Waite v. Waite
| Citation | 618 So.2d 1360 |
| Decision Date | 27 May 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 79463,79463 |
| Parties | 18 Fla. L. Week. S311 Beres WAITE, Petitioner, v. Joyce WAITE, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
James C. Blecke, and Norman M. Waas, Parenti, Falk & Waas, P.A., Miami, for petitioner.
Kenneth R. Drake of Touby Smith DeMahy & Drake, P.A., and Frank A. Abrams, Miami, for respondent.
We have for review Waite v. Waite, 593 So.2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA1991), which certified the following question of great public importance:
Whether Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So.2d 1126 (Fla.1988), permits a claim by a former spouse for battery against the other spouse, committed during the marriage, and prior to the effective date of section 741.235, Florida Statutes (1985), where the claim is limited to the extent of insurance coverage, the spouse was convicted of attempted first degree murder stemming from the battery, and the egregious nature of the injuries demonstrates that the policy considerations enunciated in Sturiano--"fear of disruption of the family or other marital discord, or the possibility of fraud or collusion"--were not present when the battery was committed.
Waite, 593 So.2d at 231 (). We rephrase the question as follows:
Does the doctrine of interspousal immunity remain a part of Florida's common law?
We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
In 1984, Joyce Waite and other members of her family were attacked by her husband, who inflicted substantial injuries upon them with a machete. He subsequently was convicted of several crimes including attempted murder. Joyce Waite divorced him. Later, she filed suit seeking a recovery of damages against a homeowner's insurance policy. On the husband's motion, the trial court dismissed the cause as being barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity. See Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352 (Fla.1979), modified, Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So.2d 1126 (Fla.1988). The Third District reversed based on Sturiano.
In Sturiano, 523 So.2d at 1128, we held that the doctrine of interspousal immunity no longer is applicable when the public policy reasons for applying it do not exist. These policy reasons are judicial avoidance of acts that could disrupt the family or foster marital discord, or where there is a strong possibility of fraud or collusion between husband and wife. Based on this holding, we found in Sturiano that the doctrine did not bar a wife's claim filed against the insurer of a deceased husband when the factual claim before us arose from the same accident in which the husband died and when the claim did not exceed the limits of liability.
Since Sturiano was issued, this Court and its advisory commissions have had an opportunity to review legal issues relevant to the doctrine of interspousal immunity. As a result of that review, we now find that there no longer is a sufficient reason warranting a continued adherence to the doctrine of interspousal immunity. As we previously have held, the common law will not be altered or expanded by this Court unless demanded by public necessity or to vindicate fundamental rights. In re T.A.C.P., 609 So.2d 588, 594 (Fla.1992). Here, we find that both public necessity and fundamental rights require judicial abrogation of the doctrine.
First, we find no reason to believe that married couples are any more likely to engage in fraudulent conduct against insurers than anyone else. An otherwise meritorious claim should not be foreclosed simply because a person is married to a wrongdoer.
The fact is that when couples collude in a fraud, many devices exist to detect the deception whether or not the couples are married. Insurance companies can and do hire their own lawyers and investigators to examine suspicious claims. When testifying, the claimants are subject to impeachment and discrediting because of their own financial stake in the outcome. They are subject to the court's contempt power, to the criminal laws for perjury and various forms of fraud, to civil lawsuit, and even to the racketeering and forfeiture statutes authorizing (among other things) the seizure of property used to further their crimes. If these other devices are adequate for unmarried couples, then we believe they also must be equally adequate for those with a marriage license. See Art. I, Sec. 2, Fla. Const.
Second, we do not believe that the types of lawsuits prohibited by the doctrine of interspousal immunity, if allowed, are likely to foster unwarranted marital discord. Under present law, for example, an abused spouse still might file criminal charges against the abuser, can sue in equity over property interests, and can file for an injunction for protection. We believe that marital disharmony will not be increased merely because of the addition of a lawsuit for the various types of personal injury at issue here.
Finally, we note that thirty-two states have abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity completely, Waite v. Waite, 593 So.2d 222, 225, 229-31 (Gersten, J., dissenting), leaving Florida in a shrinking minority. The doctrine also has been resoundingly rejected by the single most respected authority on American tort law. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts Sec. 122, at 902-04 (5th ed. 1984). We particularly agree with Keeton's observation that the very act of creating exceptions to the doctrine, as this Court repeatedly has done, renders the doctrine increasingly less justifiable. Id. at 904. We also find absolutely no evidence that fraud and collusion have been promoted or encouraged to any undue extent in the majority of states that have abrogated the doctrine, some many decades ago.
For the foregoing reasons, the result reached below is approved and the certified question as rephrased here is answered in the negative.
It is so ordered.
The abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity will not damage what the marital relationship is designed to be--a special relationship between partners who share love, common interests, concerns, hopes, and endeavors. As the majority notes, if one of those partners commits a wrong against the other, the injured party should not be foreclosed from bringing an otherwise meritorious claim just because he or she is married to the wrongdoer.
I concur that the common law will only be altered or expanded by this Court in order to vindicate fundamental rights or when demanded by public necessity. Majority at 1361. I believe that time has come. The doctrine of interspousal immunity is rooted in the common law and is not a statutory creation. As such, it is appropriate for this Court to abrogate the doctrine rather than defer to legislative action.
Justices Grimes and McDonald raise the specter of a proliferation of lawsuits between spouses upon the abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity. However, limiting litigation has never been the stated policy for the doctrine. Rather, the doctrine is based upon the dual public policies of fostering marital harmony and avoiding possible collusion or fraud between spouses.
The Legislature has already statutorily abrogated the doctrine with regard to the intentional tort of battery. Section 741.235, Fla.Stat. (1991). Florida law also permits a spouse to file a criminal complaint against a spouse, to seek an injunction for protection from that spouse's violence, and to sue in equity over property interests. 1 If the preservation of marital harmony is the compelling reason for maintaining interspousal immunity as to other personal tort actions, then that rationale should apply with equal force to these legal actions that the law permits one spouse to maintain against the other. Certainly, it is difficult to make any rational argument for interspousal immunity as to these permitted legal actions. Yet, such actions are just as likely, if not even more likely, to foster marital discord than are the personal tort actions that are barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity.
Moreover, if the overriding concern is to prevent fraud or collusion by spouses in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Clay Elec. Co-Op., Inc. v. Johnson
...that "public policy dictates that an action by the parents for negligent stillbirth should be recognized in Florida"); Waite v. Waite, 618 So.2d 1360, 1361 (Fla.1993) (noting that this Court will not alter the common law "unless demanded by public necessity or to vindicate fundamental right......
-
Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 98-362.
...caused by such conduct, family harmony may be destroyed in a very perceptible, and legal, sense by such conduct. In Waite v. Waite, 618 So.2d 1360 (Fla. 1993), the Supreme Court made a similar observation when it abrogated the interspousal immunity doctrine. There, the Court we do not belie......
-
Herzfeld v. Herzfeld
...the authority to make such a change to the application of the doctrine. We disagree. As was noted by Justice Harding in his concurrence in Waite, because the "doctrine of interspousal immunity is rooted in the common law and is not a statutory creation[,] ... it is appropriate for this Cour......
-
Gracey v. Eaker
...We have rephrased certified questions in the past to conform them more properly to the true issue under review. See, e.g., Waite v. Waite, 618 So.2d 1360 (Fla.1993). 2. Section 491.0147, Florida Statutes (1997), discussed infra, requires psychotherapists to keep confidential the substance o......
-
Marriage dissolution
...action, spouses can sue one another for contract, fraud, and other torts and bring such other claims as is necessary. [ Waite v. Waite , 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).] As to claims for marital asset dissipation, however, when there is no specific transaction or agreement between the spouses ......
-
§ 8.01 Personal Injury Claims
...42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914). Delaware: Beattie v. Beattie, 630 A.2d 1096 (Del. 1993) (as to claims for negligence). Florida: Waite v. Waite, 618 So.2d 1360 (Fla. 1993). Hawaii: Haw. Rev. L. § 572-28. Idaho: Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1975). Indiana: Brooks v. Robi......
-
Family law proceedings and grounds
...of Interspousal Immunity The Florida Supreme Court abrogated the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity. [ Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).] Decades ago, the Florida legislature abrogated the doctrine with regard to the intentional tort of battery. [§741.235, Fla. Stat.] T......
-
Domestic violence
...Fla. Stat.] No plaintiff, however, may recover twice for the same incident which gives rise to the cause of action. [ Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).] DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 10-83 Domestic Violence §10:421 §10:412 Statute of Limitations The action must be commenced within four years......