Wagner v. Int'l Auto. Components Grp. N. Am., Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 September 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. 3:14–CV–1831.
• Citation: 131 F.Supp.3d 746
• Parties: Raymond Lee WAGNER, Jr., Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS GROUP NORTH AMERICA, INC. ; CAD Engineering Resources Inc., d/b/a CER Group N.A., Inc.; Machinery Movers & Structural Specialist ; and DRM, LLC, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

131 F.Supp.3d 746

Raymond Lee WAGNER, Jr., Plaintiff,

v.INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS GROUP NORTH AMERICA, INC. ; CAD Engineering Resources Inc., d/b/a CER Group N.A., Inc.; Machinery Movers & Structural Specialist ; and DRM, LLC, Defendants.

Civil No. 3:14–CV–1831.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

Signed Sept. 16, 2015.

Charles A. Flynn, Jeremy Matthew Cothern, Ronald J. Berke, Berke, Berke & Berke, Chattanooga, TN, for Plaintiff.

John R. Anderson, Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C., Chattanooga, TN, Lynn Vuketich Luther, Thomas J. Gibney, Eastman

& Smith Ltd., Toledo, OH, Ethan R. Holtz, Jaffe, Raitt, Heuer & Weiss, Southfield, MI, Raymond D. Lackey, David J. Sneed & Associates, Franklin, TN, John P. Nefflen, Burr & Forman, LLP, Christopher M. Jones, Paul L. Sprader, Levan, Sprader, Patton & McCaskill, PLLC, Nashville, TN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

ALETA A. TRAUGER

, District Judge.

Pending before the court are Motions to Dismiss filed by defendants Machinery Movers & Structural Specialist ("MMSS") (Docket No. 78) and DRM, LLC ("DRM") (Docket No. 82), to which the plaintiff Raymond Lee Wagner, Jr. ("Wagner") has filed Responses in opposition (Docket Nos. 84, 85), MMSS and DRM have filed Replies (Docket Nos. 90, 91), and Wagner has filed a joint Sur–Reply (Docket No. 95). For the following reasons, the court will grant the defendants' motions.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from injuries that Wagner suffered on August 11, 2013, while working as a temporary employee at a factory in Springfield, Tennessee (the "Springfield Plant"). The Springfield Plant was owned by defendant International Automotive Components Group North America, Inc. ("IAC") and operated by IAC and defendant CAD Engineering Resources Inc. d/b/a CER Group N.A., Inc. ("CER"). Wagner was injured while operating a mold press, which is a device utilized in the manufacture of parts for automobiles. (See Docket No. 49.)

Wagner initially filed suit on August 8, 2014, against only IAC and CER. (Docket No. 1.) On October 24, 2014, Wagner filed an Amended Complaint.¹ (Docket No. 26.) On January 30, 2015, IAC and CER timely filed Answers to the Amended Complaint. (Docket Nos. 52, 53.) In their Answers, IAC and CER asserted the general affirmative defenses of "intervening negligent acts of third parties" and "contributory negligence and/or comparative fault." (Docket No. 52 at p. 7, ¶¶ 4–5; Docket No. 53 at p. 7, ¶¶ 4–5.) IAC and CER did not name the third parties to which they were referring in asserting these potential defenses.² (Id. )

On April 30, 2015, Wagner filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the [Amended] Complaint to add as defendants MMSS and DRM.³ (Docket No. 63.) MMSS is a Tennessee corporation that specializes in machinery moving and millwright services. DRM is a Tennessee limited liability company that provides manufacturing plant design, installation, and integration solutions.

In the memorandum in support of his motion to amend, Wagner cited IAC's April 10, 2015 interrogatory response, which stated:

2. Identify who or what was responsible for the installation of the machine at the Springfield Plaint in which the [p]laintiff was injured.

ANSWER: IAC contracted with Machinery Movers and DRM, LLC to move the machine from Huron, Ohio to the Springfield facility. The installation was overseen by Greg Wilkerson, corporate engineer.

(Docket No. 65 at p. 2.) Wagner then contended that MMSS and DRM may be the parties that IAC and CER were referring to in asserting their intervening third parties and contributory negligence affirmative defenses. Accordingly, Wagner suggested that MMSS and DRM may be added as defendants "by right" pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20–1–119

. (Docket No. 64 at p. 2.)

The court granted Wagner leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (Docket No. 66.) On June 9, 2015, Wagner filed the Second Amended Complaint, alleging that MMSS and DRM "were negligent in the moving and installation of the mold press, which caused the press to malfunction." (Docket No. 67 at p. 4, ¶ 18.)

On June 24, 2015, IAC and CER filed Answers to the Second Amended Complaint. (Docket Nos. 71, 72.) The Answers reiterated the general affirmative defenses of the "intervening negligent acts of third parties" and "contributory negligence and/or comparative fault" but again did not specifically name MMSS or DRM or any other third party. (Docket No. 71 at p. 10, ¶¶ 4–5; Docket No. 72 at p. 10, ¶¶ 4–5.) Both IAC and CER denied "knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity" of the allegations against MMSS and DRM. (Docket No. 71 at p. 6, ¶ 18; Docket No. 72 at p. 6, ¶ 18.)

On July 15 and 16, 2015, MMSS and DRM filed the instant Motions to Dismiss on the grounds that this action is barred against them by the applicable statute of limitations. (Docket Nos. 78, 82.) On July 27, 2015, Wagner filed Responses in opposition. (Docket Nos. 84, 85.) On August 7, 2016, MMSS and DRM filed Replies. (Docket Nos. 90, 91.) On August 24, 2015, Wagner filed a Sur–Reply. (Docket No. 95.)

RULE 12(b)(6) STANDARD

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court will "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir.2007)

; Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir.2002). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a plaintiff provide " ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The court must determine only whether "the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims," not whether the plaintiff can ultimately prove the facts alleged. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) ).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but a complaint's allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)

. To establish the "facial plausibility" required to "unlock the doors of discovery," the plaintiff cannot rely on labels, "legal conclusions" or "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action," but, instead, the plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)

; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

ANALYSIS

Wagner's lawsuit alleges a personal injury arising from an accident at the Springfield Plant that occurred on August 11, 2013. As the parties agree, the statute of limitations for filing a personal injury suit in Tennessee is one year.⁴ Tenn.Code Ann. § 28–3–104(a)(1)

. Accordingly, Wagner was required to file his claims for damages for personal injury on or before August 11, 2014. Wagner initiated the instant action on August 8, 2014. (Docket No. 1.) However, Wagner did not file the Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint to add MMSS and DRM as defendants until April 30, 2015, nor file the Second Amended Complaint against MMSS and DRM, upon granting of the motion by the court, until June 9, 2015. (Docket Nos. 63, 67.) Measuring from either of these dates, it is clear that Wagner only acted against MMSS and DRM approximately twenty-one or twenty-two months after the date of his injury and nine or ten months after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations period. Accordingly, MMSS and DRM contend that Wagner's claims against them must be dismissed. Wagner argues, to the contrary, that his claims against MMSS and DRM are not time-barred for two reasons: one, they are protected by Section 20–1–119 and two, they are protected by the "discovery rule." The court will address these arguments in turn.

I. Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20–1–119

First, Wagner contends that he is permitted to file suit against MMSS and DRM by the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20–1–119

, which allows a plaintiff to add a new defendant to a lawsuit, via a motion to amend, within ninety days of an existing defendant's alleging fault against a non-party. Wagner contends that Section 20–1–119 is satisfied because IAC and CER (1) stated in their Answers the affirmative defenses that unnamed third parties committed intervening acts, and (2) identified MMSS and DRM in an interrogatory response as having been involved in the moving and installing of the mold press.

Section 20–1–119

provides, in pertinent part:

(a) In civil actions where comparative fault is or becomes an issue, if a defendant named in an original complaint initiating a suit filed within the applicable statute of limitations, or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations, alleges in an answer or amended answer to the original or amended complaint that a person not a party to the suit caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which the plaintiff seeks recovery, and if the plaintiff's cause or causes of action against that person would be barred by any applicable statute of limitations but for the operation of this section, the plaintiff may, within ninety (90) days of the filing of the first answer or first amended answer alleging that person's fault, either: (1) Amend the complaint to add the person as a defendant ...

Id. (emphasis added).⁵

As interpreted by the Tennessee courts, two...