Wade v. North Chicago Police Pension Bd.

Decision Date01 November 2007
Docket NumberNo. 101265.,101265.
PartiesLawrence WADE, Appellant, v. The CITY OF NORTH CHICAGO POLICE PENSION BOARD, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Bernard Wysocki, of Wysocki & Smith, Waukegan, for appellant.

Richard J. Puchalski, Chicago, and Richard J. Reimer, Hinsdale, for appellee.

Stanley H. Jakala, Berwyn, for amicus curiae Police Benevolent & Protective Association of Illinois.

Joseph Crimmins, Hoffman Estates, for amicus curiae Hoffman Estates Police Pension Fund.

James L. Dobrovolny, Urbana, for amicus curiae Illinois Public Pension Fund Association.

OPINION

Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Plaintiff, Lawrence Wade, filed an application for a disability pension with defendant, the City of North Chicago Police Pension Board (Board). At the commencement of plaintiff's hearing before the Board, plaintiff's counsel requested limited consideration for a "duty-related disability pension" only, pursuant to section 3-114.1 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/3-114.1 (West 2002)). Following a hearing, the Board denied plaintiff a line-of-duty disability pension on three independent bases, concluding that plaintiff "did not incur a disability from the performance of an act of duty," his "condition does not render it necessary for his suspension or retirement from police service," and "three doctors selected by the pension board did not certify the Applicant as disabled," after conducting examinations of plaintiff pursuant to section 3-115 of the Code (40 ILCS 5/3-115 (West 2002)). Plaintiff thereafter filed an action for administrative review in the circuit court of Lake County, and the circuit court ultimately confirmed the Board's decision. Plaintiff then appealed to the appellate court, arguing that (1) the Board had denied him a fair and impartial hearing because it had relied solely on the medical report of one physician (Dr. James Milgram) in denying him a disability pension; (2) the Board's decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) the Board improperly interpreted section 3-115 of the Code to mandate that all three examining physicians selected by the Board certify the applicant disabled as a prerequisite to a disability award. The appellate court initially found that the Board had correctly interpreted section 3-115 and had properly denied plaintiff's application for disability pension benefits on that basis alone. Thus, the appellate court did not reach the other issues raised by plaintiff.

Plaintiff thereafter petitioned this court for leave to appeal. In conjunction with a denial of leave to appeal, we issued a supervisory order, directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment in Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 353 Ill.App.3d 852, 289 Ill.Dec. 411, 819 N.E.2d 1211 (2004), and remanding to that court, in light of Turcol v. Pension Board of Trustees of Matteson Police Pension Fund, 214 Ill.2d 521, 293 Ill.Dec. 307, 828 N.E.2d 277 (2005), "to resolve the issue of whether the Board's determination that plaintiff had not proven his disability was against the manifest weight of the evidence." See Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 215 Ill.2d 620, 293 Ill.Dec. 312, 828 N.E.2d 282 (2005) (supervisory order). On remand, the appellate court found that the Board's determination was indeed against the manifest weight of the evidence; however, the appellate court adhered to its earlier interpretation of section 3-115, and again upheld the denial of disability benefits on that basis. 359 Ill.App.3d 224, 295 Ill.Dec. 594, 833 N.E.2d 427. We granted plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315(a).

If the appellate court is correct in holding that the Board's determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence, then the question of section 3-115's proper interpretation is squarely before us; if the appellate court is incorrect, we need not address the interpretational issue. Therefore, we first consider whether the Board's decision on disability was in fact against the manifest weight of the evidence. To that end, we set forth a summary of the evidence bearing upon that issue, consisting of plaintiff's testimony before the Board, his medical records, and the reports of examining physicians selected by the Board.

Plaintiff testified he was working "full duty" as a patrolman for the City of North Chicago on April 20, 2002, when he responded to the scene of an arrest to assist other officers in transporting an arrestee. As plaintiff was bringing the handcuffed prisoner from the scene of the arrest and down a steep, rocky embankment, the prisoner stumbled and began to fall. Plaintiff tried to keep the arrestee from falling, the two became entangled, and both "tumbled" to the bottom of the hill. Plaintiff testified when he stood up he felt pain in his right knee immediately. When he got back to the police station, he noticed, in addition to the pain, "some slight bruising" of the knee and swelling. From the police station, he was taken to the hospital, where an X-ray was taken, an immobilizer was applied to his leg, and he was given crutches.

Plaintiff was subsequently seen by Dr. Christ Pavlatos, who ordered magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of plaintiff's knee. According to plaintiff, Pavlatos later told him the MRI had revealed two tears of the "inner and outer portion" of the right knee and, consequently, surgery would be required. Surgery was in fact performed, and plaintiff thereafter underwent eight weeks of physical therapy. Plaintiff recalled that, at some point during his postoperative recovery, "[t]here was some swelling and some fluid built up on the knee again." In response, his doctor drained fluid from the knee and on two occasions administered cortizone injections. Plaintiff testified that, after his May 2002 knee surgery, he worked in a sedentary capacity for the City of North Chicago until February of 2003. Plaintiff stated: "At that point I had my knee drained for the second time, another 25 CCs of fluid was taken out and two more injections. And at that point my doctor said, `This knee is just not responding and you're just not able to work,' period." Plaintiff never returned to "full duty" as a patrolman.

Plaintiff testified, as of the time of the June 19, 2003, hearing, pursuant to doctors' orders, he was restricted to "a permanent sedentary type of work situation, a sit-down job." No doctor had released him to go back to work as a patrolman. Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of a letter, dated September 23, 2002, from the deputy chief of operations for the City of North Chicago, advising him that the City of North Chicago did not have a permanent sedentary position for a police officer, and informing him he had two options: retire or apply for a disability pension. He obviously chose the latter course.

At the hearing, plaintiff testified that he experiences pain just walking. He rated his pain as 7 on a 10-point scale. He said his knee is weak and sometimes locks or buckles. He stated he sometimes experiences a grinding sensation in the knee. He claimed he "could only sit for about 20 minutes, stand for about 25 to 30 minutes, and walk for about 25 minutes," before he had pain in the knee. Plaintiff reiterated that he was working "full duty" prior to the April 2002 injury.

Plaintiff acknowledged preexisting problems with his knee in the fall of 2001, noting "the pain, the discomfort, the problems getting in and out" of his squad car. He stated he saw Dr. Pavlatos for that condition on December 27, 2001. Plaintiff said he could not recall missing work for any reason between that office visit and his April 2002 injury.

The Board had before it plaintiff's rather extensive medical records, most notably those evincing plaintiff's medical treatment with Dr. Roger Collins. An early entry in that file, dated July 30, 1992, indicates that plaintiff reported a 1989 injury to his right knee, sustained while playing football. According to plaintiff, the knee became painful and later became swollen. Also in that entry, plaintiff reported knee pain after participating in basketball games in November of 1991. With respect to his 1992 knee complaints, the file indicates that plaintiff reported pain in both knees "with prolonged sitting." He stated the first few steps after prolonged sitting might be "quite painful." At that time, he informed Dr. Collins that he had not experienced locking of the knees, but he had occasionally had bilateral buckling since 1989. He said he also occasionally had pain in the knees during sleep. X-rays taken in 1992 revealed "scant early degenerative changes" in plaintiff's knees.

The next entry in Dr. Collins' records is dated August 5, 1997. According to Collins' file, plaintiff was seen on that date for an evaluation of his right knee. Plaintiff stated he had been running bases when he felt a "pop" in his right knee accompanied by immediate pain. The entry notes:

"He recalls that he injured his knee in the past when he was about 27 years of age. He was playing football. He was on the ground and another player fell on his knees causing him to go into hyper-extension. He developed immediate swelling."

Plaintiff reported having had problems with his knees for a number of years. Some symptoms were similar to those mentioned in the 1992 entry, such as pain and stiffness after sitting. Collins noted swelling of the right knee on the date of examination. After further assessment, Collins discussed the risks and benefits associated with surgery.

Plaintiff opted for surgery. Postoperative file entries dated August 19, August 25, and September 27, 1997, indicate, at the time of surgery, a "Grade II chondromalacia or thinning on the weight-bearing surface of the medial and lateral femoral condyles" was noted. Plaintiff was found to have "torn medial and lateral menisci" and "a defect on the patellofemoral...

To continue reading

Request your trial
225 cases
  • White v. Ill. State Police
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • August 28, 2020
    ......Signed August 28, 2020 482 F.Supp.3d 756 Gregory Abbott Bedell, Chicago, IL, David G. Sigale, Law Firm of David G. Sigale, P.C., Glen Ellyn, IL, ...924, 917 N.E.2d 999, 234 Ill. 2d 446, 465 (Ill. 2009), & Wade v. City of North Chicago , 315 Ill.Dec. 772, 877 N.E.2d 1101, 226 Ill. ......
  • Hayashi v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulation, s. 116023
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • October 17, 2014
    ...is that it applies only to convictions occurring after the statute's enactment. See Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill.2d 485, 511, 315 Ill.Dec. 772, 877 N.E.2d 1101 (2007) (an ambiguous statute is one which is “ ‘capable of being understood by reasonably well-infor......
  • American Airlines Inc. v. The Dep't Of Revenue
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • July 20, 2010
    ...decision of the administrative agency, not the determination of the circuit court. Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill.2d 485, 504, 315 Ill.Dec. 772, 877 N.E.2d 1101, 1112 (2007). In reviewing the decision of the administrative agency, “ ‘[t]he applicable standard of......
  • Dunlap v. Village of Schaumburg, 1-08-1358.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 25, 2009
    ......Chicago, IL, for Appellees. .         Justice JOSEPH ... Pittsburgh S.S., 171 F.2d at 179; cf. Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill.2d ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT