Wade v. Department of Corrections
| Decision Date | 10 April 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 113501,113501 |
| Citation | 453 N.W.2d 683,182 Mich.App. 519 |
| Parties | Gerald WADE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant-Appellee. 182 Mich.App. 519, 453 N.W.2d 683 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[182 MICHAPP 519] James T. Miller, Romeo, for plaintiff-appellant.
[182 MICHAPP 520] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and Rose A. Houk, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant-appellee.
Before MURPHY, P.J., and MacKENZIE and CAVANAGH, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order of the trial court granting defendant's motion for summary disposition. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Plaintiff, a resident of the Michigan Department of Corrections Coldwater facility, filed a complaint against defendant after he fell on some grease or other substance as he was walking from the facility mess hall. Plaintiff suffered a severe fracture of the right patella.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant had a statutory duty pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 691.1406; M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(106) to maintain the facility so as to avoid defective and dangerous conditions which could result in bodily injury. The dangerous condition of which plaintiff alleged defendant had knowledge and which defendant allowed to exist was "an accumulation of grease, oil, water, food or other slippery matter in the corridor from the messhall [sic] to Unit No. C-29 of said premises."
Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), governmental immunity, as well as (C)(8), failing to state a claim, and (C)(10), no genuine issue of material fact. The lower court, after enunciating the applicable standard for a (C)(8) motion, appeared to decide the motion in defendant's favor on the basis of MCR 2.116(C)(7). Nonetheless, it is clear that the lower court did not decide the matter on the basis of MCR 2.116(C)(10). In dismissing plaintiff's complaint, the trial court stated:
[182 MICHAPP 521] The Court considers this motion under the--exclusive of the (10) aspects of this--considers the motion in light of the pleadings alone. The Court reviews only the pleadings. The motion is to be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. It is the responsibility and requirement that the plaintiff allege avoidance of immunity. The statutory basis is obvious, the building defect, but there has to be a defect in the building itself. Now, a mere accumulation, as has been stated here, accumulation, in paragraph 10 of the complaint, of grease, oil, water, food, or slippery matter in no way alleges a defect. It didn't say what was defective. And the Court is satisfied that under those circumstances the motion should be granted, and the Court will grant the motion.
I do not reach the (C)(10) motion because I don't think it's necessary--that aspect of the motion because I don't think it's necessary for purposes of this determination today.
We note that defendant argued below that Reardon v. Dep't of Mental Health, 430 Mich. 398, 424 N.W.2d 248 (1988), mandated the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. Now, on appeal, plaintiff essentially argues that the trial court should have applied the public building exception to governmental immunity to this case because an accumulation of oil or grease on a floor constitutes a dangerous and defective condition of a public building. We agree.
In Reardon, our Supreme Court attempted to clarify the parameters of the statutory building exception to governmental immunity by stating the following:
In light of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of this legislation [the governmental immunity act], we are persuaded that the Legislature did not intend an expansive reading of the public building exception. Instead, we conclude [182 MICHAPP 522] that the Legislature intended that the exception apply to facts similar to the facts of Williams [Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231; 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961) ]--the case which precipitated the statute in the first place. In other words, an injury arising out of a dangerous or defective physical condition of the building itself.
This conclusion is buttressed by the language chosen by the Legislature in enacting the public building exception. The first sentence imposes upon governmental agencies the duty to "repair and maintain public buildings under their control...." In Bush v. Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich. 716; 275 N.W.2d 268 (1979), we held that this duty is not strictly limited to the repair or maintenance of public buildings. Instead, we held that "a building may be dangerous or defective because of improper design, faulty construction or the absence of safety devices." Id. at 730 . We reiterate this proposition, as the holding in Bush is entirely consistent with today's conclusion that the injury must be occasioned by the dangerous or defective physical condition of the building itself. As long as the danger of injury is presented by a physical condition of the building, it little matters that the condition arose because of improper design, faulty construction, or absence of safety devices. However, while the public building exception is not strictly limited to failures of repair or maintenance, the Legislature's choice of those terms to define the governmental duty is indicative of its intention regarding the scope of the exception. The duty to repair and maintain a premises clearly relates to the physical condition of the premises.
In addition, the second sentence of the exception imposes liability on governmental agencies for injuries "resulting from a dangerous or defective condition of a public building...." (Emphasis supplied.) [Reardon, supra, 430 Mich. pp. 409-410, 424 N.W.2d 248.]
In summary, the Legislature intended to impose a duty to maintain safe public buildings, but not necessarily safety in public buildings. In both cases, the assaults were the result of the act of an [182 MICHAPP 523] intervening party rather than a dangerous or defective condition of the building itself. Therefore, we conclude that the public building exception does not apply under the facts of these cases.
Since situations "similar to the facts in Williams " fall within the building exception, a closer look at Williams is necessary. In Williams, the City of Detroit owned a building which had not been rented or leased for some years. It is possible to surmise that the building was used for storage.
In any event, on the day of the incident, the city was abandoning the use of the building and removing furniture. Plaintiff's decedent was employed by a moving firm which had been hired by the city.
Employed in connection therewith was an elevator which plaintiff claims was not properly safeguarded and maintained. The decedent was assisting in carrying a desk into said elevator at the 6th floor level of the building and was walking backward. He was proceeding toward an opening in the elevator which was not guarded or protected in any way, as it is claimed. There was a space between the elevator floor and the side of the shaft approximately 30 inches in width. Mr. Williams fell from the elevator floor down this shaft and was killed. Suit was brought on the theory that defendant city and the individual defendants were guilty of negligence constituting the proximate cause of the death.
Since Williams stands as the touchstone in determining whether the building exception applies to a particular fact situation, we must evaluate the facts of this case against that standard.
In Williams, there [182 MICHAPP 524] was a dangerous condition in the building's elevator system. In this case, there was a dangerous condition in that the floor of the public building was too slippery to walk on safely. Again, we note that the Supreme Court in Reardon emphasized that the duty to repair and maintain the premises clearly relates to the physical condition of the premises. We believe that it is axiomatic that the physical condition of the premises of a public building includes the physical condition of the building's floor.
In Ray v. Dep't of Social Services, 156 Mich.App. 55, 401 N.W.2d 307 (1986), lv. den. 428 Mich. 891, 403 N.W.2d 811 (1987), this Court held that dirty floors, caused by trash, spilled drinks, and water from a leaking roof, constituted a dangerous condition falling within the public building exception to governmental immunity. Ray, supra, p. 64, 401 N.W.2d 307. Although decided before Reardon, we believe that Ray remains good law and was not...
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