Walden v. United States
| Decision Date | 11 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:11-cv-199,No. 2:07-cr-54,2:11-cv-199,2:07-cr-54 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
| Parties | JIMMY L. WALDEN, Jr., Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Jimmy L. Walden, Jr., ("Petitioner" or "Walden") has filed a pro se motion to vacate, correct, or set aside his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a brief, and a supplemental motion, (Docs. 82, 82-1, and 88).1 The United States has filed a response in opposition to the motions, (Docs. 85 and 91), and petitioner a reply to the first response, (Doc. 87). For the reasons which follow, the § 2255 motion to vacate will be DENIED.
Title 28 United States Code section 2255(a) provides that a federal prisoner may make a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his judgment of conviction and sentence on the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, that the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or that the sentence is in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack. As a threshold standard, to obtain post-conviction relief under § 2255 a motion must allege: (1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the federal statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or law sofundamental as to render the entire criminal proceeding invalid. Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2003); Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2003).
Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating an error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the criminal proceedings, Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 353 (1994); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993), and he likewise bears the burden of articulating sufficient facts to state a viable claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A § 2255 motion may be dismissed if it only makes vague conclusory statements without substantiating allegations of specific facts and thereby fails to state a claim cognizable under § 2255. Green v. Wingo, 454 F.2d 52, 53 (6th Cir. 1972).
Under Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts, a court is to determine, after a review of the answer and the records of the case, whether an evidentiary hearing is required. If the motion to vacate, the answer, and the records of the case show conclusively that the petitioner is not entitled to relief under § 2255, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing. Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 92 (6th Cir. 1986). The Court FINDS no need for an evidentiary hearing in the instant case.
In an indictment filed on June 12, 2007, Walden was charged with five narcotics offenses, (Doc. 1). Count one alleged that, on August 31, 2006, Walden knowingly and intentionally distributed 50 grams or more of cocaine base; Count two charged that, on October 5, 2006, he knowingly and intentionally possessed with the intent distribute five grams of cocaine base; Counts three and four asserted that, on October 6, 2006, he knowingly and intentionally possessed with the intent to distribute cocaine base in respective quantities of fifty grams or more and of a detectibleamount of cocaine; and Count five charged that, on that same date, he knowingly and intentionally possessed with the intent distribute marijuana, (id.).
Though Walden entered into a plea agreement and filed it with the Court, he successfully sought to withdraw the agreement and proceeded to trial, (Docs. 31-33). At the close of a three-day trial, the jury found him guilty of Counts two-five and a mistrial was declared on Count one, (Docs. 47-49). Thereafter, Count one was dismissed upon motion of the government and Walden was sentenced, as a career offender, to a life term of imprisonment, (Docs. 59-60).
Petitioner filed a direct appeal and the judgment was affirmed. United States v. Walden, 625 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2010). He then filed the instant § 2255 motion on July 6, 2011, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The facts recited below are taken from the Sixth Circuit's opinion on Walden's direct appeal.
Walden, 625 F.3d at 963 (footnote omitted).
III. Discussion
Claims of ineffective assistance arise from the guarantee in the Sixth Amendment, which provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI. A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right not just to counsel, but to "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a break down in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
Id. As with any other claim under § 2255, a movant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel was deficient. See Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 2006); Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1081 (3d Cir. 1985).
In considering the first prong of the test set forth in Strickland, the appropriate measure ofattorney performance is "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must "identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690. The evaluation of the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance must be made "from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Second, a petitioner must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 454-455 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Counsel is constitutionally ineffective only if a performance below professional standards caused the defendant to lose what he "otherwise would probably have won." United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992).
As grounds for relief in his § 2255 motion, Walden asserts that trial counsel gave him ineffective assistance by failing to file various motions, including a motion to suppress, a motion to dismiss the indictment based on speedy trial violations, and a motion for a judgment of acquittal, as to Counts two through five. Likewise, petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance on appeal because counsel failed to assert that "Tracy Brown" was an informant; to argue, with respect to Count two, that there was "no proof of any lesser quantity;" and to raise an indictment issue under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6. In the supplement to the § 2255 motion, petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance at sentencing, based on three purported attorney errors: (1) and (2) the failures to argue that Walden's...
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