Wadhams Oil Co. v. State

Decision Date07 February 1933
Citation246 N.W. 687,210 Wis. 448
PartiesWADHAMS OIL CO. v. STATE.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

On motion for rehearing.

Motion denied.--[By Editorial Staff.]

For original opinion, see 245 N. W. 646.Fish, Marshutz & Hoffman, of Milwaukee (I. A. Fish, J. H. Marshutz, and W. H. Voss, all of Milwaukee, of counsel), for plaintiff.

John W. Reynolds, Atty. Gen., and Herbert H. Naujoks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

H. H. Thomas and Olin & Butler, all of Madison, amici curiæ.

PER CURIAM.

Upon a motion for rehearing, the defendant seeks a reversal of the decision so far as it holds that gasoline filling stations are not included in the definition of chain store business. The argument runs thus: Gasoline is within the classification of goods, wares, or merchandise. Gasoline is kept for sale at retail at a filling station. A filling station being a place where goods, wares, or merchandise are kept for sale at retail, it is a store or mercantile establishment. Therefore, if any person, firm, corporation, or association owns and operates two or more filling stations, they are engaged in the business of operating and maintaining two or more stores or mercantile establishments where goods, wares, or merchandise are sold or offered for sale at retail. There is also a lengthy argument with respect to the intent of the Legislature.

There is no difficulty in discovering the intent of the Legislature. That is made plain by section 5(2) of chapter 29, Laws of Special Session 1931. The Legislature intended to require a license fee from every person, firm, corporation, or association engaged in the chain store business. Section 5(1) defines what in the mind of the Legislature amounted to a chain store as follows: “Every person, firm, corporation or association engaged in the business of operating or maintaining in this state under the same general management, supervision and ownership two or more stores or mercantile establishments where goods, wares or merchandise are sold or offered for sale at retail shall for the purposes of this section be deemed to be engaged in the chain store business.”

The question is not what the Legislature intended, but what did it mean when it used the language quoted. If the Legislature had intended to be all-inclusive, other appropriate language might have been used. In the definition, it might have said, instead of a store or mercantile establishment “a place,” and inserted after the word “merchandise” the words “of any kind,” and phrased the statute as follows: “Every person, firm, corporation or association engaged in the business of operating or maintaining in this state under the same general management, supervision and ownership two or more places where goods, wares or merchandise of any kind are sold or offered for sale at retail shall for the purposes of this section be deemed to be engaged in the chain store business.”

So phrased, the statute would have included filling stations and many other establishments not within the terms of the act as we shall see.

The case is argued here as if the court had invented some rule of construction. The Legislature itself has established rules for the construction of statutes (chapter 370). The first rule laid down, section 370.01(1) is as follows: “All words and phrases shall be construed and understood...

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13 cases
  • Standard Oil Co. v. Fox
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
    • March 1, 1934
    ...to on re-hearing) it has been decided in the negative in Wisconsin (Wadhams Oil Co. v. Wisconsin, 210 Wis. 448, 245 N. W. 646, 649, 246 N. W. 687). In the former case the decision is based almost entirely on the ground that the word "store" in its dictionary sense is literally broad enough ......
  • J. C. Penney Company v. Diefendorf
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • April 28, 1934
    ...Stores v. South Carolina Tax Com., (S. C.) 55 F.2d 931; Wadhams Oil Co. v. State, 210 Wis. 448, 245 N.W. 646, (on rehearing) 210 Wis. 457, 246 N.W. 687.) provisions of section 5-A of said act providing for an offset of the amount paid in real estate taxes are not in violation of any constit......
  • FOX V. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • January 14, 1935
    ...be likely to think of a filling station as within the range of the inquiry.{1} Wadhams Oil Co. v. State, 210 Wis. 448, 245 N.W. 646, 649, 246 N.W. 687. There might be force in this suggestion if the statute had left the meaning of its terms to the test of popular understanding. Instead, it ......
  • National Amusement Co. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • January 7, 1969
    ...Plymouth v. Elsner (1965), 28 Wis.2d 102, 106, 135 N.W.2d 799, 802; and Wadhams Oil Co. v. State (1933), 210 Wis. 448, 459, 245 N.W. 646, 246 N.W. 687. Considering these two basic rules of construction, it would appear that a party objecting to the tax assessment can escape its imposition b......
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