Wai v. Rainbow Holdings
| Decision Date | 07 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-61197-CIV.,03-61197-CIV. |
| Parties | Aung Lin WAI, Plaintiff, v. RAINBOW HOLDINGS, M.T.M. Ship Management Pte. Ltd., and M.T. Maritime Management (USA) LLC, in personam, and M/T Chembulk Westport, in rem, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Guilford & Rash, Miami, Julio Jesus Ayala, Jr., Crew Member Advocacy Center, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Aung Lin Wai, plaintiff.
William R. Boeringer, Hayden & Milliken, Coral Gables, FL, for Rainbow Holdings, M.T.M. Ship Management Pte. Ltd., M.T. Maritime Management (USA) LLC, In Personam, defendants.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF M.T. MARITIME MANAGEMENT (USA) LLC
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendants, Rainbow Holdings, M.T.M. Ship Management Pte. Ltd. ("MTM-Singapore"), and M.T. Maritime Management (USA) LLC's ("MTM-U.S.A.['s]") Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 15], which the Court converted, in part, to a motion for summary judgment on February 23, 2004 [D.E. 42]. The Court heard oral argument on October 15, 2003 and has reviewed the parties' written submissions, pertinent portions of the record, and the applicable law.
On June 19, 2003, Plaintiff, Aung Lin Wai, filed a civil action to recover damages for injuries that he suffered on May 9, 2003 aboard the M/T Chembulk Westport, while working as a member of the ship's crew. (D.E.1.) Mr. Wai's Complaint alleges claims of negligence under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, failure to provide maintenance and cure, and failure to treat. It also contains a count for failure to pay wages under 46 U.S.C. § 10313, which the Court dismissed on May 15, 2004 without prejudice upon Mr. Wai's motion to voluntarily dismiss the count. (D.E.48.) On October 16, 2003, the Court dismissed the Complaint without prejudice against the in rem Defendant, M/T Chembulk Westport, for lack of jurisdiction over the vessel. (D.E.35.)
On August 11, 2003, Defendants, Rainbow Holdings, MTM-Singapore, and MTM-U.S.A., moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue, and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (D.E.15.) Defendants argued that Mr. Wai's employment agreement contained a clause requiring that litigation of all employment-related disputes be conducted in Singapore. (Id. at 3.) They further argued that U.S. choice-of-law principles required the Court to apply Singapore law, which would weigh in favor of dismissal. (Id. at 15.) Finally, they asked for a ruling that service of process was defective under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, even though they had accepted service de facto and waived re-service. (Id. at 16.)
On February 23, 2004, the Court issued an Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (D.E.42.) The Court ruled that Defendants' argument for dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) was unavailing and declined to rule on the moot issue of whether service was proper. (Id. at 9 n. 4, 24.) The Court did, however, rule that Defendants' arguments based on the forum selection clause in Mr. Wai's employment agreement (improper venue) and choice-of-law principles (forum non conveniens) were properly brought as motions to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3). (Id. at 9-10.) Nevertheless, the Motion to Dismiss on the basis of the forum selection clause was denied because the clause was merely a permissive "consent to jurisdiction" clause rather than a "mandatory" clause limiting the forum exclusively to Singapore. (Id. at 17-18.) The Court also denied the Motion on the basis of forum non conveniens, concluding that it was premature to conduct the choice-of-law analysis required by Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953), and Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 90 S.Ct. 1731, 26 L.Ed.2d 252 (1970). (Id. at 21-23.)
While Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(3) was denied, the portion of the Motion under Rule 12(b)(6) survived. The Court ruled that MTM-U.S.A.'s argument that its connection to Mr. Wai and the M/T Chembulk Westport was too tenuous to establish liability was properly considered a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Id. at 11.) The Court, however, concluded that it would have to consider matters outside of the pleadings to decide the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and therefore converted it to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. (Id. at 12.) The parties were given an opportunity to conduct discovery and provide supplemental briefing, and the issue is now ripe for decision. The sole issue under consideration is whether MTM-U.S.A.'s connections to Mr. Wai and the M/T Chembulk Westport are sufficient to establish MTM-U.S.A.'s liability for Mr. Wai's injuries under the Jones Act or general maritime law of the United States.
The following facts are not in dispute. Mr. Wai was employed as an Assistant Chief Officer aboard the M/T Chembulk Westport from February 2003 until his injury on May 9, 2003. His duties included vessel navigation and acting as the radio accountant. Mr. Wai boarded the M/T Chembulk Westport in China. He was hired by MTM-Singapore and signed an employment agreement with the company in which he agreed to abide by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement made between MTM-Singapore and the government of Myanmar's Seamen Employment Control Division. Mr. Wai is a citizen of Myanmar (the former Burma) and is currently seeking asylum in the United States.
The M/T Chembulk Westport is a Liberian-flagged chemical tanker. Its disponent owner is Rainbow Holdings, a Liberian corporation which is owned by Srategic Shipping Inc., also a Liberian corporation. As explained more fully below, Strategic Shipping also indirectly owns both MTM-Singapore and MTM-U.S.A. MTM-U.S.A. acts as a cargo agent for the M/T Chembulk Westport, and the vessel's crew regularly sends operational reports to MTM-U.S.A. Mr. Wai also submitted evidence that MTM-U.S.A. and Rainbow Holdings have common management and share a common address.
Notwithstanding its relationship to Rainbow Holdings and MTM-Singapore, MTM-U.S.A. argues that it is not liable under the Jones Act or the general maritime law for Mr. Wai's injuries because it never owned or chartered the M/T Chembulk Westport nor employed Mr. Wai. Mr. Wai, on the other hand, argues that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the true ownership, operation, and control of the M/T Chembulk Westport.
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In making this assessment, the Court "must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir.1997), and "must resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant," United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Ins. Co. of America, 894 F.2d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir.1990).
"By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Likewise, a dispute about a material fact is a "genuine" issue "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
The moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is proper "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In those cases, there is no genuine issue of material fact "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
MTM-U.S.A. argues that Mr. Wai fails to state a cause of action against it under the Jones Act or the general maritime law because it never owned, operated, or chartered the M/T Chembulk Westport nor ever employed Mr. Wai. Specifically, the Defendants submitted employment agreements signed by Mr. Wai and MTM-Singapore. (D.E. 15 Exs. B, C.) Defendants also submitted an affidavit of Maung Win Kyaw, the Sea Personnel Manager of MTM-Singapore, stating that MTM-Singapore, a Singapore limited liability company with its principal place of business in Singapore, acts as the managing owner of the M/T Chembulk Westport, responsible for hiring the crew. (D.E. 21 ¶¶ 1, 6.)...
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