Wagner v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 02-1564.
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | Luttig |
| Citation | 335 F.3d 297 |
| Parties | Daniel G. WAGNER, JR., a minor child acting by and through his parents Daniel Wagner and Regina Wagner; Daniel Wagner; Regina Wagner, in their individual capacities, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY; Montgomery County Public Schools; Jerry D. Weast, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools, Montgomery County Public Schools, Defendants-Appellants, v. Community Services for Autistic Adults and Children, Third Party Defendant, Christine Caselles, Dr., Movant. Daniel G. Wagner, Jr., a minor child acting by and through his parents Daniel Wagner and Regina Wagner; Daniel Wagner; Regina Wagner, in their individual capacities, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Board of Education of Montgomery County; Montgomery County Public Schools; Jerry D. Weast, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools, Montgomery County Public Schools, Defendants-Appellants, v. Community Services for Autistic Adults and Children, Third Party Defendant, Christine Caselles, Dr., Movant. |
| Docket Number | No. 02-2187.,No. 02-1564.,02-1564.,02-2187. |
| Decision Date | 07 July 2003 |
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY; Montgomery County Public Schools; Jerry D. Weast, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools, Montgomery County Public Schools, Defendants-Appellants,
v.
Community Services for Autistic Adults and Children, Third Party Defendant,
Christine Caselles, Dr., Movant.
Daniel G. Wagner, Jr., a minor child acting by and through his parents Daniel Wagner and Regina Wagner; Daniel Wagner; Regina Wagner, in their individual capacities, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Board of Education of Montgomery County; Montgomery County Public Schools; Jerry D. Weast, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools, Montgomery County Public Schools, Defendants-Appellants,
v.
Community Services for Autistic Adults and Children, Third Party Defendant,
Christine Caselles, Dr., Movant.
Page 298
ARGUED: Jeffrey Alan Krew, Columbia, Maryland, for Appellants. Kerry Lynn Edwards, MAYER, BROWN, ROWE & MAW, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Lisa L. Levine, MAYER, BROWN, ROWE & MAW, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge LUTTIG wrote the opinion, in which Judge NIEMEYER joined. Judge WIDENER filed a dissenting opinion.
LUTTIG, Circuit Judge:
In this case we are called upon to interpret 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), the so-called "stay put" provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq.
Daniel Wagner is an autistic child covered by the IDEA. Prior to the initiation of this suit, Daniel was receiving at home Lovaas therapy pursuant to an Individualized Educational Program (IEP) prepared by the Board of Education of Montgomery County (the "School Board") and agreed to by his parents. Trouble arose when the Lovaas service provider identified in the IEP, Community Services for Autistic Adults and Children (CSAAC), stopped providing services. The School Board proposed a new IEP and the parents commenced due process proceedings, challenging the proposed IEP. While those proceedings were ongoing, the parents also sought an injunction under section 1415(j) in district court. The district court reasoned that because Daniel's current placement was unavailable, due to the unwillingness of CSAAC to provide services, the School Board was required to propose an alternative, equivalent placement to satisfy the "stay put" provision. Because we conclude that the district court erred in its interpretation of section 1415(j), we vacate the district court's orders and remand for further proceedings.
Daniel Wagner is now seven years old. For the year beginning on July 2, 2001 and ending on June 30, 2002, Daniel was receiving special education services based on an IEP agreed to by all parties at a meeting held on March 8, 2001 (the "March 8 IEP"). The March 8 IEP provided that Daniel was to receive 20 hours of in home ABA discrete trial instruction (i.e., Lovaas therapy) and 10 hours of shadowing support at a pre-school. In addition, the Wagners had arranged for Daniel to continue for another year at a private preschool, even though he was eligible to begin
Page 299
kindergarten at a Montgomery County public school (MCPS).
Problems arose by October or November of 2001, when the relationship between the Wagners and some of the personnel at CSAAC deteriorated. On November 14, 2001, CSAAC ceased sending its employees to the Wagner home, effectively cutting off the provision of services. On November 28, 2001, when it became apparent that CSAAC would not perform as obligated, the School Board prepared and proposed a new IEP for Daniel. The new IEP contemplated provision of services at Maryvale Elementary School (a MCPS school). By January of 2002, the Wagners rejected the new IEP and initiated due process proceedings.
On February 14, 2002, the ALJ conducted a hearing to consider the proposed change in placement for the remainder of the school year. At the hearing, counsel for CSAAC stated that CSAAC was willing to provide services to Daniel in order to satisfy the "stay put" provision of the IDEA. The very next day, however, the offer was withdrawn. In a letter dated March 6, 2002, the School Board then offered the Wagners the "Maryvale Plus" plan, which consisted of the afore-mentioned new IEP proposal augmented with more one-on-one discrete trial/systematic instruction (to reach a full 20 hours/week) at Maryvale and 10 hours in regular kindergarten at Maryvale, with an instructional assistant.
On March 12, 2002, the Wagners went into federal district court and sought a preliminary injunction to effect their "stay put" rights under the IDEA. The Wagners argued that CSAAC would no longer provide services as it was obligated to do under the March 8 IEP. On March 19, 2002, CSAAC offered to resume providing services but through a subcontract with an outside behavioral specialist or psychologist, most likely through New Jersey's Lovaas Institute for Early Intervention (New Jersey LIFE). The parents found this new proposal unacceptable.
On April 5, 2002, the district court conducted a hearing and later issued an opinion in which it concluded that "Daniel's then-current educational placement, provided by CSAAC, has been and, as I find, is no longer available." Wagner v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, Maryland, 198 F.Supp.2d 671, 675-76 (D.Md. 2002). The then-current placement was unavailable because Lovaas was the only program that would satisfy the requirements of the March 8 IEP, CSAAC was the only state-approved provider of Lovaas services, and CSAAC was not available to provide services. The district court reasoned that "[w]hen the current placement is unavailable in order to comply with the `stay put' provisions, the [School Board] is obligated to provide an alternative placement that is a comparable program, capable of implementing an IEP that does not constitute a change in placement." Id. at 673. The district court then determined that the Maryvale Plus proposal was not comparable. Because there were no other placement proposals before the district court at that time, the district court then issued a preliminary injunction requiring the School Board "to propose another at home alternative for a `stay put' placement that does not involve CSAAC within 15 days." Id. at 678. The School Board appealed that ruling, but also provided the proposal within the specified time. The School Board proposed an in home Lovaas based ABA placement to be administered by New Jersey LIFE, and the district court concluded that that proposal satisfied the "stay put" provision of the IDEA.
At the beginning of the next school year, the Wagners sought to enroll...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Action NC v. Strach, 1:15-cv-1063
...378 (4th Cir. 2012) ). The party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of justifying such relief. Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. , 335 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2003). To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction, a party must establish that (1) the party is likely to succeed on the ......
-
Guilford Coll. v. McAleenan, 1:18CV891
...518, 524 (4th Cir. 2013). The party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of justifying such relief. Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. , 335 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2003). To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction, a party must establish that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the mer......
-
County School Bd. of Henrico County, Vir. v. Rt, Civil Action No. 3:04CV923.
...of Education. Contrary to the School Board's argument, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Wagner v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 335 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2003), does not foreclose this Court from reaching the same outcome as did the Second, Third and Ninth Circuits. In Page 713 the ......
-
Tradeways, Ltd. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Civil Action No. ELH-20-1324
...justifying such relief. See League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014); Wagner v. Bd. of Educ., 335 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2003). A preliminary injunction can be classified as being either prohibitory or mandatory. A prohibitory injunction "maintain......