Wade v. Stigdon
| Decision Date | 10 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:18-cv-02475-TWP-DLP |
| Citation | 506 F.Supp.3d 582 |
| Parties | Harry Kevin WADE, Plaintiff, v. Terry STIGDON in Her Official Capacity as Director of the Indiana Department of Child Services, Kelly McSween, Kristine Killen, David Reed, Heidi Decker, Sarah Sparks, Jacob May, and Terry J. Stigdon, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Mark R. Waterfill, Attorney at Law, Plainfield, IN, for Plaintiff.
Benjamin C. Ellis, Cameron S. Huffman, Jordan Michael Stover, Joshua Robert Lowry, Kelly Cochran, Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants Terry Stigdon, Kelly McSween, Kristine Killen, David Reed, Heidi Decker, Sarah Sparks, Jacob May.
Benjamin C. Ellis, Jordan Michael Stover, Joshua Robert Lowry, Kelly Cochran, Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant Terry J. Stigdon.
ENTRY ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 by Plaintiff Harry Kevin Wade ("Wade") (Filing No. 119 ) and Defendants Terry Stigdon ("Stigdon") (in both her official capacity as Director of the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS") and her personal capacity), Kelly McSween, Kristine Killen, David Reed, Heidi Decker, Sarah Sparks, and Jacob May (Filing No. 122 ) (collectively, the "Defendants"). Wade initiated this action alleging the Defendants retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights. For the reasons that follow, Wade's Motion is denied and the Defendants’ Cross-Motion is granted .
In late 2017 or early 2018, DCS opened a case into the potential abuse or neglect of K.L., a transgender child (Filing No. 122-2 at 2 ). DCS assigned Family Case Manager Kelly McSween ("McSween") to the case, who determined that Family Centered Therapy ("FCT") would be an appropriate service for K.L. and his family. Id. To administer FCT, DCS referred the case to Lifeline Youth and Family Services, Inc. ("Lifeline"), id. , a non-governmental entity contracted to provide therapeutic services to children and families.
The contract between DCS and Lifeline permits Lifeline to either accept or decline a referral based on whether it has adequate or appropriate staff to handle the referral and specifies that Lifeline will provide services according to the most current versions of DCS's various service standards (Filing No. 122-5 at 4 ). In an Assurances document memorializing this agreement, Lifeline agreed, pertinent here, that it would provide "a culturally competent, safe, and supportive environment for" lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or questioning ("LGBTQ") youth and maintain sensitivity "to the sexual and/or gender orientation of" all family members, including "children/youth." (Filing No. 122-6 at 3.) Further, a DCS LGBTQ Practice Guidebook linked in the Assurances document instructed that "it is vital that social services staff ensure all placements and services are safe and supportive" and that "[i]t is the expectation that providers and staff treat all individuals and families respectfully and non-judgmentally, irrespective of one's personal views of sexual orientation and/or gender identity." Id. ; Filing No. 122-1 at 3–4. Contractually, if DCS became "dissatisfied with the work product of or the working relationship with [an employee] assigned to work on [the] contract and/or those individuals assigned to provide any of the services pursuant to [the] contract, [DCS] may request in writing the replacement of any or all such individuals, and the Contractor shall grant such request." (Filing No. 122-5 at 36–37.)
Lifeline, in accordance with this arrangement, accepted the referral and assigned K.L.’s case to its employee Wade (Filing No. 122-2 at 2 ). Wade—who, in addition to serving as a licensed counselor trained in FCT, is a Christian minister—expressed concern about his ability to counsel the family because of his religious beliefs. Id. In particular, Wade told McSween that he did not "understand" transgender individuals, that he did not agree with the transgender "lifestyle," and that he would find it difficult to provide services to the family without expressing these personal views to them. Id. But Wade did not refuse to provide counseling services to K.L. and his family (Filing No. 120-3 at 5 ).
McSween informed her supervisor Sarah Sutton ("Sutton") about this conversation; who, in turn, told DCS Local Office Manager for Vigo County Heidi Decker ("Decker"). (Filing No. 122-3 at 2, 3.) Under these circumstances, McSween, Sutton, and Decker decided it would not be appropriate for Wade to provide services to K.L. and his family (Filing No. 122-3 at 3.) Following this decision, Decker asked Sutton to inform Kristina Killen ("Killen"), the DCS Child Welfare Services Manager and Regional Service Coordinator for Vigo County, about the conversation between McSween and Wade. Id. Decker had no further involvement in any decisions regarding Wade. Id. at 3.
After hearing about the conversation, Killen—who was charged with addressing issues arising with outside providers within the relevant geographic region—emailed Lifeline about the situation (Filing No. 122-7 ). Killen explained that while Wade said he was willing to "give it chance," and work with the family, the local DCS office did not feel it would be appropriate as the potential harm to the child was too great. Id. ; (Filing No. 120-4 at 4 ). On approximately January 22, 2018, Killen contacted her direct supervisor Sarah Sparks ("Sparks") and Sparks’ direct supervisor David Reed, the Deputy Director of Child Welfare Services ("Reed") (Filing No. 122-1 at 7 ). Thereafter, Killen, Sparks, and Reed consulted with DCS's legal counsel and concluded that under the contract between DCS and Lifeline, Wade should no longer provide services to certain DCS clients because he could not counsel transgender clients without expressing his personal views or allowing those views to interfere with his therapy. Id. at 7–8. Specifically, they determined that Wade's view directly conflicted with the contract DCS maintains with Lifeline, which states that "service providers will provide a culturally competent, safe, and supportive environment for all youth regardless of sexual orientation." (See Filing No. 122-6 at 3.) Killen called Lifeline with this news on January 24, 2018 (Filing No. 120-5 at 6 ), and that same day, Lifeline informed her over email that it no longer employed Wade (Filing No. 122-1 at 8 ). The next day, DCS sent Lifeline a letter drafted by staff attorney Jacob May ("May") indicating that it was prohibiting Wade from counseling its clients and directing any inquiries to Reed (Filing No. 122-8 ). On January 26, 2018, Lifeline sent DCS a letter stating that Wade was no longer employed by the company (Filing No. 120-5 at 6 ).
Following his termination. Wade sued the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing, relevant to this Entry, that they retaliated against him for exercising his protected First Amendment rights (Filing No. 87 at 5–6).
The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, Inc. , 476 F.3d 487, 489–90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews "the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante v. DeLuca , 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "However, inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion." Dorsey v. Morgan Stanley , 507 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial." Hemsworth , 476 F.3d at 490 (citation omitted). "The opposing party cannot meet this burden with conclusory statements or speculation but only with appropriate citations to relevant admissible evidence." Sink v. Knox County Hosp. , 900 F. Supp. 1065, 1072 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citations omitted).
"In much the same way that a court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment, nor is it permitted to conduct a paper trial on the merits of [the] claim." Ritchie v. Glidden Co. , 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). "[N]either the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc. , 129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
These same standards apply even when each side files a motion for summary judgment. The existence of cross-motions for summary judgment does not imply that there are no genuine issues of material fact. R.J. Corman Derailment Serv., LLC v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs. , 335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). The process of taking the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, first for one side and then for the other, may reveal that neither side has enough to prevail without a trial. Id. at 648. "Wit...
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