Waker v. United States, 6421.

Decision Date28 April 1965
Docket NumberNo. 6421.,6421.
Citation344 F.2d 795
PartiesEdmond WAKER, Defendant, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Robert E. Fast, Boston, Mass., with whom Hale & Dorr, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for appellant.

Melvin B. Miller, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., U. S. Atty., and William J. Koen, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on brief, for appellee.

Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, WATERMAN,* Circuit Judge and GIGNOUX, District Judge.

ALDRICH, Chief Judge.

The defendant was convicted of violating 26 U.S.C. § 4742(a) forbidding the transfer of marihuana without a written order upon a form issued by the Secretary of the Treasury. The defense, essentially, was entrapment. It is clear, on the government's own case, that a transfer was requested by a government agent.1 It is also clear, just as in Whiting v. United States, 1 Cir., 1963, 321 F.2d 72, that while the agent apparently had some private reason for suspecting that the defendant would be amenable, on the evidence presented in court he had no probable cause.2 We reaffirm our holding in Whiting that where the inducement exercised was not "shocking or offensive per se" the only issue is whether the defendant was sufficiently predisposed, so that while the particular offense was brought about by the government agent, the defendant's criminality, or "corruption," was not. On this issue, once inducement has been shown, the burden is on the government beyond a reasonable doubt.3 United States v. Landry, 7 Cir., 1958, 257 F.2d 425, 429; Lunsford v. United States, 10 Cir., 1952, 200 F.2d 237, 239-240. However, such predisposition may be inferred from the circumstances themselves. Defendant's concept that "an established pattern of continuing criminal conduct" must be found is erroneous. As we pointed out in Whiting, supra, entrapment is allowed as a defense not because the defendant has not committed the acts constituting the crime, but because entrapment, as legally defined, is unacceptable to a sense of justice and fair play. It would be excessive to extend it to a defendant who showed himself ready and willing, and merely had to be persuaded that this was a safe opportunity to commit the offense. In such circumstances we would not impose on the government the very heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a habitual offender, or even that he was a prior offender at all. Our discussion in Whiting of the purpose behind the entrapment defense and the countervailing policies need not be repeated.

Although the instant defendant had to be "played with" a bit, the jury was warranted in concluding, to continue in the vernacular, that he was willing to take the bait. We see no purpose in detailing the evidence in the body of this opinion.4 The difficulty comes with the charge. The court did not separate out the issue of probable cause, as it might appear to the agent, to solicit the defendant, and defendant's actual predisposition to engage in illicit activities, i. e., whether he was in fact entrapped. It charged the jury that the prosecution could establish the defendant's predisposition by showing that the agent knew that he was predisposed to commit the crime, either from "personal knowledge, or from information from an established authority that is to be believed." This was either a total failure to charge on the more basic issue of predisposition as distinguished from probable cause, or a charge that on this basic issue hearsay could be considered. In either event it was directly contrary to Whiting v. United States, 1 Cir., 1961, 296 F.2d 512, 517-519. The defendant duly saved his rights. On this essential matter we have no alternative but to reverse.5

The defendant made another request which, since the matter may well come up at a second trial, we must deal with. The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that it might find him "guilty of the lesser offense of unlawful acquisition or possession of marihuana." On this appeal he identifies this as meaning a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a), prohibiting the acquisition of marihuana without having paid the tax imposed upon a transferee. If this was "an offense necessarily included in the offense charged," F.R.Crim.P. 31(c), the defendant was entitled to the requested instruction. It may be conceded, in the light of the presumptions established by 26 U.S.C. §§ 4744(a) and 7491, that the evidence in fact warranted a finding that the defendant was guilty of this lesser offense.

We have found very little articulation of the reason why a defendant, as distinguished from the government, is entitled to a charge that he may be found guilty of an offense of a lesser character than the one specified in the indictment. However, it is not what might be regarded as the humanitarian approach, to give a jury, reluctant to find the defendant guilty of the larger offense but possibly prepared to do so if necessary, the opportunity to temper justice. See Sansone v. United States, 85 S.Ct. 1004 (3/29/65). The rule is not applicable unless the lesser offense is made out by some, but less than all, of the factual elements constituting the greater offense, Sansone v. United States, supra. Furthermore, the lesser offense must not require some additional element not needed to constitute the greater offense. Larson v. United States, 10 Cir., 1961, 296 F.2d 80, 81; Giles v. United States, 9...

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28 cases
  • U.S. v. Swingler
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • March 20, 1985
    ...v. Brown, 604 F.2d 557, 561 (8th Cir.1979); Olais-Castro v. United States, 416 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir.1969); Waker v. United States, 344 F.2d 795, 798 (1st Cir.1965); Larson v. United States, 296 F.2d 80, 81 (10th Cir.1961). To convict a defendant of conspiracy to distribute amphetamine, ......
  • Com. v. Doyle
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • December 21, 2006
    ...by the government's undercover activities, Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. at 460, 253 N.E.2d 346, quoting from Waker v. United States, 344 F.2d 795, 796 (1st Cir. 1965); or that he was enmeshed by "methods so outrageous or wicked as to deny him due process," Commonwealth v. LaBonte, 25 ......
  • United States v. Curry
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • May 6, 1968
    ...States v. Landry, 257 F.2d 425, 430 (7th Cir. 1958); Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169, 174 (9th Cir. 1966); Waker v. United States, 344 F.2d 795, 796 (1st Cir. 1965); Lunsford v. United States, 200 F.2d 237, 239-240 (10th Cir. No predisposition can be shown here from a prior record, fo......
  • State v. Brown
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • May 3, 1972
    ...is not needed to commit the greater offense in the manner alleged in the information or the bill of particulars. See Waker v. United States, 344 F.2d 795, 798 (1st Cir.). Limiting the scope of the doctrine in this way obviates any necessity for charging on every offense that the evidence su......
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