Wadle v. State
| Citation | 120 N.E.3d 253 |
| Decision Date | 28 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1465 |
| Parties | Jordan B. WADLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Attorney for Appellant: Cara Schaefer Wieneke, Wieneke Law Office, LLC, Brooklyn, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Caroline G. Templeton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Following a jury trial in Fayette Superior Court, Jordan B. Wadle ("Wadle") was convicted of Level 3 felony leaving the scene of an accident, Level 5 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated ("OWI") causing serious bodily injury, Level 6 felony OWI endangering a person, and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent ("ACE") of 0.08 or more.1 On appeal, Wadle contends that his convictions for leaving the scene of an accident and driving while intoxicated constitute impermissible double jeopardy.
[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
[3] On November 12, 2015, the victim in this case, Charles Woodward ("Charles") and his wife Nancy went to a bar in Connersville, Indiana with Charles's brother Ed and Ed's wife Nisa. While Nisa spoke with a friend at the bar, Wadle smacked her back. When Nisa objected, Wadle stated that the next time he smacked Nisa, he would smack her "lower," apparently referring to her buttocks. Tr. Vol. I, p. 114. Nisa responded that her husband Ed would not like it if Wadle smacked her bottom, which prompted Wadle to state that he was not afraid of Nisa's husband and would beat him up. At some point thereafter, Nisa informed Ed of Wadle's behavior and comments. Ed went outside to the parking lot to confront Wadle as Wadle prepared to leave. Charles, seeing that his brother was upset, followed Ed outside.
[4] When Charles went outside, he saw Ed standing near a group of people that included a now-shirtless Wadle. Neither Charles nor anyone else struck Wadle, but Wadle attacked Charles by hitting and kicking him. Wadle then got into his car and began to back his car out of the parking lot, driving in reverse through the group of people that had gathered. Wadle then drove his car at Charles, who had turned to re-enter the bar. Wadle struck Charles with his car, knocking him to the ground. Charles attempted to get back up, but Wadle struck him again, knocking him underneath the guardrail near the outside wall of the bar. Wadle drove away, and Ed telephoned 911.
[5] Local police then began to look for Wadle and soon spotted him a few miles outside of Connersville. The police initiated a traffic stop and noted the smell of alcohol coming from Wadle. They also noticed that he had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and was unsteady on his feet. The police took Wadle to a hospital for a blood draw, which revealed that Wadle's blood alcohol level was 0.14.
[6] As a result of being hit by Wadle's car, Charles suffered serious injuries. His skull was fractured
, and he had bleeding on the brain. Charles had to undergo surgery that involved the removal of a portion of his skull and the insertion of a metal plate. He also sustained broken ribs, which necessitated two surgeries. Charles was placed in an induced coma and spent a total of sixty days in the hospital and twenty-one additional days at a rehabilitation center.
[7] On November 16, 2015, the State charged Wadle with Count I, Level 3 felony aggravated battery; Count II, Level 3 felony leaving the scene of an accident; Count III, Level 6 felony OWI causing serious bodily injury; Count IV, Class A misdemeanor OWI endangering a person; and Count V, Class A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more. On March 1, 2018, the State filed amendments to the charging information alleging that Wadle had a previous conviction for OWI, thereby elevating Count III to a Level 5 felony and Count IV to a Level 6 felony. The State also amended Count V to allege that Wadle committed Class C misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle with an ACE of 0.08 or more but also filed a Part II to this count, elevating the charge to a Level 6 felony based on the prior conviction.
[8] A bifurcated jury trial took place on March 12–13, 2018. At the conclusion of the first phase of the trial, the jury acquitted Wadle on Count I, but found him guilty on the remaining counts. Specifically, the jury found Wadle guilty on Count II as a Level 3 felony, Count III as a Level 6 felony, Count IV as a Class A misdemeanor, and Count V as a Class C misdemeanor. In the second phase of the trial, Wadle admitted that he had a prior conviction for OWI and pleaded guilty to the enhancements of the charges that were based on his prior conviction.
[9] On May 16, 2018, the trial court sentenced Wadle as follows: Count II, sixteen years, with two years suspended to probation; Count III, six years, with two years suspended to probation; Count IV, two and one-half years, with two years suspended to probation; and Count V, one year.2 The court ordered all sentences to be served concurrently. Wadle now appeals.
[10] Wadle claims that his convictions for OWI and leaving the scene of an accident constitute impermissible double jeopardy under the Indiana Constitution. Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense." In Richardson v. State , 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999), our supreme court held that "two or more offenses are the ‘same offense’ in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense." (emphases in original).
[11] Wadle admits that his convictions do not amount to double jeopardy under the "statutory elements" test but contends that his convictions do amount to double jeopardy under the Richardson "actual evidence" test. Under the actual evidence test, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish all the essential elements of a second challenged offense. Singh v. State , 40 N.E.3d 981, 986 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied , (citing Richardson , 717 N.E.2d at 53 ). The term "reasonable possibility" "turns on a practical assessment of whether the jury may have latched on to exactly the same facts for both convictions." Id. (citing Spivey v. State , 761 N.E.2d 831, 832 (Ind. 2002) ). The actual evidence test "is not violated when the evidentiary facts establishing the essential elements of one offense also establish only one or even several, but not all, of the essential elements of a second offense." Spivey , 761 N.E.2d at 833.
[12] Application of the actual evidence test requires us to identify the essential elements of each of the challenged crimes and to evaluate the evidence from the jury's perspective. Singh , 40 N.E.3d at 986 (citing Lee v. State , 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (Ind. 2008) ). "[A] ‘reasonable possibility’ that the jury used the same facts to reach two convictions requires substantially more than a logical possibility." Garrett v. State , 992 N.E.2d 710, 719 (Ind. 2013) (citing Lee , 892 N.E.2d at 1236 ). Accordingly, when reviewing a claim under the actual evidence test, we consider the essential elements of the offenses, the charging information, the jury instructions, the evidence, and the arguments of counsel. Id. at 720 ; Singh , 40 N.E.3d at 986 (both citing Lee , 892 N.E.2d at 1234 ).
[13] In the present case, Wadle was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident. Pursuant to the controlling statute, a driver involved in an accident must generally remain at the scene or as close as possible to the scene of the accident until the operator gives his or her name, address, and registration number of the vehicle and exhibits his or her driver's license to any other person involved in the accident. Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1.1(a)(1), (2). In addition, if the accident results in injury to another person, the operator shall also provide reasonable assistance to the injured person, as directed by law enforcement or medical personnel and give notice, or ensure that someone else gives notice, as soon as possible after the accident to local police, sheriff's department, state police, or 911 operators. Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1.1(a)(3). A person who knowingly or intentionally fails to comply with these requirements commits a Class B misdemeanor. Id. at § 1.1(b). However, the offense is "a Level 3 felony if the operator knowingly or intentionally fails to stop or comply with subsection (a) during or after the commission of the offense of operating while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury .... " Id. at § 1.1(b)(4) (emphasis added).
[14] Here, pursuant to this statute, Wadle's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident was elevated to a Level 3 felony because he fled the scene of an accident after having committed the offense of OWI causing serious bodily injury. He was also convicted of OWI causing serious bodily injury. This, Wadle claims, violated the actual evidence test. Specifically, Wadle argues that when applying the actual evidence test in cases where a base offense has been elevated, "one must view the elevation of a felony from its base level almost as if the elevation itself were a separate offense under the actual evidence test, such that its essential elements cannot be established by the same evidence used to establish another offense's essential elements." Appellant's Br. at 14. In other words, Wadle argues that if the evidentiary facts supporting the elevation also establish all of the elements of another crime, both convictions cannot stand.
[15] There is support for...
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