Wagner v. Fed. Election Comm'n

• Decision Date: 07 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–5162.,13–5162.
• Citation: 793 F.3d 1
• Parties: Wendy E. WAGNER, et al., Plaintiffs v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

793 F.3d 1

Wendy E. WAGNER, et al., Plaintiffs

v.FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Defendant.

No. 13–5162.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued En Banc Sept. 30, 2014.

Decided July 7, 2015.

Alan B. Morrison argued the cause for plaintiffs. With him on the briefs was Arthur B. Spitzer.

Ilya Shapiro and Allen J. Dickerson were on the brief for amici curiae Center for Competitive Politics, et al. in support of plaintiffs.

Kevin Deeley, Acting Associate General Counsel, Federal Election Commission, argued the cause for defendant. With him on the briefs were Harry J. Summers, Assistant General Counsel, and Holly J. Baker and Seth E. Nesin, Attorneys.

J. Gerald Hebert, Scott L. Nelson, Fred Wertheimer, and Donald J. Simon were on the brief for amici curiae Campaign Legal Center, et al. in support of defendant.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON, ROGERS, TATEL, BROWN, GRIFFITH, KAVANAUGH, SRINIVASAN, MILLETT, PILLARD, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Chief Judge:

Seventy-five years ago, Congress barred individuals and firms from making federal campaign contributions while they negotiate or perform federal contracts. The plaintiffs, who are individual government contractors, contend that this statute violates their First Amendment and equal protection rights. Because the concerns that spurred the original bar remain as important today as when the statute was enacted, and because the statute is closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms, we reject the plaintiffs' challenge.

I

The statute at issue, 52 U.S.C. § 30119(a)(1), makes it unlawful for any person “who enters into any contract with the United States ... directly or indirectly to make any contribution ... to any political party, committee, or candidate for public office or to any person for any political purpose.” This prohibition applies “between the commencement of negotiations ... and ... the completion of performance” of the contract. Id. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) has construed the section not to apply “in connection with State or local elections.” 11 C.F.R. § 115.2(a).

The plaintiffs are three individuals who hold or have held federal contracts. The first two, Lawrence Brown and Jan Miller, spent much of their careers as full-time employees of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Each went back to work at USAID under a personal services contract after retirement. The third plaintiff, Wendy Wagner, is a law professor. In 2011, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) hired Wagner under a consulting contract to prepare a report about science and regulation.

All three plaintiffs wanted to make campaign contributions during the 2012 federal elections, but each was barred from doing so by § 30119. On October 19, 2011, they filed suit against the FEC in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the statute's constitutionality. The plaintiffs contend that § 30119 violates their rights under both the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

The plaintiffs have been careful to frame their challenge narrowly. First, they challenge the constitutionality of § 30119 “only as it applies to plaintiffs and other individual contractors,” not as it applies to contractors that are corporations or other kinds of entities. Pls. Br. 1. Second, they do not challenge the statute as the FEC might seek to apply it to a contractor's independent expenditures on electoral advocacy, as opposed to his or her contributions to candidates, parties, or political action committees (PACs). Id. at 40 n. 5 (stating that the “[p]laintiffs have no interest in making independent expenditures”); Oral Arg. Recording 26:59–27:06 (same).

Nor do they challenge the law as the Commission might seek to apply it to donations to PACs that themselves make only independent expenditures, commonly known as “Super PACs.” Oral Arg. Recording 25:59–26:33 (“Super PACs.... are not at issue here; none of my clients wants to make a contribution to them or anything like them.”); id. 26:59–27:06 (same). In short, the plaintiffs challenge § 30119 only insofar as it bans campaign contributions by individual contractors to candidates, parties, or traditional PACs that make contributions to candidates and parties.

After considering the merits of this challenge, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the FEC. Wagner v. FEC, 901 F.Supp.2d 101, 113 (D.D.C.2012). On appeal, a panel of this court held, sua sponte, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the constitutional claims because the special judicial review provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) “grants exclusive merits jurisdiction to the en banc court of appeals.” Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1011 (D.C.Cir.2013) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 437h, now codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30110 ). The panel therefore remanded the case to the district court to make appropriate findings of fact, and then to certify those facts and the relevant constitutional questions to this court sitting en banc. Id. at 1017.

The case has now returned to us. But time does not stand still, and some important facts have shifted in the years since this litigation began. The plaintiffs advise us that both Wagner and Brown have now completed their federal contracts and hence are once again free to make campaign contributions. See Brown Supp. Mootness Decl. ¶ 3; Second Wagner Supp. Decl. ¶ 2. Brown, at least, has already done so. See Brown Supp. Mootness Decl. ¶ 3. Accordingly, Wagner's and Brown's claims are moot. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67–72, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (holding that the plaintiff's departure from her position as a state employee mooted her First Amendment challenge to a law regulating the speech of state employees).¹

Miller's contract is ongoing, however, and his constitutional claims therefore remain alive. But the mootness of the other plaintiffs' claims matters because Miller's injury is notably narrower than theirs. Whereas Wagner and Brown alleged that they wanted to support a variety of political “causes,” and that they had given to “PACs” or “political committees” in the past, Miller tells us only that he wants to contribute to “candidates running for federal offices and/or their political parties.” Compare Wagner Decl. ¶ 6, and Brown Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8, with Miller Decl. ¶ 7. Miller thus has standing to challenge the statute only as it applies to contributions to candidates and parties. See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) ( “[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross. Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press....” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Our limited jurisdiction therefore narrows the plaintiffs' already-narrow challenge even further: the only issue properly before us is the application of § 30119 to contributions by an individual contractor to a federal candidate or political party. In Parts II through V, we address the plaintiffs' First Amendment arguments. In Part VI, we consider their equal protection arguments.²

II

Since Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court has instructed us to review different kinds of campaign finance regulations with different degrees of scrutiny. 424 U.S. 1, 19–25, 44–45, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) ; see McCutcheon v. FEC, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1444, 188 L.Ed.2d 468 (2014) (plurality opinion); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134–38, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). Laws that limit a person's independent expenditures on electoral advocacy are subject to strict scrutiny. McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1444 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45, 96 S.Ct. 612 ). Under that standard, “the Government may regulate protected speech only if such regulation promotes a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” Id.; see, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339–41, 130 S.Ct. 876.

Laws that regulate campaign contributions, however, are subject to “a lesser but still ‘rigorous standard of review,’ ” McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1444 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29, 96 S.Ct. 612 ), because “contributions lie closer to the edges than to the core of political expression,” FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003). “Under that standard, ‘[e]ven a significant interference with protected rights of political association may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.’ ” McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1444 (emphasis added) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612 ); see Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161–62, 123 S.Ct. 2200 ; SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 692 (D.C.Cir.2010) (en banc).

The Supreme Court has repeatedly applied this “closely drawn” standard to challenges to campaign contribution restrictions.³ And it has repeatedly (and recently) declined invitations “to revisit Buckley 's distinction between contributions and expenditures and the corollary distinction in the applicable standards of review,” McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1445.⁴ So, too, have we. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 696.

The plaintiffs argue that we should nonetheless apply strict scrutiny here because § 30119 does not merely limit contributions, but bans them entirely. As the plaintiffs recognize, however, the Supreme Court expressly rejected this argument in FEC v. Beaumont, concluding that both limits and bans on contributions are subject to the same “closely drawn” standard. 539 U.S. at 161–63, 123 S.Ct. 2200. “This argument,” the Court said, ...