Wakefield v. Levin, 397

Decision Date04 January 1955
Docket NumberNo. 397,397
Citation118 Vt. 392,110 A.2d 712
PartiesRuth WAKEFIELD v. Sam LEVIN, d/b/a People's Department Store.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

Black & Wilson, Burlington (Albert W. Coffrin, Burlington, on the brief), for plaintiff.

Edmunds, Austin & Wick, Burlington, for defendant.

Before SHERBURNE, C. J., and JEFFORDS, CLEARY, ADAMS and CHASE, JJ.

CLEARY, Justice.

This is an action in tort to recover damages for injuries suffered by the plaintiff when she slipped and fell while leaving the defendant's store. Trial was by jury with a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The case is here on the defendant's exceptions to the admission of evidence and to the denial of the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict. The declaration alleged negligence of the defendant by (1) failing to provide a means of ingress or egress to his premises that was reasonably safe; (2) failing to keep the entryway so that it would not become slippery and dangerous for use due to rain, snow, ice and slush; (3) failing to provide rubber matting or other material of a nonslip nature to protect persons using the entryway from its slippery condition due to rain, snow, ice and slush, when the defendant knew or should have known that the entryway became slippery due to rain, snow, ice or slush. The declaration also alleged that the plaintiff was without fault. The floor of the entrance was old type terrazzo.

Subject to the defendant's exception an expert was allowed to testify that there are two types of terrazzo used in store entrances and as to the wearing qualities of the non-slippery type of terrazzo. The defendant claims that questions dealing with other types of surfaces were improper because the question here involved was whether this particular entrance was safe. But the plaintiff's declaration also alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to provide an entrance of a non-slip nature that would not become slippery. So in order for the jury to determine whether this entrance was reasonably safe and also whether it should have been constructed of non-slip material it was proper to allow the plaintiff to show the types and characteristics of materials commonly used for such a surface. Cole v. North Danville Creamery, 103 Vt. 32, 41, 42, 151 A. 568; Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., Inc., 113 Vt. 433, 435-436, 35 A.2d 365.

The expert was also asked what if any measures or safeguards might be taken to prevent such a surface as existed here from being slippery or to make it less slippery and, subject to the defendant's exception, answered it could be covered with a suitable rubber mat. This was properly admitted in order for the jury to determine whether the defendant should have provided such a mat to make the entrance reasonably safe. Cole v. North Danville Creamery, 103 Vt. 32, 41, 42, 151 A. 568; Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., Inc., 113 Vt. 433, 435-436, 35 A.2d 365.

Finally, and subject to the defendant's objection and exception, the expert was allowed to state his opinion that the use of the old style terrazzo was hazardous. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether this was a violation of the general rule regarding opinion evidence because, on the grounds briefed and relied upon by the defendant and in view of the other evidence in the case, we are not satisfied that the claimed error was prejudicial. The evidence objected to was similar in effect to other evidence received without objection so the error, if any, was harmless. Stoddard & Son v. Village of North Troy, 102 Vt. 462, 467, 150 A. 148; Shastany v. Weeks, 113 Vt. 363, 369, 34 A.2d 174.

Both parties have briefed the defendant's motion for a nonsuit made during the trial but in oral argument defendant's counsel stated he did not press that point and plaintiff's counsel stated he understood the defendant waived it. We so understand and therefore give it no consideration.

The defendant has briefed his motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to prove (1) that the construction of the entranceway was inherently dangerous; (2) that the defendant had failed to remedy a dangerous condition once he knew of it; and (3) that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failure to look where she was going.

In passing upon the defendant's motions the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and if there is any substantial evidence fairly and reasonably tending to support the plaintiff's claim the question is for the jury. Fletcher v. Manning, 118 Vt. 240, 241-242, 105 A.2d 264; Campbell v. Howard National Bank, 118 Vt. 182, 183-184, 103 A.2d 96; McLaughlin v. Getman, 117 Vt. 25, 26, 83 A.2d 513; Wilford v. Salvucci, 117 Vt. 495, 498, 95 A.2d 37; Green Mountain Mushroom Co. v. Brown, 117 Vt. 509, 511, 95 A.2d 679; Reynolds v. John Hancock Ins. Co., 117 Vt. 541, 545, 97 A.2d 121. Viewed in this light the evidence showed that the defendant had been connected with the People's Department Store located on Church Street in Burlington for approximately forty years, was a partner in the business when the terrazzo flooring in the vestibule entrance was installed in 1920 and was the sole owner of the business and the building on November 25, 1949. On that date the plaintiff entered the store as a prospective customer. She was wearing laced oxford shoes with a flat heel and rubber boots with a flat sole. She noticed that the entire entranceway to the People's Department Store was wet, slushy and slippery. As the plaintiff came out of the store she noticed that it was wet and was walking carefully and looking carefully because it was bad all over. She took two or three steps, slipped, fell to the floor and was injured.

There are two types of terrazzo surfaces commonly in use, the old type and the new type. Both types are a mixture of marble chips and cement. In addition, the new type contains particles of carborundum. In both types after the mixture has been allowed to harden it is polished. The carborundum is harder than the cement and makes the surface less slippery. The old type of terrazzo is more slippery when wet and is...

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12 cases
  • Blaine Const. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 12 Abril 1999
    ...(R.I.1914); Overt v. State, 97 Tex.Crim. 202, 260 S.W. 856, 857 (Tex.Crim.App.1924) (flour weight fluctuation); Wakefield v. Levin, 118 Vt. 392, 110 A.2d 712, 715 (Vt.1955) (vestibule/foyer); Marcott v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry., 147 Wis. 216, 133 N.W. 37, 37, 39 (Wis.191......
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Vermont
    • 21 Mayo 1971
    ...condition." Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, 264 A.2d 796, 799 (Vt.1970) (slip on the proverbial banana peel); see Wakefield v. Levin, 118 Vt. 392, 397, 110 A.2d 712 (1954). An "invitation" such as defendant issued to plaintiff here "carries with it some measure of assurance of safety, which ......
  • Lewis v. Vermont Gas Corp.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 5 Mayo 1959
    ...any substantial evidence fairly and reasonably tending to support the plaintiff's claim the question is for the jury. Wakefield v. Levin, 118 Vt. 392, 395, 110 A.2d 712. The effect of modifying evidence is to be excluded. Contradictions and contradictory inferences are for the jury to resol......
  • Bagalio v. Hoar, 1829
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 4 Enero 1955
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