Wainwright v. Davis Nursing Ass'n
| Decision Date | 15 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:12CV00334 JLH,5:12CV00334 JLH |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
| Parties | JANIE R. WAINWRIGHT PLAINTIFF v. DAVIS NURSING ASSOCIATION; and DAVIS LIFE CARE CENTER DEFENDANTS |
Janie R. Wainwright formerly was employed by Davis Nursing Association, d/b/a Davis Life Care Center. Her employment was terminated effective November 10, 2011. Wainwright contends that the termination was unlawful because it violated the Family and Medical Leave Act, it was based on her race, her sex, her pregnancy, her disability, and it was done in retaliation for reporting an incident in which a white employee made a racial slur concerning a resident of the nursing home. Wainwright also alleges that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and that Davis Life Care Center committed the tort of outrage. Her complaint cites 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 2612, 42 U.S.C. § 2612, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, and 29 U.S.C. § 206(d),1 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-101 et seq.
Davis Life Care Center has filed a motion for summary judgment, and Wainwright has responded. For reasons that will be explained, Davis Life Care Center's motion for summary judgment is granted.
A court should enter summary judgment if the evidence demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must respond by coming forward with specific facts establishing a genuine dispute for trial. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Fulbright McNeill, Inc., 519 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2008). A genuine dispute exists only if the evidence is sufficient to allow a jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2511. When a nonmoving party cannot make a showing sufficient to establish a necessary element of the case on which that party bears the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S. Ct. at 2552.
Wainwright was hired by Davis Life Care Center as a staff registered nurse on September 2, 2009. Document #1 at 3. On December 20, 2009, she was promoted to registered nurse supervisor. Id. Her job included supervising the care of forty-five to fifty-five residents in the facility and at timessupervising the entire building of 140-60 residents. Id. She supervised two licensed practical nurses and six to eight certified nurse technicians. Id.
On March 25, 2011, another employee reported to Wainwright that she had witnessed a third employee, Amanda Nelson, verbalize an offensive racial slur to an African American resident. Id. Specifically, Nelson referred to the African American resident as "an Aunt Jemimia." Document #20-5 at 1. Wainwright reported this slur to the administration of Davis Life Care Center, who investigated the incident and counseled Nelson. Document #12-4. Wainwright then reported the matter to the Office of Long-Term Care, which regulates nursing homes in Arkansas. Document #20-1. The Office of Long-Term Care found the complaint to be unfounded. Document #12-6 at 2. Following these reports, a supervisor began yelling at Wainwright in front of other employees and began treating her differently because she was offended by the racially-charged statement. Document #20-1.
Wainwright was pregnant during 2011 and took several weeks of leave. The policy of Davis Life Care Center is that any leave that qualifies for purposes of FMLA leave is counted as FMLA leave even if the employee is eligible for paid leave during some or all of that time either as personal time off or as sick leave. Document #20-4 at 2. Wainwright began FMLA leave on August 8, 2011. Document #12-7 at 6. She was informed that her FMLA leave would be exhausted on October 30, 2011. Id. That date was subsequently extended to November 8, 2011. Document #12-8.
Wainwright delivered a child by cesarean section on October 5, 2011. Document #12-7 at 2. Her doctor wrote that she needed to remain off work until November 30, 2011. Document #12-7 at 2 and Document #20-3. Wainwright did not return to work. Document #12-7 at 2.
On November 11, 2011, the human resources department of Davis Life Care Center wrote Wainwright a letter explaining that her FMLA leave was exhausted on November 8, 2011. Document #12-8. The letter informed Wainwright that with her FMLA leave exhausted, her position was no longer protected, and her unpaid leave had not been approved, so her employment was terminated effective November 10, 2011. Id.
On December 20, 2011, Wainwright filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Document #12-1. She checked the boxes for discrimination based on race, sex, and retaliation, but not disability. Id. The EEOC issued a right to sue letter on May 30, 2012. Wainwright commenced this action by filing a complaint on August 28, 2012.
As noted, Wainwright brings her claims pursuant to the Arkansas Civil Rights Act as well as a variety of federal statutes. The Arkansas courts look to federal precedent for guidance in interpreting the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-105(c). Disparate treatment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII, the ADA and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act are analyzed in the same manner. Evance v. Trumann Health Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 2013); Davis v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 685 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir. 2012); Stoner v. Ark. Dept. of Correction, No. 3:10CV00218 KGB, 2013 WL 6061651, at *12 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 18, 2013). Neither party has argued that the protections offered by the Arkansas Civil Rights Act are broader or narrower than the federal statutes, so the Court's rulings on Wainwright's federal claims will apply equally to her corresponding state-law claims. Hess v. Ables, 714 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2013).
The FMLA provides that an eligible employee is entitled to a total of twelve work weeks of leave during any twelve-month period because of the birth of a son or daughter or because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) and (C). "An FMLA entitlement claim arises when an employer denies or interferes with an employee's substantive FMLA rights." Hager v. Arkansas Dept. of Health, 735 F.3d 1009, 1015 (8th Cir. 2013). The employee bears the initial burden of proof to show that she was entitled to a denied FMLA benefit. Ballato v. Comcast Corp., 676 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2012).
Wainwright asserts that she did not exhaust her FMLA leave, but the undisputed facts show that she did. As noted, her FMLA leave began on August 8, 2011. By November 8, 2011, Wainwright had exhausted all of her FMLA leave. After Wainwright's child was born on October 5, 2011, her physician wrote that she should be on medical leave until November 30, 2011. Document #12-7 at 1; Document #20-3. Wainwright testified that she understood that if she stayed off work until November 30, 2011, her FMLA leave would have been exhausted before she returned to work. Document #12-7 at 2. Thus, the termination of Wainwright's employment effective November 10, 2011, did not interfere with her substantive rights under the FMLA leave.
Wainwright also contends that the termination of her employment was an act of race discrimination. She presents no direct evidence of race discrimination, so her claim must be analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Burton v. Arkansas Secy. of State, 737 F.3d 1219, 1229 (8th Cir. 2013). Under this framework, Wainwright must show that (1) she is amember of a protected class, (2) she met her employer's legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. Id. Wainwright may satisfy the fourth part of a prima facie case in a variety of ways, such as showing more favorable treatment of similarly-situated employees who are not in the protected class. Id. If she meets her burden of establishing a prima facie case, Davis Life Care Center must provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination that rebuts Wainwright's prima facie case. Id. If Davis Life Care Center does so, the presumption of discrimination disappears, and Wainwright must prove that the proper justification was merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
Wainwright has not presented evidence to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. First, she was not meeting the legitimate expectations of her employer because she did not return to work after her FMLA leave was exhausted, nor did she obtain approval for additional unpaid leave. Second, she has presented no evidence of circumstances that would give rise to an inference of discrimination.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Wainwright has met her burden of establishing a prima facie case, she cannot show that the reason for her termination—that her FMLA leave expired and she did not return to work—was a pretext for racial discrimination. She says in an affidavit that there were white employees who used FMLA...
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