Waggoner v. Bank of Bernie
Citation | 281 S.W. 130 |
Decision Date | 02 March 1926 |
Docket Number | No. 3936.,3936. |
Parties | WAGGONER v. BANK OF BERNIE. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Stoddard County; W. S. C. Walker, Judge.
Action by Joel Waggoner against the Bank of Bernie. From an order sustaining defendant's demurrer to the petition, plaintiff appeals. Appeal dismissed.
R. Kip Briney, of Bloomfield, for appellant. Wammack & Welborn, of. Bloomfield, for respondent.
This is an action for damages growing out of defendant's failure to honor a check drawn on it by plaintiff and payable to the First National Bank of Dexter. Plaintiff has appealed from an order sustaining defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's petition. The petition, in so far as material, reads as follows:
"Wherefore," etc.
In support of its demurrer respondent first argues the petition would seem to fail to state a cause of action because there is no allegation that the alleged deposit in the Bank of Bernie was made either by plaintiff or his wife as required by section 11779, R. S. Mo. 1919. It is pointed out that, in so far as alleged in the petition, the deposit may have been made by some third person, and that therefore the statute referred to would not apply. This point is highly technical, and to our minds places an entirely too strict and unreasonable a construction on the statute. Likewise respondent's point that the petition fails to allege the action of the First National Bank of Dexter was malicious and without probable cause is not well taken. This is not an action for false imprisonment. We doubt seriously the propriety of such an allegation. On the contrary, it would seem that an allegation that the Dexter bank maliciously had plaintiff arrested would clearly absolve defendant from liability under the doctrine of proximate cause hereinafter discussed.
The briefs and arguments of counsel for both appellant and respondent are devoted almost entirely to the question of what was the proximate cause of plaintiff's arrest and imprisonment. Appellant contends that the act of the defendant Bank of Bernie in dishonoring plaintiff's cheek was the proximate cause, while respondent argues that the act of the Dexter bank in having plaintiff arrested was an independent intervening cause, and, therefore, the proximate cause of plaintiff's alleged damage.
We shall first dispose of some preliminary matters. Respondent's demurrer, of course, admits the truth of all facts well pleaded. It is a well settled general rule that it is the duty of a bank to pay on demand all checks drawn by depositors on their checking accounts to the amount of their respective deposits. So in this case, under the allegations of plaintiff's petition, the fact that he had on deposit sufficient funds to pay the check given the Dexter bank made it defendant's duty to honor that check. O'Grady v. Stotts City Bank, 80 S. W. 696, 106 Mo. App. 366; Allen Grocery Co. v. Bank, 182 S. W. loc. cit. 781, 192 Mo. App. 476; 3 R. C. L. 521; 7 C. J. 628. Under our statute defendant bank would be liable in damages for failure to pay plaintiff's check when it should have been paid to the extent of the actual damages alleged and proven. Section 976, R.. S. Mo. 1919.
The particular question involved in this case, in so far as we have been able to discover, has never been determined by any appellate court of this state, and there is very scant authority from any other court directly on the proposition. The question of proximate cause of an injury is one always more or less beset with difficulty, and of necessity each case must be decided on its own particular facts. There are a great number of decisions in this state defining the term "proximate cause." In Holwerson v. Railway, 57 S. W. 770, 774, 157 Mo. loc. cit. 231 (50 L. R. A. 850), it is said:
"That negligence which sets in motion a train of events that in their natural sequence might, and ought to be expected to, produce an injury, if undisturbed by any independent intervening cause, is the proximate cause of that injury."
The same general rule is announced in other cases. Glenn v. Railway, 150 S. W. 1092, 167 Mo. App. loc. cit. 116; Strayer v. Railroad, 156 S. W. 732, 170 Mo. App. loc. cit. 525; Powell v. Walker, 195 Mo. App. 150, 185 S. W. 532. The cases also hold that:
Lawrence v. Heidbreder Co., 93 S. W. 897, 119 Mo. App. 316.
Similar doctrine is...
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