Wahab v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.
| Decision Date | 30 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 12-6613 (PGS) |
| Parties | ATIYA WAHAB, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Atiya Wahab's ("Plaintiff") request for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint [Docket Entry No. 34] to specifically name the State of New Jersey and the following individuals, Steven Maybury, Gwen Zervas, Pam Lyons, Deborah Figueroa, and John Does 1-5 (the "individual Defendants"), as Defendants in this matter and to add claims against all of the existing and proposed Defendants under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"). Defendants oppose Plaintiff's Motion [Docket Entry No. 38]. The Court has fully reviewed and considered all arguments made in support of, and in opposition to, Plaintiff's Motion. The Court considers Plaintiff's Motion without oral argument pursuant to L.CIV.R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth more fully below, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint pro se on October 19, 2012 (Docket Entry No. 1), followed by an Amended Complaint on August 13, 2013, also pro se. (See Amended Complaint; Docket Entry No. 34). In said Complaints, Plaintiff alleges discrimination and retaliation engaged against herby various supervisors and superiors. However, Plaintiff only names the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP") as a Defendant in the caption. (Id.). Plaintiff allegedly thought referencing individuals in the body of the original Complaint and Amended Complaint was sufficient to plead a cause of action against them individually. Plaintiff, now represented by counsel, seeks to file a Second Amended Complaint, adding her superiors Steven Maybury, Gwen Zervas, Pam Lyons, Deborah Figueroa, John Does 1-5 in their individual capacities as well as the State of New Jersey as Defendants. (Id.). Further, Plaintiff now alleges a claim for a violation of NJLAD. (Id.).
Plaintiff argues the motion to amend should be granted because Fed. R. Civ.P. 8(a) does not require the pleading to state specific facts, only that the Defendant is given fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. (Id.). Furthermore, relying on Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980), Plaintiff argues that a pro se complaint is held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and that courts have a special obligation to construe such complaints liberally. (Id.). Plaintiff contends that the Amended Complaint, which was filed by Plaintiff as a pro se Plaintiff, should be construed liberally. Under a liberal construction, Plaintiff claims that all Defendants received proper notice of this action. (Id.).
Plaintiff argues that due to the notice pleading standard applied generally to complaints and the even further relaxed standards applied to pro se litigants' pleadings, Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint provide fair notice to the Defendants of the nature and basis of the asserted claims and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. (Id.). Plaintiff further supports her argument by dismissing the importance of the caption of a Complaint, stating that itis not considered part of the pleader's statement of claim and is not determinative of the parties to the action. (Id.). Instead Plaintiff argues that the words of the Complaint are what are important and that both the Complaint and Amended Complaint state who engaged in the alleged discrimination. (Id.). Furthermore, Plaintiff cites to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) and argues that leave to amend pleadings shall be freely given when justice so requires. (Id. citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Lastly, Plaintiff argues Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) specifically permits an amendment of a pleading to relate back to the of the original Complaint when the amendment asserts a claim that arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out, or attempted to be set out, in the original pleading. (Id. citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B)).
Defendant, NJDEP, argues that Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended Complaint would be futile, and therefore should be denied. (See Brief in Opposition; Docket Entry No. 38). Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the addition of defendants cannot relate back to the time of the original pleading, and Defendant, Department of Environmental Protection is immune from suit under NJLAD pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. (Id.).
Additionally, Defendant asserts that the claims of discrimination based on sex and color should be dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. (Id.). Defendant also claims that the applicable statute of limitations bar any acts occurring before September 15, 2011 because Plaintiff submitted her Charge of Discrimination to the EEOC on July 11, 2012, and any earlier acts would exceed the 300 day period applied to her claims. (Id.). Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's attempt to add individual Defendants is futile because Plaintiff cannot satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) to comport with the statute of limitations requirements, andbecause individual defendants are immune from suit under Title VII and the NJLAD. (Id.).
Defendant further argues that claims regarding Plaintiff's disability should be dismissed based on the doctrine of laches and equitable estoppel. (Id.) Defendant claims that because Plaintiff previously advised the Court in writing that she was withdrawing her disability claim, both the Court and Defendant relied on this assertion. (Id.). Defendant submits that it relied on this assertion when submitting interrogatories and requests for production of documents to Plaintiff, in taking her deposition and in its decision to not file a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint in lieu of an Answer. (Id.).
In her Reply, Plaintiff argues that the main purpose for filing the motion to amend the Complaint is to make clear that the supervisors named in the body of the Complaint are named Defendants and that the facts alleged against them establish a cause of action under NJLAD. (See Reply Brief; Docket Entry No. 39). Plaintiff admits that the Eleventh amendment "may" bar an action for damages against the State of New Jersey and NJDEP, but not against the named Defendants in their individual capacities for damages, and not against NJDEP for equitable relief. (Id.).
II. Analysis
Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2), leave to amend the pleadings is generally granted freely. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, the Court may deny a motion to amend where there is "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance ofthe amendment, [or] futility of the amendment." Id. However, where there is an absence of undue delay, bad faith, prejudice or futility, a motion for leave to amend a pleading should be liberally granted. Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 400 (3d Cir. 2004).
In deciding whether to grant leave to amend, "prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of the amendment." Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Cornell & Co., Inc. v. Occupational Health and Safety Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978)). To establish prejudice, the non-moving party must make a showing that allowing the amended pleading would (1) require the non-moving party to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial, (2) significantly delay the resolution of the dispute, or (3) prevent a party from bringing a timely action in another jurisdiction. See Long, 393 F.3d at 400. Delay alone, however, does not justify denying a motion to amend. See Cureton v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001). Rather, it is only where delay becomes "'undue,' placing an unwarranted burden on the court, or . . . 'prejudicial,' placing an unfair burden on the opposing party" that denial of a motion to amend is appropriate. Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).
Further, a proposed amendment is appropriately denied where it is futile. An amendment is futile if it "is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is legally insufficient on its face." Harrison Beverage Co. v. Dribeck Imp., Inc.,, 133 F.R.D. 463, 468 (D.N.J. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To evaluate futility, the District Court uses "the same standard of legal sufficiency" as applied to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). "Accordingly, if a claim is vulnerable to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), but the plaintiff moves to amend, leave to amend generally must be granted unless the amendment would not cure the deficiency." Id.
In determining futility, the Court considers only the pleading, exhibits attached to the pleading, matters of public record, and undisputedly authentic documents if the party's claims are based upon same. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). To determine if a pleading would survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept all facts alleged in the pleading as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting them. Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). "[D]ismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the [pleading] as true, the p[arty] has failed to plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is...
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