Wade v. State

Decision Date11 September 2013
Docket NumberNo. PD–1710–12.,PD–1710–12.
Citation422 S.W.3d 661
PartiesChristopher James WADE, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Charles W. McDonald, Waco, TX, for Appellant.

Alex J. Bell, Assistant District Attorney, Waco, TX, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, TX, for the State.

OPINION

COCHRAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., and PRICE, WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY, and ALCALA, J., joined.

The Supreme Court has consistently held that a person's refusal to cooperate with a police request during a consensual encounter cannot, by itself, provide the basis for a detention or Terry frisk.1 Because appellant's refusal to cooperate was accompanied only by his extreme nervousness and a game warden's hunch he was up to no good, the warden's stop-and-frisk of appellant violated the Fourth Amendment. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals that had upheld the stop-and-frisk.2

I.

Appellant, Christopher James Wade, is an electrician who was spending his lunch hour sitting in his work truck in the near-empty parking lot of the Flat Rock public boat ramp off Lake Waco in China Spring, Texas. It was mid-May in Texas, so he had his truck engine running.

Jason Campbell and James Ranft—game wardens for the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department—pulled up their boat to the ramp right around lunchtime to investigate fishing violations. Warden Campbell got out and approached appellant's truck. He had noticed its engine was running and “wanted to make sure the occupant was okay.” 3 He also thought that the truck was “out of place” and “suspicious” because he did not see a boat or any fishing equipment. Instead, the truck had a large box trailer attached with “Wade Electric” printed on the sides. Warden Campbell said that he would not classify the boat ramp area as a “high crime area,” but he had made some narcotics arrests there and had issued numerous citations for fishing and boating violations.

Appellant rolled his window down, and Warden Campbell asked him if he was okay. Appellant said he was eating lunch, but the warden thought that was a lie because he did not see any “evidence”—food, wrappers, or a cooler—of a lunch. There was “nothing of the kind that would have supported that claim.” When asked, appellant said that he lived “nearby,” but his license, turned over on request, showed that he lived some fifteen miles away in Elm Mott, rather than China Spring, so the warden figured that was a lie, too.4 Appellant explained that he was “looking at purchasing a house close to the boat ramp.” Warden Campbell considered this a third lie. And appellant was overly nervous. Warden Campbell explained that he felt concerned for his safety.

From the onset of the contact, I noticed that his—demeanor was—was one of nervousness. At the point when his story changed about the third time, I asked him if he had any weapons or anything that I should be aware of and he replied with, why are you doing this to me. And I thought that was quite a strange response for someone that was just eating their lunch or taking a break. And I asked a second time if he had any weaponsor any contraband on his person that I should know about. And he asked again, why are you doing this. [After he refused to allow a search of his vehicle,] I asked him to step out of the vehicle and explained that I was going to conduct a pat-down for my safety.

As ordered, appellant got out of his truck. Warden Campbell “frisked” him and again asked if there was anything he should know about. Appellant said there was a pipe in the truck. The warden searched the truck and found the pipe and a small amount of methamphetamine. The State filed a felony drug charge, and appellant filed a motion to suppress.

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied appellant's motion. The trial judge held that the actions Warden Campbell observed created an objective and particularized basis for reasonable suspicion that appellant was engaged in criminal activity. Appellant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, was sentenced to one year's confinement in state jail, and appealed the trial judge's ruling on his motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed,5 because Warden Campbell observed three “objective facts” that created a reasonable suspicion that appellant was engaged in criminal activity and posed a threat. First, “Officer Campbell became suspicious when Wade changed his story concerning his reason for being at the boat ramp.” 6 Second, “Wade appeared very nervous.” 7 And third, “Officer Campbell asked Wade two times if he had any weapons, and Wade did not answer the question, instead giving what Officer Campbell considered strange responses.” 8

Appellant's petition for review asks whether a reasonable-suspicion determination that criminal activity and potential danger may be derived—almost wholly—from a citizen's refusal to answer questions about what he has in his truck or to permit a search of his truck.9

II.
A. Standard of Review

When reviewing the ruling on a suppression motion, we afford almost total deference to the trial judge's determination of historical facts—if supported by the record.10 Regardless of whether the judge granted or denied the motion, appellate courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling.11 The prevailing party is afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it.12 We review de novo a trial judge's application of the law of search and seizure to the facts. 13 We will uphold the trial judge's ruling if it is reasonably grounded in the record and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. 14

B. Police–Citizen Interactions

There are three distinct types of police-citizen interactions: (1) consensual encounters that do not implicate the Fourth Amendment; (2) investigative detentions that are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope and duration that must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) arrests, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures, that are reasonable only if supported by probable cause.15 Police officers are as free as any other citizen to approach citizens to ask for information or cooperation.16 Such consensual encounters may be uncomfortable for a citizen, but they are not Fourth Amendment seizures. 17

No bright-line rule governs when a consensual encounter becomes a detention.18 Courts must take into account the totality of the circumstances of the interaction to decide whether a reasonable person would have felt free to ignore the police officer's request or terminate the consensual encounter.19 This is the Mendenhall test.20 If ignoring the request or terminating the encounter is an option, then no Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred. 21 But—as the Supreme Court made clear in California v. Hodari D.22—if an officer through force or a show of authority succeeds in restraining a citizen in his liberty, the encounter is no longer consensual; it is a Fourth Amendment detention or arrest, subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.23 The question of whether the particular facts show that a consensual encounter has evolved into a detention is a legal issue that is reviewed de novo.24

C. Reasonable Suspicion

Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity permits a temporary seizure for questioning that is limited to the reason for the seizure. 25 A police officer has reasonable suspicion for a detention if he has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.26 This is an objective standard that disregards the actual subjective intent of the arresting officer and looks, instead, to whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention.27

The standard also looks to the totality of the circumstances; 28 individual circumstances may seem innocent enough in isolation, but if they combine to reasonably suggest the imminence of criminal conduct, an investigative detention is justified.29 “It is enough to satisfy the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion that the information is sufficiently detailed and reliable— i.e., it supports more than an inarticulate hunch or intuition—to suggest that something of an apparently criminal nature is brewing.” 30 A person's refusal to cooperate with a police request during a consensual encounter cannot, by itself, provide the basis for a detention.31

As with the question of whether a consensual encounter has become a Fourth Amendment detention, the question of whether a certain set of historical facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is reviewed de novo.32

D. Terry Frisk

If an officer is justified in believing that a person whose suspicious behavior he is investigating is armed, he may frisk that person to determine if the suspect is, in fact, carrying a weapon and, if so, to neutralize the threat of physical harm.33 The purpose of a Terry frisk is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.34 But police may not escalate a consensual encounter into a protective frisk without reasonable suspicion that the person (1) has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal offense and (2) is armed and dangerous.35

With that general background, we turn to the facts of this case.

III.

Appellant argues that Warden Campbell did not have reasonable suspicion to order him out of his truck and frisk him because his refusal to answer certain questions was not a legitimate basis for a detention or pat-down. We conclude that the courts below misapplied Terry in allowing appellant's action of standing on his rights to serve as the tipping point in the reasonable-suspicion calculus.

A. The consensual encounter escalated into a detention when Warden Campbell...

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