Waldman v. Town of Barrington

• Decision Date: 22 March 1967
• Docket Number: No. 2890,2890
• Citation: 227 A.2d 592,102 R.I. 14
• Parties: Edmund I. WALDMAN et al. v. TOWN OF BARRINGTON et al. Equity
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 592

227 A.2d 592

102 R.I. 14

Edmund I. WALDMAN et al. v. TOWN OF BARRINGTON et al.

Equity No. 2890.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 22, 1967.

William R. Goldberg, Ronald R. Gagnon, Pawtucket, for complainants

Graham, Reid, Ewing & Stapleton, James A. Jackson, Providence, for respondents.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

This bill in equity was brought to enjoin the respondent municipality from operating a public bathing beach on land located in the town of Barrington to which the complainants claim title in fee. The cause was heard by a justice of the superior court sitting in equity, who thereafter entered a decree denying and dismissing the bill of complaint. From that decree the complainants have prosecuted their appeal to this court.

The complainants are the owners of three parcels of land which abut a portion of the beach that extends between Bay Road on the east and Water Way on the west. Each maintains a residence on the land owned by him. The respondent maintains and operates a public bathing facility which extends for some distance along the shore up to and in front of the property of complainants.

In the conduct of this operation respondent maintains a parking area, a bathing pavilion, and a small structure that provides shelter for a police officer as well as public toilet facilities. It is contended by complainants that this use constitutes a continuing trespass in the area lying between the high-water mark and the beginning of the uplands, that is, the area to which they claim they hold title in fee. The instant bill was brought to enjoin this continuing trespass.

It appears that in 1847 one Pardon Clark was the owner of the land in question. The deed by which the land was conveyed to him contained a metes and bounds description of the tract in which reference was made to the easterly line of the lot as extending 'to the town Beach.' Subsequently, in 1854, Clark conveyed to Amos H. Beckwith and John T. Mauran, the deed referring to the easterly line of the property as extending 'to the beach.' In 1978 Beckwith and Mauran conveyed the tract to the West Elmwood Land Company, the description of the property in the deed being by reference to Martin Plat No. 2 as recorded in the records of land evidence in the town of Barrington.

In 1882 a conveyance of the tract was made by West Elmwood Land Company to Stephen A. Jenks, hereinafter refereed to as Jenks. In the deed the tract was described as being bounded 'North by Highland Street, on the east by Ocean Street, on the south by the Beach of Narragansett Bay, and on the west by Beach Avenue.' The complainants rely primarily on this conveyance to establish the southerly bound of their respective parcels.

In 1912 Jenks caused a survey to be made of the tract, and a map drawn therefrom was introduced into evidence by respondent. As thereon delineated the easterly line of the tract extends along the westerly side of Ocean street, now Bay Road, to a stone bound located at the northern line of an area described on the map as 'Beach' and then turning extending northwesterly along the northerly line of the area marked 'Beach' to the easterly line of Beach avenue, now Water Way. This map discloses that a number of stone bounds mark a line at the south of the Jenks property which extends along the northerly line of the area marked 'Beach,' and that a hedge fence extends along this same line.

In 1913, Jenks died, leaving as his heirsat-law S. Herbert Jenks, Mary E. Easton, and Frances J. Cushman. In June 1913 these heirs executed a series of partition deeds conveying their various interests to one another in such a manner as to effect a division of the tract into three parcels. In each of these deeds the southerly line of the parcel conveyed is referred to as bounding on 'Narragansett Bay.' At the time these deeds were recorded another map of the tract was prepared for the heirs of Jenks, on which were delineated the boundaries of the three parcels created by the above conveyances. This map shows also that the southerly boundary of the tract extended along the northerly or in shore line of the area marked 'Beach' on the prior map prepared for Jenks. Thereafter these parcels passed into the ownership of the present complainants by a series of conveyances, in most of which the southerly boundary of the tract is described as being the 'beach of Narragansett Bay' or the 'shore of Narragansett Bay.'

Evidence was adduced also that one Frederick W. Waterman, Jr., a qualified surveyor, had prepared plans of the shore area under consideration. He testified that he had examined all the deeds in the chain of title dated after the death of Jenks and that, according to the descriptions set out in these conveyances, the southerly line of complainants' property coincides with the line of the granite bounds running along the northerly line of the beach as well as with the hedge fence that extends along that northerly line of the beach. It is to be noted that the deeds thus examined by Mr. Waterman all contain descriptions by metes and bounds.

It is clear from the pleadings that the issue raised here does not require the court to try title to this land as between complainants and respondent. Nowhere in the record does respondent purport to claim title in itself. In such circumstance the right of complainants to the injunctive relief sought depends upon the establishment of a right to immediate possession of the land superior to any such right existing in respondent. Goloskie v. Recorvitz, R.I., 219 A.2d 759. In short, in the posture in which this case is presented to us complainants are not entitled to the injunctive relief sought unless they establish a right to immediate possession of the contested premises superior to that of respondent.

In order to establish the existence of this superior right to immediate possession, complainants argue that the conveyance from West Elmwood Land Company to Jenks was a conveyance of all the land to the shore at the high-water line. They argue expressly that 'beach' is that portion of the shore that lies between the high-water line and the low-water line and, therefore, that a conveyance to the beach as a matter of law included all that portion of the strand lying between the upland and the high-water line.

We cannot agree with complainants' contention that a conveyance to the 'beach' as a matter of law is a conveyance to the mean high-water line. However the term 'beach' may be defined in other jurisdictions, we think there is ample authority in this state for distinguishing between the terms 'beach' and 'shore' when such terms are used in a legal context, particularly where they are used for the purpose of defining property rights. In Jackvony v. Powel, 67 R.I. 218, 21 A.2d 554, this court in a scholarly opinion by Mr. Justice Moss sought to ascertain what constitutes the 'privileges of the...