Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 10–277.
Citation | 180 L.Ed.2d 374,131 S.Ct. 2541,564 U.S. 338 |
Decision Date | 20 June 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 10–277.,10–277. |
Parties | WAL–MART STORES, INC., Petitioner, v. DUKES et al. |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
Theodore B. Olson, Mark A. Perry, Amir C. Tayrani, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Counsel of Record, Rachel S. Brass, Theane Evangelis Kapur, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.
Joseph M. Sellers, Christine E. Webber, Jenny R. Yang, Kalpana Kotagal, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Washington, D.C., Brad Seligman, Jocelyn D. Larkin, The Impact Fund, Berkeley, CA, Steven Stemerman, Elizabeth A. Lawrence, Davis, Cowell & Bowe, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Arcelia Hurtado, Noreen Farell, Equal Rights Advocates, San Francisco, CA, Sheila Y. Thomas, Law Office of Sheila Thomas, Oakland, CA, Stephen Tinkler, The Tinkler Law Firm, Santa Fe, NM, Merit Bennett, The Bennett Firm, Santa Fe, NM, Debra Gardner, Baltimore, MD, Shauna Marshall, Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco, CA, for Respondents.
Theodore B. Olson, Mark A. Perry, Amir C. Tayrani, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, D.C., Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Counsel of Record, Rachel S. Brass, Theane Evangelis Kapur, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.
We are presented with one of the most expansive class actions ever. The District Court and the Court of Appeals approved the certification of a class comprising about one and a half million plaintiffs, current and former female employees of petitioner Wal–Mart who allege that the discretion exercised by their local supervisors over pay and promotion matters violates Title VII by discriminating against women. In addition to injunctive and declaratory relief, the plaintiffs seek an award of backpay. We consider whether the certification of the plaintiff class was consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2).
Petitioner Wal–Mart is the Nation's largest private employer. It operates four types of retail stores throughout the country: Discount Stores, Supercenters, Neighborhood Markets, and Sam's Clubs. Those stores are divided into seven nationwide divisions, which in turn comprise 41 regions of 80 to 85 stores apiece. Each store has between 40 and 53 separate departments and 80 to 500 staff positions. In all, Wal–Mart operates approximately 3,400 stores and employs more than one million people.
Pay and promotion decisions at Wal–Mart are generally committed to local managers' broad discretion, which is exercised "in a largely subjective manner." 222 F.R.D. 137, 145 (N.D.Cal.2004). Local store managers may increase the wages of hourly employees (within limits) with only limited corporate oversight. As for salaried employees, such as store managers and their deputies, higher corporate authorities have discretion to set their pay within preestablished ranges.
Promotions work in a similar fashion. Wal–Mart permits store managers to apply their own subjective criteria when selecting candidates as "support managers," which is the first step on the path to management. Admission to Wal–Mart's management training program, however, does require that a candidate meet certain objective criteria, including an above-average performance rating, at least one year's tenure in the applicant's current position, and a willingness to relocate. But except for those requirements, regional and district managers have discretion to use their own judgment when selecting candidates for management training. Promotion to higher office—e.g., assistant manager, co-manager, or store manager—is similarly at the discretion of the employee's superiors after prescribed objective factors are satisfied.
The named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, representing the 1.5 million members of the certified class, are three current or former Wal–Mart employees who allege that the company discriminated against them on the basis of their sex by denying them equal pay or promotions, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1 et seq. 1
Betty Dukes began working at a Pittsburgh, California, Wal–Mart in 1994. She started as a cashier, but later sought and received a promotion to customer service manager. After a series of disciplinary violations, however, Dukes was demoted back to cashier and then to greeter. Dukes concedes she violated company policy, but contends that the disciplinary actions were in fact retaliation for invoking internal complaint procedures and that male employees have not been disciplined for similar infractions. Dukes also claims two male greeters in the Pittsburgh store are paid more than she is.
Christine Kwapnoski has worked at Sam's Club stores in Missouri and California for most of her adult life. She has held a number of positions, including a supervisory position. She claims that a male manager yelled at her frequently and screamed at female employees, but not at men. The manager in question "told her to ‘doll up,’ to wear some makeup, and to dress a little better." App. 1003a.
The final named plaintiff, Edith Arana, worked at a Wal–Mart store in Duarte, California, from 1995 to 2001. In 2000, she approached the store manager on more than one occasion about management training, but was brushed off. Arana concluded she was being denied opportunity for advancement because of her sex. She initiated internal complaint procedures, whereupon she was told to apply directly to the district manager if she thought her store manager was being unfair. Arana, however, decided against that and never applied for management training again. In 2001, she was fired for failure to comply with Wal–Mart's timekeeping policy.
These plaintiffs, respondents here, do not allege that Wal–Mart has any express corporate policy against the advancement of women. Rather, they claim that their local managers' discretion over pay and promotions is exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading to an unlawful disparate impact on female employees, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k). And, respondents say, because Wal–Mart is aware of this effect, its refusal to cabin its managers' authority amounts to disparate treatment, see § 2000e–2(a). Their complaint seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive damages, and backpay. It does not ask for compensatory damages.
Importantly for our purposes, respondents claim that the discrimination to which they have been subjected is common to all Wal–Mart's female employees. The basic theory of their case is that a strong and uniform "corporate culture" permits bias against women to infect, perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary decisionmaking of each one of Wal–Mart's thousands of managers—thereby making every woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory practice. Respondents therefore wish to litigate the Title VII claims of all female employees at Wal–Mart's stores in a nationwide class action.
Class certification is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Under Rule 23(a), the party seeking certification must demonstrate, first, that:
Second, the proposed class must satisfy at least one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b). Respondents rely on Rule 23(b)(2), which applies when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole."2
Invoking these provisions, respondents moved the District Court to certify a plaintiff class consisting of " ‘[a]ll women employed at any Wal–Mart domestic retail store at any time since December 26, 1998, who have been or may be subjected to Wal–Mart's challenged pay and management track promotions policies and practices.’ " 222 F.R.D., at 141–142 ( ). As evidence that there were indeed "questions of law or fact common to" all the women of Wal–Mart, as Rule 23(a)(2) requires, respondents relied chiefly on three forms of proof: statistical evidence about pay and promotion disparities between men and women at the company, anecdotal reports of discrimination from about 120 of Wal–Mart's female employees, and the testimony of a sociologist, Dr. William Bielby, who conducted a "social framework analysis" of Wal–Mart's "culture" and personnel practices, and concluded that the company was "vulnerable" to gender discrimination. 603 F.3d 571, 601 (C.A.9 2010) (en banc).
Wal–Mart unsuccessfully moved to strike much of this evidence. It also offered its own countervailing statistical and other proof in an effort to defeat Rule 23(a)'s requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. Wal–Mart further contended that respondents' monetary claims for backpay could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), first because that Rule refers only to injunctive and declaratory relief, and second because the backpay claims could not be manageably tried as a class without depriving Wal–Mart of its right to present certain statutory defenses. With one limitation not relevant here, the District Court granted respondents' motion and certified their proposed class.3
A divided en banc Court of Appeals substantially affirmed the District Court's certification order. 603 F.3d 571. The majority concluded that respondents' evidence of commonality was sufficient to "raise the common question whether Wal–Mart's female employees nationwide were subjected to a...
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