Wade v. City of Chicago

Decision Date22 March 2006
Docket NumberNo. 1-04-0642.,1-04-0642.
Citation847 N.E.2d 631
PartiesWilliam A. WADE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee (Robert P. Jasinski, Michael Madigan, William O'Reilly, John Coughlin, and Wayne Jarocki, Defendants).
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

John T. Kennedy, Evanston, for Appellant.

Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon and Erica M. Landsberg, of counsel), for Appellee.

Justice ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, William Wade, brought this action against defendants, the City of Chicago (City) and police officers Robert Jasinski, Michael Madigan, William O'Reilly, John Coughlin, and Wayne Jarocki,1 to recover damages for the injuries he received during an alleged vehicle "chase" in downtown Chicago on October 4, 2000. A jury entered a verdict in favor of defendants Jasinski and the City, and the trial court entered judgement on the verdict. Plaintiff appeals.

BACKGROUND

On October 4, 2000, at approximately 2:20 p.m., Jerry Davis was driving westbound on Van Buren Street, located in downtown Chicago, in a station wagon fleeing from the police. At the same time, plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk on the north side of Van Buren Street when Davis drove up onto the sidewalk and struck plaintiff and other pedestrians. As a result, plaintiff was treated for multiple injuries and underwent numerous surgeries on his right leg.

On October 16, 2000, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against the City and an unnamed officer for negligently, willfully, and wantonly "pursuing" a vehicle on October 4, 2000. He alleged that the officer's "pursuit" caused the driver of the pursued vehicle to drive up onto the sidewalk and strike plaintiff, thereby causing his injuries. On February 22, 2001, plaintiff amended his two-count complaint by adding two additional counts, and added Davis as the driver of the pursued vehicle.

On January 23, 2001, the City, on behalf of defendant police officers, moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint based on the immunity provision of section 2-202 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 2002)), arguing that the officers were immune from liability for negligence in the execution or enforcement of the law, and that plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts for a willful and wanton claim. Plaintiff amended the complaint and deleted the negligence claim against defendants. He subsequently amended the complaint two additional times and filed a fourth amended complaint, adding Officer Jasinski and several other officers as defendants. Thereafter, he filed a first amendment to the fourth amended complaint, alleging that the City and the named police officers negligently conducted a "pursuit." The City moved to dismiss the amendment. The trial court granted the City's motion and dismissed plaintiff's negligence claim with leave to amend. Plaintiff repleaded his negligence count only against Officer Jasinski in his second amendment to the fourth amended complaint. The City again filed a motion to dismiss the negligence count, which the trial court denied on May 9, 2003. The City also filed various affirmative defenses and a counterclaim against Davis for contribution.

Plaintiff moved to enter a default judgment against Davis,2 which was granted on January 31, 2001. Plaintiff subsequently moved to dismiss his claims against Davis, which the trial court allowed.

On September 12, 2003, the City moved for summary judgment, arguing that Officers Madigan, O'Reilly, Coughlin, and Jarocki, who were not in the vehicle, could not have engaged in any "pursuit" and therefore did not act willfully or wantonly and did not proximately cause plaintiff's injuries. On October 23, 2003, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the matter proceeded to trial against defendants Jasinski and the City.

Prior to trial, the City filed several motions in limine. As relevant here, the trial court reserved ruling on the City's motion to bar testimony from certain witnesses, including James Cox, indicating that they had heard an officer say there was a "chase" or a "pursuit." The trial court also ruled that any evidence regarding events after plaintiff's accident would not be admitted.

Plaintiff, in his motion in limine, requested the court to bar any evidence of Davis's criminal history. The trial court ruled that it would allow evidence regarding Davis's outstanding warrant, but not concerning any prior criminal history.

Plaintiff argued that Jasinski willfully and wantonly chased Davis through a crowded downtown street, with conscious disregard for or utter indifference to the safety of others, and that Jasinski's conduct was a proximate cause of his injuries.

Defendants argued that plaintiff's injuries were exclusively caused by Davis and that Jasinski's conduct was not willful and wanton.

At trial, Officer Jasinski testified that he had been working for the City as a police officer for 8½ years. On October 4, 2000, he was working in plain clothes on "pickpocket duty" with about 10 other officers. Jasinski testified that he and the other officers were on a designated frequency on the police radio so they could communicate to each other. To communicate to the central office, they would turn a knob on the radio and switch to an open frequency. While on the network frequency, Jasinski heard another police officer, Jarocki, announce over the radio that a station wagon in the alley just west of Wells Street, between Jackson Boulevard and Van Buren Street, was suspicious. He believed that the occupant of the station wagon may have attempted to break into a van in the alley. Jasinski drove to the end of the alley on Van Buren Street in his unmarked car. He parked about 30 feet from the alley, exited the vehicle and walked toward the alley. He then heard over his radio that the station wagon was coming down the alley toward him and saw it driving out of the mouth of the alley without stopping or yielding at about 25 miles per hour.

Jasinski went to his unmarked car. As he was getting in his car, he saw the station wagon speed up and run a red light at Franklin Street without slowing down, going about 35 miles per hour. At that point, Jasinski activated his emergency lights and siren and drove west on Van Buren Street. He had oscillating lights and white strobe lights on the sides. Jasinski testified that he was trying to identify the driver and the license plate number to conduct an investigation. He slowed down to five miles per hour at the Franklin Street light, checked traffic, then drove through the red light with his emergency equipment activated. At that time, the station wagon drove through another red light on Wacker Drive. Jasinski waited for traffic to stop and switched to the left side of the street so that oncoming traffic could see him better. He then proceeded through the red light at Wacker Drive. After crossing the intersection, he saw the station wagon on the bridge at the Chicago River but could not see it once it went over the crown of the bridge. As he drove over the bridge, he saw the station wagon stopped in traffic. The light at the next intersection, Canal Street, was red, and traffic was backed up from the light. Jasinski then witnessed the station wagon drive up onto the sidewalk at about 35 miles per hour, but he did not see it hit anyone. At this time, he was about 20 to 25 cars behind the station wagon. Jasinski testified that he was not in "pursuit" of the station wagon because he was never close enough to signal the driver to pull over. The entire event happened over approximately two blocks, during which time Jasinski was driving the speed limit of 30 miles per hour. Subsequent events after the accident, including an event where Jasinski hit the back of the station wagon shortly after it had crashed into another vehicle after turning the wrong way on a one-way street, were not admitted into evidence as the trial court found them to be irrelevant.

Terrence Costello testified that he was driving westbound on Van Buren Street on October 4, 2000, at around 2:20 p.m., when he saw a station wagon strike a man in the sidewalk. He testified that the station wagon was driving at about 45 or 50 miles per hour. He believed that about 10 seconds later, although it could have been longer, he heard and saw a unmarked police car driving in the left lane at about 35 to 40 miles per hour. In an offer of proof, Costello testified that he thought the police vehicle was "chasing" the station wagon because very little time had passed between when the station wagon struck plaintiff and when the police car came up next to him. The trial court struck the offer of proof as Costello did not have a trustworthy basis for his conclusion.

Syed Hussain testified that he was driving a taxi cab that day when he witnessed the accident. He opined the station wagon was driving at about 35 miles per hour. He stated that he heard the siren about a second or two after the second pedestrian was struck. He estimated that the police car was traveling at about 35 miles per hour. In an offer of proof, Hussain, as a experienced taxi cab driver of 15 years, opined that he believed that the police officer was "chasing" the station wagon.

James Cox testified that on October 4, 2000, he was on a heating and air conditioning service job at a building on Jackson Boulevard and Wacker Drive, and he parked his van in the alley west of Wells Street. He heard sirens and checked on his van from the roof, where he saw two people walking around and looking into his van. When he got downstairs, he learned that the two people were police officers and that the back window of the van was broken and there were pry marks on the van. In an offer of proof, Cox testified that one...

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