Wager v. Pro
| Decision Date | 14 October 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-1544,75-1544 |
| Citation | 575 F.2d 882,188 U.S.App.D.C. 1 |
| Parties | John Arthur WAGER, Appellant, v. Maynard J. PRO, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court, for the District of Columbia (D.C. Civil Action 1717-73).
Mary-Elizabeth Medaglia, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and Eric B. Marcy, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellee.
Before TAMM, LEVENTHAL and MacKINNON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TAMM.
John A. Wager, plaintiff-appellant, seeks review of a judgment on the pleadings granted in favor of Maynard J. Pro, defendant-appellee. The trial court ruled that even if Wager's allegations were taken as true, judgment must be for the defendant. To reach this result the trial court relied upon the basic principle of law that a court will not assist one wrong-doer in taking advantage of another wrong-doer when an illegal or immoral transaction is at the heart of the dispute. Wager v. Pro, 391 F.Supp. 752 (D.D.C.1975). The trial court considered the bribery scheme that Wager and Pro participated in to be either illegal or immoral. Since the bribery scheme was at the heart of the dispute, Wager, a wrong-doer as a participant therein, could not bring an action against Pro, also a wrong-doer.
The issue for this court to decide is whether there were any genuine issues of material fact which would prevent a judgment on the pleadings from being granted. We find that Wager's pleadings did raise genuine issues of material fact. The trial court was in error in granting Pro's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Therefore we must reverse the trial court's decision and remand this case for a decision on the merits.
Wager commenced this action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in August of 1973. Defendant Pro had the case removed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court then granted Pro's motion for judgment on the pleadings in March of 1975. Wager has now appealed that decision to this court.
The trial court accepted Wager's complaint and the facts set forth therein as true. Wager v. Pro, supra. Wager was a probationary laboratory technician trainee in the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of the Internal Revenue Service of the United States Treasury Department. Pro was Wager's immediate supervisor in the National Forensic Laboratory within the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division.
Wager alleged that Pro directed him to undertake a project designed to catch certain suspected organized crime figures in an attempt to bribe Wager. Wager also alleged that Pro gave him detailed instructions concerning what he should do and assured him, in response to Wager's objections, of protection from legal prosecution. Thereafter, pursuant to Pro's instruction, Wager consulted with certain persons and eventually mailed to them a letter containing evidence in the possession of the United States and requesting a loan of $15,000.
As a result of his actions Wager was arrested and later indicted on two counts of soliciting a bribe. Wager averred that Pro continued to assure him of immunity even after his arrest. The case went to trial in October of 1972 and resulted in Wager's acquittal. Wager complained that at no time during this period did Pro come forward to explain the exculpatory circumstances. Wager contended that when Pro testified as a witness during the trial he falsely denied knowing about the bribery scheme. Thus, Wager alleged that Pro was grossly negligent in directing him to participate in the bribery scheme in the first place, in advising him that he would suffer no legal prosecution, and in not coming forward with evidence exculpatory of Wager.
The law is settled that a judgment on the pleadings is not appropriate where the complaint raises issues of fact which if proved would defeat recovery. Franklin National Bank v. Krakow, 295 F.Supp. 910 (D.D.C.1969); United States v. Chelsea Towers, 295 F.Supp. 1242 (D.N.J.1967). This is so even if the trial court is convinced that the party opposing the motion is unlikely to prevail at trial. Hughes v. American Jawa, Ltd., 529 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1976).
The trial court cited as dispositive of this action the legal principle that a court will not extend its relief to either party when the cause of action is founded upon an illegal or immoral transaction. The trial court thus implicitly determined that the bribery scheme was either illegal or immoral. We do not agree. The appropriateness of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is determined by giving all reasonable inferences to the opponent's pleadings. 1 In this case the trial court failed to draw the inference that the scheme Wager and Pro participated in was a legitimate effort on the part of government agents to capture reputed criminals.
Government officers may use artifice and stratagem to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises. Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 16 S.Ct. 434, 40 L.Ed. 606 (1896); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 15 S.Ct. 470, 39 L.Ed. 550 (1895). A trap for the unwary criminal is not illegal per se. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958). Whether a trap is illegal is determined by referring to a general intention or predisposition to commit, whenever possible, crimes of the kind solicited. Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1958); Sherman v. United States, supra, at 382, 78 S.Ct. 819. In proof of such predisposition the defendant's reputation, criminal activities, and prior disposition may be admitted into evidence. Marks v. United States, supra.
The inference Wager is entitled to is that he was involved in a government stratagem designed to trap unwary reputed organized crime figures who were predisposed to commit bribery of government officials. Furthermore, Wager was acquitted of charges of soliciting a bribe. Acquittal does not conclusively establish the untruth of all the evidence submitted against the defendant, United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972), but neither does the fact that Wager was criminally prosecuted establish that his actions were illegal.
The pleadings do raise an issue of fact: was Wager involved in an illegal or immoral bribery scheme or was he part of a legitimate law enforcement stratagem. It is certainly material because under the trial court's statement of the applicable law the outcome of this case could be altered by its resolution one way or the...
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