Waldbaum v. Waldbaum
| Decision Date | 26 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-1838-15T3 |
| Parties | MAXIM WALDBAUM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRISTINE WALDBAUM, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Carroll, Leone, and Mawla.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FM-07-2066-01.
Maxim H. Waldbaum, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
Michelle A. Benedek-Barone argued the cause for respondent (Laufer, Dalena, Cadicina, Jensen & Boyd, attorneys; William M. Laufer, of counsel; Michelle A. Benedek-Barone, on the brief).
Plaintiff appeals from an October 22, 2015 order, entered following a post-judgment plenary hearing, and a December 11, 2015 order denying a motion after the hearing. We affirm the October 22, 2015 order in part, reverse other parts, and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the December 11, 2015 order.
The following facts are taken from the record. Plaintiff Maxim Waldbaum and defendant Christine Waldbaum were married December 10, 1983. At the time, defendant had earned a master's degree in nursing and was employed as a psychiatric nurse. Plaintiff was and continues to be employed as a patent attorney in New York City.
The parties purchased a home in Maplewood in 1986. In 1989, they adopted an infant son and defendant reduced her work hours to care for the child. In 1993, the parties wished to adopt another child, but the biological mother reneged, and the child was returned. As a result, defendant became depressed, resigned from her job, and never regained employment. Defendant was later diagnosed with bipolar disorder. At the time of the plenary hearing, her diagnosis and condition remained the same.
The parties eventually adopted a second son born in 1996. This child suffered from numerous health issues, including schizoaffective disorder, hallucinations, ADHD, and autism.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce in March 2001. The parties entered into a comprehensive property settlement agreement (PSA) and were divorced on June 26, 2002.
Pursuant to the PSA, the parties continued to jointly own the marital residence and were both responsible for its mortgage. The home was to be sold when their youngest child turned twenty-one and the equity would be split between the parties.
Pursuant to the PSA, the parties agreed to refinance the home to increase the mortgage to $300,000. From the $120,000 received through the refinance plaintiff received $75,000 to pay off the parties' outstanding credit card debt. He also received an additional $8000. Defendant received $35,000 to pay her counsel and expert fees, and would receive a credit for the mortgage pay down when the house was sold. Defendant was responsible for the monthly mortgage payment. The parties agreed plaintiff would deduct $1500 per month from his alimony and apply it to the mortgage. Plaintiff was responsible for paying the property taxes and repairs over $750 for the residence.
The PSA provided plaintiff would pay defendant $11,500 per month permanent alimony, and $4 000 per month in child support. The PSA stipulated these figures were based on plaintiff's yearly income of $660,000, and no income for defendant. In addition, thePSA obligated plaintiff to pay for the children's medical, dental, and prescription insurance, private schools, and college expenses.
Plaintiff married a fellow patent attorney, Yunling Ren, shortly after the divorce in October 2002. The same month, plaintiff and Ren adopted a daughter from China. Ren resided in China with their daughter.
In July 2002, eleven days after the divorce, Ren purchased a cooperative apartment on West 13th Street in New York City for $831,200, taking a $650,000 mortgage. Plaintiff certified he provided $50,000 for the purchase of the property.
In August 2003, Ren purchased a vacation home in Crarysville, New York for $400,000. Plaintiff certified that Ren made the purchase "solely with her own money."
In 2003, plaintiff approached defendant about refinancing the marital residence and she agreed. At the time, defendant had been diagnosed with stage two breast cancer. She began a course of chemotherapy from January 2004 to May 2004, and then radiation from May 2004 to August 2004, which left her "confused, distracted, fatigue[d], depress[ed] and anxi[ous]." Nonetheless, the refinance occurred in June 2004. Plaintiff took $120,000 in equity as a mortgage cash out from the house; defendant received $10,000.
In 2006, plaintiff approached defendant again about refinancing and she agreed. Plaintiff received approximately$145,000 to $165,000 from the refinance; defendant received no money. Thereafter, no equity remained in the residence.
Commencing in 2009, plaintiff unilaterally reduced his alimony and child support payments without either a court order or defendant's agreement. Plaintiff ceased paying the mortgage in 2011, causing the bank to threaten foreclosure. Plaintiff also did not pay numerous home repair bills, submitted by defendant, as required by the PSA.
Defendant filed a motion to enforce plaintiff's obligations, and plaintiff filed a cross-motion to modify his support and mortgage obligations. On August 24, 2011, the motion judge entered an order temporarily reducing plaintiff's support obligation to $8800 per month, scheduled a plenary hearing, and ordered mediation. Plaintiff did not comply with the order to pay the reduced support, resulting in another enforcement motion by defendant.
On September 29, 2011, a second motion judge entered an order requiring plaintiff to pay arrears and $5000 to defendant for the counsel fees incurred to enforce plaintiff's obligation. The judge further reduced plaintiff's support obligation to $5000 per month. The judge determined plaintiff had acted in bad faith by failing to comply with the August 24, 2011 order.
Plaintiff stopped meeting his financial obligations altogether. Further motion practice resulted in the motion judge entering an order on January 23, 2012, reducing plaintiff's monthly support obligation to $3354.07. Notably, although plaintiff's support obligation was modified, none of the post-judgment orders relieved him of the obligation to pay the mortgage.
A third judge conducted case management conferences and attempted settlement conferences to resolve the matter without necessity of a plenary hearing. The matter did not resolve. On August 30, 2013, the judge ordered plaintiff to pay defendant an additional $20,000 in counsel fees for the plenary hearing. Plaintiff did not comply.
A case management conference occurred on April 30, 2015, before the fourth judge who would ultimately try the matter. The judge set a trial date of June 2, 2015, and ordered plaintiff to pay the $25,000 in counsel fees owed to defendant before the commencement of the hearing or the court would "impose appropriate sanctions."
Plaintiff appeared on the first day of trial not having complied with the order to pay counsel fees. Notwithstanding, the trial judge permitted him to participate in the hearing, but entered an order requiring plaintiff appear the next day with thefunds "or suffer the sanctions of incarceration or dismissal of his pleadings with prejudice."
Plaintiff appeared for the second day of trial without the $25,000. The trial judge held him in contempt pursuant to Rule 1:10-3 and dismissed his pleadings, barring him from participating in the trial, and leaving defendant as the only witness.
Trial occurred over three days in June 2015. The trial judge issued a letter opinion and signed a judgment on October 22, 2015, which plaintiff now appeals.
The judge found defendant's testimony credible and without "material inconsistencies." The judge "observed [defendant's] demeanor when she testified, and she did not hesitate in answering questions, nor did her body language suggest she was lying to the court."
Defendant's testimony recounted the reasons for the initial re-financing of the former marital residence to pay off credit card debt and her expectation that after the divorce she would meet her needs with the support from plaintiff. Defendant asserted plaintiff had not suffered a change in circumstance warranting a modification of his support obligation or the successive re-financing of the former marital residence.
The trial judge also credited defendant's testimony regarding her medical condition and her claim plaintiff took advantage ofher to refinance the property in 2004. The judge stated:
Defendant testified plaintiff had purposely dissipated the value of the residence and purposely impoverished himself through excessive spending after the divorce. She testified discovery revealed plaintiff earned $966,000 in 2006, yet he sought a third re-finance of the former marital residence claiming he had no funds.
Defendant also testified plaintiff deliberately stopped paying the mortgage and paying support to intentionally create a foreclosure. She explained plaintiff's actions were intentional because he was simultaneously spending $4500 per month for his daughter's private education in China, and filed a case information statement (CIS) certifying to the payment of rent to Ren.
Defendant introduced plaintiff's CISs in evidence, including the one filed at the time of the divorce in 2001, and three filed during the post-judgment litigation in 2010, 2013, and 2015. Plaintiff's CISs...
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