Waldron v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

Decision Date19 April 1943
Docket Number63
Citation31 A.2d 902,347 Pa. 257
PartiesWaldron v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Appellant
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

March 25, 1943, Argued

Appeal, No. 63, March T., 1943, from judgment of C.P Allegheny Co., Jan. T., 1941, No. 1680, in case of Arthur H Waldron v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Judgment reversed; reargument refused May 26, 1943.

Assumpsit. Before MUSMANNO, J.

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appealed.

The judgment of the court below is reversed and is here entered for the defendant.

D. C Jennings, for appellant.

Edward O. Spotts, Jr., with him Wm. T. Corbett and John W. Cost, for appellee.

Before MAXEY, C.J.; DREW, LINN, STERN, PATTERSON, PARKER and STEARNE, JJ.

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MAXEY:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the court below for $3705, entered upon a verdict in favor of a beneficiary in an action of assumpsit on a policy in the sum of $3000 insuring against the results of bodily injuries caused by violent and accidental means.

On the morning of November 17, 1938, the dead body of the insured, Thomas N. Waldron, was found in the ravine below the Church Street Bridge in Pittsburgh. His cap was nearby and part of his spectacles, with one lens missing, was found beside him. The bridge was 93 feet high and the body was lying 24 1/2 feet out from a plumb line on the north side of the bridge. There were several fractures of the hip, leg and ribs and death was due to shock from these injuries. Before 7:15 P.M., November 16, 1938, the deceased was apparently in good health and spirits.

There was medical testimony by the coroner's physician, called by the defendant, that the superficial lacerations found on the body could have been caused by the body falling through trees and that the serious injuries "could have been" caused by a fall from the bridge. Medical testimony fixed the time of Waldron's death at about 10:15 P.M. Physicians called by the plaintiff, testified that Waldron's injuries "could have been" caused by his being struck by a motor vehicle. Officers who investigated this case testified to finding the marks of a hand and foot on the guard rail of the bridge; that there were broken branches in the trees below; and a mark on the ground about 20 feet at the slope of the ravine from the place where the body was found and indications that the body had rolled from that point. A witness saw and conversed with Waldron on the bridge at 8:15 P.M., and another witness saw Waldron after 8 P.M. Waldron was then "looking with his head in his hands and with his elbows on the railing and he was looking down". The witness testified further: "As I got within a few feet of him he turned quickly and stared directly at me and . . . his eyes seemed to be staring and bright . . . I wondered if something was wrong with him . . . I decided nothing was wrong and just went on".

The plaintiff beneficiary, deceased's father, contended that the death of the insured was caused by accidental means; the defendant contended that it was a case of suicide. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff and the court below refused to enter judgment for the defendant N.O.V. This appeal followed.

What a plaintiff must do in cases of this kind in order to warrant a recovery is settled. In Watkins v. Prudential Ins Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644, where plaintiff's case depended upon proof of death from accidental means, we said: "On plaintiff rests the burden of proving all the operative facts by a fair preponderance of the evidence. An even balancing of the evidence on the issue of death by accidental means or death by suicide denotes that plaintiff fails to sustain her burden of proof and the verdict should be for the defendant. Causes of action are always set forth affirmatively and if they are to prevail they must be supported either (1) by facts tending to prove directly the cause of action pleaded or (2) by legitimate inferences from circumstances which have met the tests of admissibility. Mere guesses and conjectures cannot be substituted for legal proof." In De Reeder et al. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 329 Pa. 328, 333, 198 A. 45, which was a suit on an "accidental death" policy we said: "Plaintiff's case fell because of failure of proof. There were no facts or circumstances from which the jury could infer legitimately to the exclusion of other inferences equally plausible that the insured's death resulted from an accident. The burden of proof resting upon plaintiffs in civil actions cannot be met by conjectures. The phrase 'burden of proof' means exactly what it says. . . . In a civil case the evidence of facts and circumstances on which plaintiff relies and the inferences logically deducible therefrom, must so preponderate in favor of...

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