Wahl v. Sutton
| Decision Date | 24 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:16-cv-01576-BAM (PC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | PETER GERARD WAHL, Plaintiff, v. SUTTON, Defendant. |
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO SUPPLEMENT (ECF Nos. 13, 16)
Plaintiff Peter Gerard Wahl ("Plaintiff"), a former state prisoner, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated this action on October 19, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 7.)
Currently pending before the court are Plaintiff's motions to supplement filed on January 13, 2017, and March 6, 2017. (ECF Nos. 13, 16.) For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's motions to supplement shall be denied.
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On November 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed a supplement to his original complaint. (ECF No. 8.) Thereafter, on December 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to supplement his original complaint. (ECF No. 9.) On January 13, 2017, the Court signed an order disregarding Plaintiff's supplemental pleading, denying his motion to supplement and granting him leave to amend his complaint within thirty (30) days. The order was docketed on January 17, 2017. (ECF No. 14.)
Before the Court's order granting leave to amend was docketed, however, Plaintiff filed a second motion to supplement his original complaint. (ECF No. 13.) During pendency of the motion to supplement, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on February 16, 2017. (ECF No. 15.) Because Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint, Plaintiff's request to supplement his original complaint is now moot and is HEREBY DENIED. See, e.g., Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) ().
As indicated, on March 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion to supplement his first amended complaint. (ECF No. 16.) By his motion, Plaintiff requests that his civil action be supplemented (Id. at p. 1.) Attached to his moving papers are minutes from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Orange, in Case: 16WF1633M A and Name: Wahl, Peter Gerard. (Id. at p. 2.) The minutes span the time period from November 15, 2016, to January 23, 2017. (Id.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) states, "[o]n motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Here, Plaintiff's motion alleges no new facts that arose subsequent to his first amended complaint to support a supplemental pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). As noted, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint in February 2017, which was after the proceedingsreflected in the minutes of the Orange County Superior Court took place. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to supplement his complaint filed on March 6, 2017, is HEREBY DENIED. However, the court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of court records in other cases. See United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2004).
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff, formerly confined at Wasco State Prison, brings suit against the followingdefendants: (1) Warden John Sutton; (2) Counselor Jane/John Doe; (3) J. Albert, CCII; and (4) Assistant Deputy Chief Warden Jane Doe.
In his first claim, Plaintiff alleges: On August 18, 2016, Plaintiff was sentenced to 16 months in Case No. 16WF1633. On September 7, 2016, Defendants took custody of Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff sought relief in the sentencing court under Proper 47. On November 30, 2016, the sentencing court reclassified Plaintiff's felony to a misdemeanor and resentenced Plaintiff to 180 days (deemed served). Once Plaintiff learned of the sentencing, he submitted grievances "everywhere," but no grievances were answered. (ECF No. 15 at p. 3.) Instead, Plaintiff was released under Prop 64 by Defendants with "summary probation." (Id.) Plaintiff checked Case No. 16WF1633 and found no probation. Plaintiff sought emergency relief and submitted grievances to Defendants J. Albert, Counselor Jane/John Doe, Assistant Deputy Chief Warden Jane Doe, and Warden John Sutton, along with the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Plaintiff also sought habeas relief, which was deemed moot and withdrawn without prejudice.
In his second claim, Plaintiff alleges that his access to courts was seriously thwarted and impaired by policy that prohibited unlimited access unless a court ordered deadline was capable of being produced. Plaintiff contends that copies and research were severely limited, requiring him to file original copies and hand draft initial complaints. Plaintiff further alleges that the grievance procedure did not provide any timely form of relief, even after he requested emergency relief. Plaintiff claims that 602 forms had to be completed in ink and pens sold in the canteen were good only for a week.
Plaintiff further asserts that he obtained relief from the lower court, but "the Defendant" disregarded the habeas action, 602s and other grievances to staff members. The counselor finally saw Plaintiff and had him sign papers on December 28, 2016, and Plaintiff was released on December 29, 2016 with alleged summary probation. Plaintiff asserts that he missed Christmas, and that "the Defendant" by his policies and callous indifference to his liberty interest appeared tobe retaliatory in denying release for 29 days.
In his third claim, Plaintiff alleges that he was ordered reclassified and resentenced to a misdemeanor (time served). Defendant did not release Plaintiff until 29 days later on other grounds. Defendant reportedly lacked jurisdiction to implement Prop 64 after court issued order at same time under Prop 47. Plaintiff did not choose to serve Defendant and his staff after November 30, 2016. Defendant was served with a petition for writ of habeas corpus that sought relief for classification delays and supplemented the same with this issue. Defendant allegedly disregarded Plaintiff's litigation seeking relief from the unconstitutional imprisonment being suffered. Plaintiff further alleges that housing C-B-3 has been scheduled for renovations due to black mold and plumbing problems. Plaintiff asserts that he also was grieving cold food and black mold.
Plaintiff asserts violations of his First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Thirteenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He seeks damages, along with declaratory relief.
Plaintiff initiated this action on October 19, 2016, as a purported class action, complaining about "classification processing" related to good time credits and transfer to mainline where additional good time credits are received. (ECF No. 1 at p. 3.) Plaintiff's amended complaint, which concerns events post-dating his original complaint, appears to improperly change the nature of this suit. In the order granting Plaintiff leave to the amend, the court expressly warned Plaintiff that he may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints). Despite the apparent change in his underlying claims, the court will nonetheless screen the allegations in Plaintiff's first amended complaint to determine if he states a cognizable claim for relief.
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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of [state law]...subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United...
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