Wadsworth v. State
| Decision Date | 17 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-602,94-602 |
| Citation | 275 Mont. 287,911 P.2d 1165 |
| Parties | , 11 IER Cases 861 Shannon L. WADSWORTH, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE of Montana and its Department of Revenue, Defendant and Appellant. . Heard |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Dennis McCafferty, James, Gray & McCafferty, Great Falls (argued), for Appellant.
Kenneth R. Olson, Great Falls (argued), for Respondent.
The State of Montana (State) and its Department of Revenue (DOR) appeal from the final judgment entered by the Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, following a jury trial finding that Shannon Wadsworth (Wadsworth) was wrongfully terminated from his employment with DOR; finding said wrongful termination was the proximate cause of the damages suffered by Wadsworth; and awarding Wadsworth $85,000 in damages. We affirm.
The following are issues on appeal:
1. Did the District Court err in not granting the State's motion for summary judgment based on Wadsworth's failure to appeal his petition for judicial review?
2. Does Wadsworth have a fundamental constitutional right to the opportunity to pursue employment and, if so, did the State provide a compelling interest for infringing upon that right?
3. Did the District Court err in allowing irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of treatment which Wadsworth claimed he received prior to the termination of his employment?
4. Did the District Court err in allowing irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of treatment which other DOR employees claimed they received from DOR?
5. Did the District Court err in allowing improper opinion, speculation, and legal conclusion testimony?
Wadsworth began working as a real estate appraiser for DOR in 1974. On September 14, 1981, DOR enacted conflict-of-interest rule 81-2 precluding DOR appraisers from engaging in independent fee appraisals, real estate sales, or brokerage activities during their off-duty hours. Conflict-of-interest rule 81-2 provides:
The very nature of this Division's work requires that our employees attain a high level of credibility and objectivity as viewed by the taxpaying public. When situations arise, such as conflicts of interest, that jeopardize either requirement, the integrity of the Department as well as the respective appraisal and assessor offices is detrimentally affected. Examples of conflicts of interest include, but are not limited to, fee appraising, selling real estate (excluding the sale of one's personal residence or property), and operating or working for a real estate firm.
In such undertakings, the actual risk of and/or appearance of impropriety that occurs cannot be tolerated. Engaging in such activities will bring about immediate disciplinary action and may result in termination.
In December of 1981, Wadsworth received a letter informing him of the conflict-of-interest rule. He filed a grievance claiming that the rule is discriminatory, unfair, and unconstitutional.
The DOR Grievance Committee concluded that the rule was "unreasonable and unnecessary." However, on July 27, 1982, the Director of DOR, Ellen Feaver, rejected the Grievance Committee's recommendation and found the policy statement to be rational and reasonable and thus sustained the rule's application. Wadsworth petitioned the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, to review Ellen Feaver's decision and requested the court enter an order stating that DOR's policy statement in rule 81-2 is unnecessary, unreasonable, and an arbitrary exercise of police power by DOR.
On October 20, 1986, the District Court ordered a new grievance hearing to be held because the tapes from the initial hearing were missing. DOR subsequently held another grievance hearing and submitted its recommendation to uphold the policy statement. The Director of DOR, Jon LaFaver, adopted the Grievance Committee's recommendation as DOR's final decision.
In its final decision, DOR denied Wadsworth's grievance and gave Wadsworth 30 days to divest himself of all interests in fee appraising, selling real estate, or operating or working for a real estate firm, and that engaging in such activities would result in disciplinary action and possible termination. The State then moved to dismiss Wadsworth's petition for judicial review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court granted the State's motion and dismissed Wadsworth's petition for judicial review. Wadsworth did not appeal from this order.
In March of 1989, DOR directed Wadsworth to comply with the conflict-of-interest rule within 30 days. Wadsworth commenced a new grievance with DOR complaining of disciplinary action directed at him for violating the conflict-of-interest rule. The hearing examiner found that Wadsworth had to divest himself of his private fee appraisal business or face discharge. In a letter dated November 27, 1989, the Director of DOR adopted a final decision wherein he accepted the decision of the hearing officer, confirmed the policy statement in rule 81-2, sustained Wadsworth's 9-day suspension without pay, and indicated that Wadsworth had 30 days to divest himself of his interests in fee appraising and selling real estate. On February 16, 1990, DOR terminated Wadsworth from his employment for refusing to give up his outside employment activities.
In November of 1990, Wadsworth filed a wrongful discharge suit in the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County. The State moved for summary judgment arguing that as a matter of law, Wadsworth's termination was not wrongful and Wadsworth's contention that DOR's conflict-of-interest rule is contrary to the United States and Montana Constitutions was barred by his failure to appeal the dismissal of his petition for judicial review. The District Court denied the State's motion for summary judgment. The State then filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence regarding DOR's treatment of Wadsworth prior to his termination. The District Court again denied the State's motion and the case proceeded to trial. The State moved to dismiss Wadsworth's wrongful termination claim as a matter of law at the close of Wadsworth's case and renewed the motion at the close of the evidence. The District Court In submitting the case to the jury, the District Judge included instructions on fundamental rights and that fundamental rights may not be infringed by the State without a showing of a compelling state interest. The jury rendered a verdict in Wadsworth's favor awarding him $85,000 in damages. DOR appeals the final judgment rendered following the jury trial.
denied the State's motions and submitted the case to the jury.
1. Did the District Court err in not granting the State's motion for summary judgment based on Wadsworth's failure to appeal his petition for judicial review?
The State argues that the District Court erred in not dismissing as a matter of law, Wadsworth's claim that his employment was wrongfully terminated. The State claims that Wadsworth raised his constitutional arguments when he challenged the application of the conflict-of-interest rule in his petition for judicial review and therefore the doctrine of res judicata bars him from raising them again in this matter. Conversely, Wadsworth argues that he brought the instant case under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDFEA) and thus raises a different subject matter and different issues from those in his petition for judicial review. We review a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Mead v. M.S.B., Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 465, 470, 872 P.2d 782, 785.
The State relies on our decision in Matter of Estate of Pegg (1984), 209 Mont. 71, 680 P.2d 316, as the sole authority for its argument. In Estate of Pegg, Walter Pegg was killed in a helicopter crash and died intestate. Pegg's third wife, Virginia, sought appointment as the personal representative of his estate. Pegg's ex-wives filed petitions requesting that Virginia be removed as personal representative of Pegg's estate. The District Court concluded that there was no evidence to support removal of Virginia as personal representative and denied the petitions. The ex-wives again filed a petition for removal of Virginia as personal representative asserting new grounds for the removal. Estate of Pegg, 680 P.2d at 317-318. The district court orally denied these petitions. We held that the district court's first order refusing to revoke Virginia's status as administrator of Pegg's estate was final and therefore appealable. The second petitions merely raised new grounds for removal and "had all the appearances of unjustified delaying tactic." Therefore, we did not reach the merits of the arguments in support of removing Virginia as personal representative. Estate of Pegg, 680 P.2d at 320.
In the recent case, City of Bozeman v. AIU Ins. Company (1995), 272 Mont. 349, 900 P.2d 929, we discussed the doctrine of res judicata more thoroughly. The doctrine of res judicata includes the following four elements:
(1) the subject matter of each action must be the same;
(2) the parties or their privies of each action must be the same;
(3) the issues must be the same and relate to the same subject matter;
(4) the capacities of the persons must be the same and relate to the same subject matter and the issues between them.
City of Bozeman, 900 P.2d at 932 (citing State ex rel. Harlem Irr. Dist. v. Judicial Dist. Court (1995), 271 Mont. 129, 894 P.2d 943.)
Wadsworth's present action does not meet the four criteria set forth in City of Bozeman. Wadsworth's WDFEA claim involves a different subject matter from his petition for judicial review, different issues from his petition for judicial review, and the capacities of the parties had...
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