Wagner Mobil, Inc. v. City of Madison

• Decision Date: 29 November 1994
• Docket Number: A,No. 93-0193,No. 8,8,93-0193
• Citation: 190 Wis.2d 585,527 N.W.2d 301
• Parties: WAGNER MOBIL, INC., Tom Showers, d/b/a McDonald's (Millpond Road); Town of Blooming Grove, A Wisconsin Town, and Blooming Grove Sanitary DistrictWisconsin Town Sanitary District, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. CITY OF MADISON, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. . Oral Argument
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 301

527 N.W.2d 301

190 Wis.2d 585

WAGNER MOBIL, INC., Tom Showers, d/b/a McDonald's (Millpond Road); Town of Blooming Grove, A Wisconsin Town, and Blooming Grove Sanitary District No. 8, A Wisconsin Town Sanitary District, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. CITY OF MADISON, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

No. 93-0193.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral Argument Nov. 29, 1994.

Opinion Decided Feb. 28, 1995.

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner the cause was argued by James M. Voss, Asst. City Atty., with whom on the briefs was Eunice Gibson, City Atty.

For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief by Richard K. Nordeng and Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison, and oral argument by Richard K. Nordeng.

Amicus curiae was filed by Curtis A. Witynski, Legal Counsel, Madison, for the League of Wisconsin Municipalities.

Amicus curiae was filed by Richard J. Stadelman, Legal Counsel, Shawano, for the Wisconsin Towns Ass'n.

Amicus curiae was filed by Thomas M. Pyper, Gregory A. Fedders and Whyte, Hirschboeck, Dudek, S.C., Madison, for the Wisconsin Realtors Ass'n WILCOX, Justice.

This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed an order of the circuit court for Dane County, Moria Krueger, circuit judge. The circuit court concluded that an annexation ordinance executed by the City of Madison violated legislative intent by creating a new town island in the Town of Blooming Grove, contrary to sec. 66.021(15), STATS. (1991-92). ¹ The court of appeals affirmed. On review in this court, the parties ask us to interpret the meaning of the last sentence in sec. 66.021(15)--"[a]fter December 2, 1973, no city or village may, by annexation, create a town area which is completely surrounded by the city or village." We conclude that the sentence is unambiguous. It means that no city or village may annex land so that a town area is completely surrounded by the annexing city or village. Because the annexation ordinance in the present case did not create a town area completely surrounded by Madison in contravention of sec. 66.021(15), the decision of the court of appeals must be reversed.

The facts in this case are not in dispute. On June 16, 1992, the City of Madison annexed 187.5 acres of land from the Town of Blooming Grove. The circuit court noted that the annexation had the following effect: "The portion of Blooming Grove located south of the annexed area is surrounded on the north and west by the City of Madison, bordered by the Town of Cottage Grove to the east, the Village of McFarland to the southwest and the Town of Dunn to the south." The annexation is known as the Yahara Hills annexation because of its location near Yahara Hills Golf Course.

On June 24, 1992, two private businesses, the Town of Blooming Grove and the Blooming Grove sanitary district that serves the annexed area (collectively, Blooming Grove) brought suit against Madison, alleging a number of theories as to why the annexation was contrary to Wisconsin law.

On September 15, 1992, Blooming Grove filed a summary judgment motion requesting that the circuit court declare Madison's annexation ordinance invalid. The primary thrust of the motion was that the annexation ordinance violated sec. 66.021(15), STATS., as that statute was interpreted by the court of appeals in Town of Sheboygan v. City of Sheboygan, 168 Wis.2d 268, 483 N.W.2d 306 (Ct.App.1992). The circuit court granted Blooming Grove's motion, concluding that the annexation "created a functional town island in violation of § 66.021(15), STATS., and contrary to the Court of Appeals holding in Town of Sheboygan v. City of Sheboygan, 168 Wis.2d 268, 483 N.W.2d 306 (Ct.App.1992)." Madison appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. In its decision, the court stated that it was bound by Town of Sheboygan even though it believed the case to have been wrongly decided. ² Madison petitioned for review in this court, which was granted.

Section 66.021(15), STATS., provides in full:

ANNEXATION OF TOWN ISLANDS. Upon its own motion, a city or village by a two-thirds vote of the entire membership of its governing body may enact an ordinance annexing territory which comprises a portion of a town or towns and which was completely surrounded by territory of the city or village on December 2, 1973. The ordinance shall include all surrounded town areas except those exempt by mutual agreement of all of the governing bodies involved. The annexation ordinance shall contain a description of the territory sufficiently accurate to determine its location, and the name of the town or towns from which such territory is detached. Upon enactment of the ordinance, the city or village clerk immediately shall file 5 certified copies of the ordinance in the office of the secretary of state, together with 5 copies of a scale map showing the boundaries of the territory annexed. The secretary of state shall forward 2 copies of the ordinance and scale map to the department of transportation, one copy to the department of revenue and one copy to the department of administration. This subsection does not apply if the town island was created only by the annexation of a railroad right-of-way or drainage ditch. This subsection does not apply to land owned by a town government which has existing town government buildings located thereon. No town island may be annexed under this subsection if the island consists of over 65 acres or contains over 100 residents. After December 2, 1973, no city or village may, by annexation, create a town area which is completely surrounded by the city or village.

As noted above, it is the last sentence of sec. 66.021(15) that is at issue in the present case.

Resolution of this case involves a question of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation and an application of the statute in question to a given set of facts are questions of law that this court reviews de novo. Braatz v. LIRC, 174 Wis.2d 286, 293, 496 N.W.2d 597, 600 (1993); State of Wisconsin Ex Rel. Town of Delavan v. Circuit Court for Walworth County, 167 Wis.2d 719, 723, 482 N.W.2d 899, 900-01 (1992). This court recently set out the statutory interpretation process:

The aim of all statutory interpretation is to discern the intent of the legislature. In ascertaining a statute's meaning, our first inquiry is to the plain language of the statute. If the language of the statute clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, it is the duty of the court to apply that intent to the case at hand and not look beyond the statutory language to ascertain its meaning.

Doe v. American Nat. Red Cross, 176 Wis.2d 610, 616, 500 N.W.2d 264, 266 (1993) (citation omitted). Further, the general rule in interpreting Wisconsin laws is that: "All words and phrases shall be construed according to common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and others that have a peculiar meaning in the law shall be construed according to such meaning." See sec. 990.01(1), STATS.

In the present case, Madison argues that sec. 66.021(15), STATS., is plain and unambiguous. Specifically, Madison asserts that the last sentence in sec. 66.021(15) clearly and unequivocally mandates that a city or village may not annex land so that a town area is completely surrounded by the annexing city or village. Blooming Grove, on the other hand, relying extensively on Town of Sheboygan, claims that the last sentence of sec. 66.021(15) is ambiguous and, therefore, resort to extrinsic aids is necessary in interpreting the statute. See, e.g., Bartus v. DHSS, 176 Wis.2d 1063, 1074, 501 N.W.2d 419, 425 (1993) (where statute is found to be ambiguous, it is the duty of the court to look beyond the statutory language to determine legislative intent). In Town of Sheboygan, the court of appeals concluded that the last sentence in sec. 66.021(15) "is ambiguous; the language does not consider town islands created, in part, because of natural or man-made barriers." Town of Sheboygan, 168 Wis.2d at 274, 483 N.W.2d at 308.

A statute, or portion thereof, will be found to be ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses. Cynthia E. v. La Crosse County Human Services Department, 172 Wis.2d 218, 225, 493 N.W.2d 56, 59 (1992). In considering the question of ambiguity, however, it is obvious that parties may disagree as to the meaning of a given statute. "This alone cannot be controlling. The court should look to the language of the statute itself to determine if 'well-informed persons' should have become confused." National Amusement Co. v. Department of Revenue, 41 Wis.2d 261, 267, 163 N.W.2d 625, 628 (1969) (emphasis in original). Only when the statutory language is found to be ambiguous will this court examine the scope, history, context, subject matter and object of the statute in discerning the intent of the legislature. Cynthia E., 172 Wis.2d at 225, 493 N.W.2d at 59.

Our review of the statutory provision at issue leads us to conclude that the statute's words clearly and unambiguously declare the legislature's intent--namely, that a city or a village may not annex land such that a town area is completely surrounded by the annexing city or village. We further conclude that the phrase "completely surrounded" should be construed according to common and approved usage. This can be easily accomplished by considering the definition of the respective words in an established dictionary. See State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis.2d 371, 377-78, 340 N.W.2d 511, 515 (1983) (where legislature chooses not to define words in a statutory section, resort may be made to a dictionary). WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 464 (1986) defines "completely" in terms of "being complete: fully, entirely." "Surround" is defined as "to cause to be encompassed, encircled, or enclosed with something." Id. at 2302. Thus, under generally accepted usage, when an object is "completely...