Walden v. City of Chicago

Decision Date21 December 2010
Docket NumberNo. 04 C 0047.,04 C 0047.
PartiesOscar WALDEN, Jr., Plaintiff,v.CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

John Ladell Stainthorp, Amber Miller, G. Flint Taylor, Jr., People's Law Offices, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.Andrew M. Hale, Avi T. Kamionski, Christina M. Liu, Monifa Kafi Gray, Shneur Z. Nathan, Andrew M. Hale & Associates, LLC, Eileen Ellen Rosen, Silvia Mercado Masters, Stacy Ann Benjamin, Rock, Fusco, LLC, Mara Stacy Georges, City of Chicago Department of Law, Jeffrey S. McCutchan, Louis R. Hegeman, Cook County State's Attorney's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RUBEN CASTILLO, District Judge.

Oscar Walden, Jr. (Plaintiff or “Walden”) has sued the City of Chicago (“City or Defendant), Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) Captain William Ryan, CPD Lieutenant Golden, CPD Detective Leon Sweitzer (“Detective Sweitzer”), and CPD Officers Joseph Faculak (“Officer Faculak”), William O'Brien (“Officer O'Brien”), William Murphy (“Officer Murphy”), and Edward Walsh (“Officer Walsh”), alleging multiple claims under both state and federal law of police misconduct relating to his arrest and prosecution for rape in 1952.1 (R. 1, Compl.) Presently before the Court are Defendant's motion for summary judgment, (R. 219), and motion to bar Plaintiff's expert witness. (R. 225.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendant's motion to bar Plaintiff's expert is denied.

RELEVANT FACTS 2

Nearly 60 years ago, on November 24, 1951, Elsie Anderson (“Anderson”) was attacked and raped by an African–American man on the south side of Chicago. (R. 220, Def.'s Facts ¶ 6.) Several weeks later, on January 11, 1952, Walden was arrested on his way to work by Chicago Police officers, including Officers Faculak, O'Brien, and Walsh. (R. 237, Pl.'s Facts ¶ 2.) Walden was twenty years old at the time of his arrest. ( Id.)

After his arrest, Walden was taken to the Kensington police station, where he was questioned by several police officers in front of Anderson, who did not state that Walden was her attacker. ( Id. ¶ 3.) Walden was then brought to another room for questioning, where the police officers questioning him kicked his shins while interrogating him in an attempt to coerce him to confess to the attack. ( Id. ¶ 4.)

After being held at another police station overnight, Walden was brought back to the Kensington police station, where he was questioned by Officer Faculak and Detective Sweitzer, a detective from the 11th Street police station. ( Id. ¶ 5.) Detective Sweitzer threatened to have Walden transferred to 11th Street where he said that they treated prisoners brutally. ( Id.) While Detective Sweitzer and other officers went to lunch, Officer Faculak continued to pressure Walden to confess, saying “you had better speak up, because when [Detective Sweitzer] comes back it will be bad. I hate to give you into his hands, because they are pretty rough at 11th Street.” ( Id. ¶ 6.)

When Detective Sweitzer returned, he sat directly in front of Walden, while Officer Faculak grabbed Walden's hand, bending his fingers back and scratching them until they were bleeding, causing Walden excruciating pain. ( Id. ¶ 7.) Walden begged the officers to stop, but Officer Faculak continued to bend his fingers back and kick him in the shins. ( Id. ¶ 8.) At the same time, Detective Sweitzer knocked Walden's head from side to side, accusing him of assaulting Anderson. ( Id.) When Walden denied attacking Anderson, Detective Sweitzer said, “You are lying, nigger.” ( Id.) Officer Faculak then ordered another officer to “go get the rope,” and told Walden that they were going to string him up to a high bar, take off his clothes, and whip him with a rubber hose until he confessed. ( Id. ¶ 9.) Officer Faculak also threatened Walden that if he did not confess, he would cause his father to lose his job, his parents and family would be evicted from their house, and the police would arrest Walden's parents, sisters, and brothers. ( Id. ¶ 10.) Walden then agreed to confess in the manner that Officer Faculak had ordered. ( Id. ¶ 11.)

Following Walden's confession, he was forced to enter a room with Anderson and apologize to her. ( Id. ¶ 12.) Prior to Walden's second encounter with Anderson, several police officers, including Officer Walsh, had gone to Walden's house and, without a warrant, entered and taken Walden's coat and hat. ( Id. ¶ 13.) The officers then soiled Walden's coat and hat to make them look more like the clothing that Anderson had described her attacker was wearing. ( Id.) Walden was forced to wear the soiled coat and hat when he was brought before Anderson. ( Id.)

Walden then signed a written statement, typed by Officer Murphy, admitting that he had raped Anderson. ( Id. ¶ 14.) During the time Walden was being held at the police station, he had repeatedly asked to be allowed to contact an attorney and his wife, but the officers had refused all of his requests. ( Id. ¶ 16.)

At 6:45 p.m. on Monday, January 14,1952—three days after he was picked up by the police—Walden was booked as an arrestee. ( Id.) The police provided Walden's confession to the prosecuting state's attorneys. ( Id. ¶ 18.) All of the officers involved in Walden's interrogation denied to the state's attorneys that he had been abused in any manner. ( Id. ¶ 17.) Defendant now admits that Walden's admissions “were false, fabricated, and coerced through torture.” (R. 242, Def.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 19.)

Walden was arraigned on February 4, 1952. (R. 220, Def.'s Facts ¶ 12.) His criminal trial began June 24, 1952. ( Id. ¶ 13.) At trial, Walden's confession was admitted against him, and Anderson identified Walden as her attacker. ( Id. ¶¶ 14– 15.) Walden challenged the validity of his confession at trial, and testified that it was coerced. ( Id. ¶ 16.) On July 2, 1952, Walden was convicted of rape, by jury verdict, and received a sentence of 75 years of imprisonment. ( Id. ¶¶ 17–18.) Walden was released from prison on parole on November 18, 1965. ( Id. ¶ 19.)

On December 30, 2002, Governor George Ryan granted Walden a pardon of innocence. ( Id. ¶ 20.) Walden was not aware that he had been pardoned until he received a letter from the Illinois Prisoner Review Board in a letter sent January 13, 2003. (R. 237, Pl.'s Facts ¶ 21.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Walden brought suit in this case on January 6, 2004, alleging claims under state and federal law. (R. 1, Compl.) Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983), Walden alleges deprivation of a right to a fair trial and wrongful conviction (Count I); coercive interrogation (Count IV); and an Equal Protection claim under Sections 1983 and 1985 (Count V).3 ( Id. at ¶¶ 89–103.) Walden also alleges a Monell policy claim against the City relating to Counts I, IV, and V (Count VI). ( Id. ¶ 106.) Under state law, Walden alleges claims for malicious prosecution (Count VIII); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IX); conspiracy (Count X); and a respondeat superior claim and an indemnification claim against the City (Counts XI and XIII). ( Id. at ¶¶ 115–127, 131.)

On August 27, 2004, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied in substantial part and granted in part on April 25, 2005 by Judge Filip.4 (R. 33, Min. Order; R. 34, Mem. Opinion and Order of Apr. 25, 2005, 391 F.Supp.2d 660 (N.D.Ill.2005).) On July 16, 2010, Defendant moved for summary judgment, (R. 219, Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J.), and to bar Plaintiff's expert. (R. 225, Def.'s Mot. to Bar Pl.'s Expert.) Defendant argues that Walden's claims are time-barred or lack evidentiary support to maintain any violation of his constitutional rights. (R. 221, Def.'s Mem. of Law in Support of Its Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.'s Mem.”) at 2.) Specifically, Defendant argues that all of Walden's federal and state-law claims, with the exception of his fair trial claim under the Fourteenth Amendment in Count I, are time-barred.5 ( Id.) Defendant further claims that Walden's fair trial claim fails as a matter of law, and that even if Walden establishes a threshold constitutional injury, he has failed to produce evidence of a Monell violation. ( Id.) Regarding Walden's proposed expert, Defendant claims that his opinions are inadmissible because he is not qualified to serve as an expert in this case and the methodology upon which his opinions are based is unreliable. (R. 225, Def.'s Mot. to Bar Pl.'s Expert.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “A disputed fact is ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Hampton v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir.2009). In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the Court draws all reasonable inferences and resolves all factual disputes in the non-moving party's favor. Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 462 (7th Cir.2009).

The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that it is entitled to summary judgment. Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir.2008). Once a moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party must “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). “The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence, however, is insufficient to fulfill this requirement. The non-moving party must show that there is evidence upon which a jury reasonably could find for [it].” Wheeler, 539 F.3d at 634.

ANALYSIS

Because Plaintiff may rely only on admissible evidence to defeat a summary judgment motion, Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir.2009), the Court addresses the admissibility of Walden's...

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