institution from December 1, 2006, through March 31, 2007. Psychiatric medication management was one of his principal job responsibilities. From 1999 until August 2007, defendant Castillo worked part-time at several Department of Corrections prisons, including Racine, and became a full-time Department of Corrections psychiatrist in August 2007. Defendant Castillo's responsibilities generally include, but are not limited to, assessing and treating patients' mental disorders and diseases and prescribing medications as needed. While employed at Racine, defendants Drinka and Castillo were part of a multi-disciplinary team that consisted of psychologists, social workers, unit managers and security staff.
As noted, shortly after plaintiff's arrival at Racine Correctional Institution, he decided he no longer wanted to take Seroquel or Paxil. (The parties dispute plaintiff's motivation for discontinuing his medications). On January 22, 2007, plaintiff told a Department of Corrections psychiatrist, Dr. Lawrence Todryk, that he had not taken his medications for three days. Plaintiff's medications were largely out of his system within 72 hours of their discontinuation. At Dr. Todryk's suggestion that he submit a health service request to be officially taken off his medications, plaintiff submitted a health service request to defendant Drinka, in which he stated: "I would like my medication discontinued (A.S.A.P.)." On January 23, 2007, Drinka approved plaintiff's request by writing "Okay!" on plaintiff's health service request form and writing a physician's order to discontinue plaintiff's medications. Drinka noted the health service request and discontinuation of medication on plaintiff's medical chart. Drinka did not meet with plaintiff or talk to him before discontinuing his Paxil and Seroquel prescriptions. Indeed, Drinka's involvement with plaintiff at Racine was limited to approving this single health service request.
It is Drinka's custom before approving or disapproving a health service request, to consult a patient's medical chart history, discuss any reports of noncompliance with nurses or other psychiatric staff, consider possible medication abuse and weigh the possible risks and benefits of continuation versus discontinuation of a patient's medication. (It is disputed whether Drinka followed this custom before approving plaintiff's health service request.).
Although plaintiff was originally scheduled to meet with defendant Castillo on February 2, 2007, plaintiff failed to keep this appointment and rescheduled the appointment for March 28. At the March 28 appointment, plaintiff reported to Castillo that he was doing well and was "maintaining" with respect to sleep, appetite, mood, energy and interest levels. Plaintiff denied any hallucinations or delusions and was not showing any psychotic symptoms. Castillo noted in his psychiatric report that plaintiff's anti-psychotic medication had been discontinued in January and that plaintiff "[a]ppear[ed] to be in remission without medication." Castillo also noted that plaintiff did not appear to be "attending to internal stimuli" or show any...
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