Wagner v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 24 December 1987
• Docket Number: No. 82-1009,82-1009
• Citation: 836 F.2d 566,266 U.S.App.D.C. 402
• Parties: 45 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1184, 45 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,630, 266 U.S.App.D.C. 402, 56 USLW 2368 Charles E. WAGNER, Appellant v. Reese H. TAYLOR, Jr., Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 566

836 F.2d 566

45 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1184,

45 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,630, 266 U.S.App.D.C. 402,

56 USLW 2368

Charles E. WAGNER, Appellant v. Reese H. TAYLOR, Jr., Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission.

No. 82-1009.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Sept. 14, 1982.

Decided Dec. 24, 1987.

Julian Karpoff, Arlington, Va., for appellant.

John W. Polk, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Atty., Royce C. Lamberth, R. Craig Lawrence, Patricia J. Kenney, Asst. U.S. Attys., and Craig M Keats, I.C.C., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee. Kenneth M. Raisler, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for appellee.

Before WALD, Chief Judge, ROBINSON and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III.

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge:

This is the first of three appeals by Charles E. Wagner, a black employee of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), from adverse rulings by the District Court in his ongoing effort to demonstrate that the agency practices unlawful employment discrimination. ¹ In the case before us, Wagner protests the rejection of his bid for an injunction to prohibit ICC from retaliating against him while his claim remains in litigation. The District Court entertained Wagner's injunctive action, but ultimately dismissed it without prejudice on the ground that "the facts fail to require ... intervention at this time. ² We hold that the court properly assumed jurisdiction of Wagner's suit, and affirm the order denying injunctive relief. ³

I. BACKGROUND

Wagner is employed as an attorney in ICC's Office of Compliance and Consumer Assistance. In 1981, he initiated an administrative class proceeding under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ⁴ as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, ⁵ alleging a pattern of racial discrimination at ICC ⁶ and seeking to be named class representative. ⁷ Shortly thereafter, Wagner lodged a series of charges that ICC had taken retaliatory actions against him for asserting the discrimination claim. The administrative process, however, produced no findings of retaliation. ⁸ To obtain administrative review, Wagner had invoked a then-existing but now-discarded expedited procedure established by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for handling retaliation charges. ⁹ Had Wagner chosen the slower route of submitting his reprisal allegations as individual complaints of discrimination, ¹⁰ he would have been entitled to immediate judicial review of the agency's final determination. ¹¹ The expedited process, however, seemingly prevented courts from directly reviewing administrative findings of no retaliation, ¹² contemplating instead judicial examination of reprisal questions in conjunction with review of the original claim. ¹³ Although Wagner argues that this court has jurisdiction to address the agency's findings of no retaliation, ¹⁴ his counsel conceded before the District Court that he was "not asking for judicial review" of those findings, but instead was seeking an injunction against further reprisals. ¹⁵ Given this stance at the trial level, we limit our consideration to the propriety of injunctive relief against future retaliation. ¹⁶

In all, Wagner asserted five claims of reprisal, four by the time the District Court denied his request for relief. The first attacked a performance rating that classified Wagner's job activity as only "minimally satisfactory" in two categories. ¹⁷ The agency, after examining this challenge, concluded that no reprisal had been intended, ¹⁸ but nonetheless, during the course of its regular performance-appraisal process, reclassified Wagner's performance as "fully satisfactory." ICC based this upgrade on a finding by the agency's Performance Review Board that the narrative appraisal of Wagner's work did not support the low rating. ¹⁹ Wagner's second claim was that his supervisor delayed processing of Wagner's challenge to his performance rating for five days because it was styled an "appeal" rather than a "review." ²⁰ Wagner also asserted that he had been improperly reprimanded in the conduct of his duties. That reprimand, however, was withdrawn the following day upon receipt of Wagner's reply. ²¹

Wagner's third reprisal claim emanated from concurrent suggestions by ICC officials, in November of 1981, that he transfer to a different department of the agency and that the pending discrimination charges be dropped. ²² Wagner rejected both proposals and brought suit in the District Court to enjoin ICC from retaliation. ²³ A month later, Wagner received a formal transfer order from the chairman of ICC stating that Wagner would be given "a new role at the Commission, as previously discussed, so that [he] will be able to work in an environment that is unrelated to [his complaint." ²⁴ Wagner then amended his complaint in the pending lawsuit ²⁵ and filed another administrative complaint ²⁶--his fourth reprisal claim. In Wagner's amended complaint, he requested the District Court to issue an order:

(1) Permanently enjoining, preventing and restraining Defendant and his agents from engaging in any acts of retaliation or harassment against Plaintiff;

(2) Permanently enjoining, preventing and restraining Defendant and his agents from reassigning or transferring Plaintiff without approval of the Court;

(3) Permanently enjoining, preventing and restraining Defendant and his agents from restricting Plaintiff in his authority to perform his duties in accordance with the description of duties and powers of his position;

(4) Granting Plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees and costs in this action; and

(5) Granting Plaintiff such relief as necessary to insure a work environment free of discrimination and harassment. ²⁷

The District Court consolidated consideration of Wagner's request for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction barring his transfer with the hearing on the merits. ²⁸ Immediately prior to the hearing, however, ICC rescinded the transfer order. ²⁹ The agency then moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting that Wagner had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

The District Court held that it had power to issue an injunction if the facts of the case warranted that relief. "Under exceptional circumstances," the court declared, "a Federal Court has jurisdiction to intervene to protect the integrity of Title VII administrative proceedings which may ultimately be brought before the Court for de novo review." ³⁰ The court nonetheless dismissed Wagner's action without prejudice, concluding that, on the facts presented, no ground for an injunction existed. ³¹

Since a court should be loath to intervene into ongoing federal executive personnel matters and since there is no clear indication that plaintiff has experienced reprisal in the past or that he will experience any interference with the progress of his complaint in the future .... the facts fail to require ... intervention at this time. ³²

On appeal, Wagner argues that the District Court abused its discretion by denying relief. We hold that federal district courts are authorized to afford interim injunctive relief against retaliatory transfers and other acts of reprisal while the administrative and judicial processes are ongoing. We further hold, given the facts of the case, that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant the injunction Wagner sought.

II. AUTHORITY OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO GRANT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

ICC charges error in the District Court's denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that Wagner was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking injunctive relief from the alleged reprisals. ³³ The question whether interim injunctive relief is available to federal employees seeking to prevent acts of retaliation is one of first impression in this court. ³⁴ Upon consideration of the language and history of Title VII, and informed by the courts' traditionally broad equitable power to fashion preliminary relief, we conclude that the District Court was correct in assuming jurisdiction. ³⁵

During oral argument, Wagner's counsel made clear that the interim injunction sought would remain in force until completion of both the administrative and judicial-review processes. We cast aside any notion that the District Court, prior to conclusion of administrative proceedings, could properly have indefinitely or permanently enjoined ICC from engaging in retaliation. To hold otherwise is to sanction a circumvention of the administrative procedures carefully erected by Congress in Title VII. ³⁶ Any decision to impose a long-term injunction must be postponed until a district court, following final agency action, has obtained jurisdiction to review the case on the merits. ³⁷ But we agree with the District Court that federal courts have authority to enjoin, when appropriate, retaliatory transfers and other acts of reprisal while the administrative or the judicial-review process is advancing.

The Supreme Court has recognized " 'a limited judicial power to preserve the court's jurisdiction or maintain the status quo by injunction pending review of an agency's action through the prescribed statutory channels.... Such power has been deemed merely incidental to the courts' jurisdiction to review final agency action....' " ³⁸ If the court may eventually have jurisdiction of the substantive claim, the court's incidental equitable jurisdiction, despite the agency's primary jurisdiction, gives the court authority to impose a temporary restraint in order to preserve the status quo pending ripening of the claim for judicial review. ³⁹ And, of course, if the court has already assumed jurisdiction following completion of the administrative proceeding, its authority to do so is all the...