Waeschle v. Dragovic
| Decision Date | 14 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-2228.,08-2228. |
| Citation | 576 F.3d 539 |
| Parties | Karen WAESCHLE, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ljubisa J. DRAGOVIC, individually and in his official capacity as Medical Examiner of Oakland County, Michigan, and Oakland County, Michigan, a municipal corporation, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
William H. Horton, Giarmarco, Mullins & Horton, P.C., Troy, Michigan, for Appellants. Patrick J. Perotti, Dworken Bernstein Co., LPA, Painesville, Ohio, for Appellee. Steven M. Jentzen, Steven M. Jentzen, P.C., Ypsilanti, Michigan, for Amici Curiae.
ON BRIEF:
William H. Horton, Elizabeth A. Favaro, Giarmarco, Mullins & Horton, P.C., Troy, Michigan, Keith J. Lerminiaux, Oakland County Corporation Counsel, Pontiac, Michigan, for Appellants. Patrick J. Perotti, Dworken Bernstein Co., LPA, Painesville, Ohio, John Henry Metz, Law Office, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. Steven M. Jentzen, Steven M. Jentzen, P.C., Ypsilanti, Michigan, B. Eric Restuccia, Office of the Michigan Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, Daniel A. Ophoff, Kent County, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Joanne G. Swanson, Kerr, Russell and Weber, PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Amici Curiae.
Before GILMAN and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; BARRETT, District Judge.*
After Karen Waeschle's mother died, an autopsy was performed to determine the cause of death. When the mother's remains were returned to Waeschle for cremation, she was not informed that the brain had been removed during the autopsy and was still being studied by the Medical Examiner. Waeschle sued Oakland County and Ljubisa J. Dragovic, the Oakland County Medical Examiner (Dragovic or the Medical Examiner), after discovering that her mother's brain had been incinerated as medical waste once the autopsy was completed. The Medical Examiner, Waeschle maintains, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving her of the right to dispose of her mother's brain.
Oakland County and Dragovic filed for summary judgment, arguing that Waeschle had no constitutionally protected property right to possess her deceased mother's brain because it had been removed for forensic examination. Dragovic also asserted a qualified-immunity defense. In the alternative, the County and Dragovic requested that the district court certify to the Michigan Supreme Court the question of whether Michigan law gives Waeschle a property interest in her deceased mother's brain for the purpose of burial or cremation.
For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the portion of the district court's judgment denying Dragovic's qualified-immunity defense, and REMAND the case with instructions to grant his motion for summary judgment with respect to Waeschle's individual-capacity claim against him. We also REVERSE the judgment of the district court denying Oakland County's and Dragovic's motion to certify the question of state law to the Michigan Supreme Court, and REMAND the case with instructions to certify the question and conduct such further proceedings as are necessary for the proper disposition of this case.
Karen Waeschle's 88-year old mother, Katherine R. Weins, was a resident of a nursing home in West Bloomfield, Michigan. In August 2006, she fell and hit her head. Weins was taken to a hospital, where she died two weeks later. Waeschle suspected that abuse or neglect caused the fall. To investigate, the West Bloomfield Township Police Department requested that an autopsy be performed on Weins's body. Waeschle did not challenge the request.
Dr. Ruben Ortiz-Reyes was the Deputy Oakland County Medical Examiner who conducted the autopsy. This required Dr. Ortiz-Reyes to remove and examine various organs, including Weins's brain, for clues regarding the cause of her death. To examine a brain, it must be soaked in a formaldehyde-like solution until it becomes stiff enough to dissect. The soaking process normally takes 10 to 14 days. With the exception of the brain, the other organs that Dr. Ortiz-Reyes examined were placed back into the body.
When Weins's body (minus the brain) was made available to Waschle, the latter cremated the remains. Waeschle disposed of her mother's body without knowing that the brain was not included. The Medical Examiner failed to notify Waeschle that her mother's body was being returned without the brain or that the Medical Examiner planned to incinerate it once the examination of that organ was completed.
Several months later, after disposing of her mother's body, Waeschle met with the Deputy Medical Examiner and was provided a copy of the autopsy report. At that time, Waeschle learned that her mother's brain had been incinerated as medical waste without her consent. This litigation followed.
As amended, Waeschle's complaint alleged that the Medical Examiner violated Waeschle's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by not returning her mother's brain for disposal after the autopsy of that organ was completed. Waeschle also claimed that Dragovic negligently and intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her in violation of state law. In June 2008, the Medical Examiner filed a motion for summary judgment on the due process claim based upon the defense of qualified immunity. He also filed a motion to dismiss the state-law causes of action. In the alternative, Dragovic urged the district court to certify the state-law issues to the Michigan Supreme Court.
The district court dismissed the state-law claims. As for the due process claim, the court found that Waeschle had established that (1) she had a quasi-property interest in her mother's brain that was protected under the United States Constitution, and (2) the Medical Examiner deprived her of that interest while acting under color of state law. The court also found that Dragovic was not entitled to qualified immunity because the quasi-property interest was "clearly established" and because the Medical Examiner "reasonably should have known" that he was violating Waeschle's Fourteenth Amendment right.
This appeal involves the denial of a qualified-immunity claim, which was set forth in Dragovic's motion for summary judgment. "We review a district court's denial of qualified immunity de novo." Blake v. Wright, 179 F.3d 1003, 1007 (6th Cir.1999). Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The central issue is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Section 1983 serves as a vehicle to obtain damages caused by persons acting under color of state law whose conduct violates the U.S. Constitution or federal laws. McQueen v. Beecher Comty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.2006). "A law enforcement officer's key defense to a § 1983 action is encapsulated in the concept of qualified immunity." Drogosch v. Metcalf, 557 F.3d 372, 377 (6th Cir.2009). "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Until recently, federal courts were required to conduct the qualified-immunity analysis using the two-step sequential inquiry set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). The first step required courts to determine "whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . or shown . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right." Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 816 (citations omitted). And
if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was "clearly established" at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct. Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.
Id. (citation omitted).
In Pearson, however, the Supreme Court held that the sequential Saucier protocol was no longer mandatory. Id. at 818. The Court reasoned that
[t]he procedure sometimes results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case. There are cases in which it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact there is such a right. Id.
Our qualified-immunity analysis that follows does not resolve the merits of Waeschle's constitutional claim. Doing so is unnecessary because, as will be shown, Waeschle's purported constitutional right is not clearly established.
The "clearly established" prong of the two-step Saucier analysis is particularly important for the present case. This court has clarified that
[f]or a right to be "clearly established," the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that his or her conduct violates that right. The unlawfulness of the official or employee's conduct must be apparent in light of pre-existing law.
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