Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 May 1995
• Docket Number: SL-W,No. 94-5282,94-5282
• Citation: 56 F.3d 491
• Parties: 67 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1577, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,688, 63 USLW 2772 Reed WALDRON, Appellant, v. SL INDUSTRIES, INC.;aber, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 491

56 F.3d 491

67 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1577,

66 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,688, 63 USLW 2772

Reed WALDRON, Appellant, v. SL INDUSTRIES, INC.; SL-Waber, Inc., Appellees.

No. 94-5282.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued Jan. 25, 1995.

Decided May 26, 1995.

Alice W. Ballard (argued), Samuel & Ballard, Philadelphia, PA, for appellant.

David B. Mulvihill (argued), Titus & McConomy, Pittsburgh, PA, for appellees.

Barbara L. Sloan, E.E.O.C., Washington, DC, for amicus-appellant, E.E.O.C.

Before BECKER, LEWIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

LEWIS, Circuit Judge.

The district court in this case predicted that, after St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), we would require a plaintiff at summary judgment in a suit brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq., and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. Sec. 10:5-1 et seq., to prove both that his employer's reasons for terminating him were false and that the real reason for termination was discrimination. Recent decisions of this court, including Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir.1994), Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825 (3d Cir.1994), and Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724 (3d Cir.1995), have established that this prediction was inaccurate. Because the district court's legal standard was thus in error, the principal question for our review is whether under the proper standard, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment. In other words, provided that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, did he also provide sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could determine either that his employer's reasons for terminating him were false or that discrimination was more than likely the motivating factor? We find that the plaintiff, Reed Waldron, presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment, and therefore we will reverse.

I.

SL Waber, Inc., a subsidiary of SL Industries, Inc., manufactures machinery designed to protect sensitive electrical and electronic equipment. Reed Waldron was employed at Waber from 1972 through 1986, but was laid off in 1986 because of a reorganization. In 1989, after two years of work at a competitor of Waber, he was rehired by Waber as a consultant. He was 61 years old when he was rehired.

In July 1990, Waber found that the employee functioning as industrial market manager, Scott Hammill, was having difficulties. Thus, Waber decided to split the industrial market manager position into two positions separately devoted to marketing electronic equipment and electrical equipment. Hammill was given the electronic marketing manager's position, and Waldron was named electrical marketing manager. In spring of 1991, Hammill voluntarily left Waber, the positions were reconsolidated, and Waldron was given the reconsolidated position of industrial market manager.

There is conflicting evidence about whether Waldron performed his tasks adequately in the industrial market manager position. Predictably, Waldron contended that he did a good job, but the company said that he did not vigorously pursue key accounts and performed poorly during a series of incidents related to preparation of and presentation to Waber's parent, SL Industries, of the fiscal year 1992 business plan.

In August 1991, just after the company adopted the 1992 business plan, Waldron was discharged--at the age of 63. Kevin Woznicki, vice-president of sales and marketing, apparently told Waldron that his job had been eliminated, that his former duties were being distributed between two new positions--electronics market manager and electrical market manager--and that Waldron was "not the best candidate" for either position, principally because he did not go after key accounts. Although Woznicki apparently told Waldron he was terminated (Joint Appendix ("App.") 116), Woznicki first sought and received approval of the decision from Ronald Mazik, the company's president.

Shortly thereafter, Ed Brown, a telephone sales representative aged 32, was promoted to the electronics market manager's position--that is, one half of Waldron's old job. The electrical market manager position (the other half) was never advertised or filled, and within a short time (five to six months) the company recombined the two positions with Brown in the consolidated post--again called industrial market manager, the title of Waldron's old job.

Waldron sued Waber, claiming that he had been discharged because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq., ¹ and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. Sec. 10:5-1 et seq. ("LAD"). ² The company moved for summary judgment, arguing that, under the "pretext-plus" standard that it predicted we would adopt for dealing with summary judgment after Hicks, Waldron did not have sufficient evidence upon which a jury could find both that Waber's reasons for firing him were pretextual and that the real reason for the termination was age-related animus. The district court agreed, found that the ADEA and LAD claims were governed by the same standard, and rendered summary judgment in favor of the company. The district court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 623(a) and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.

II.

A.

In St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), the Supreme Court addressed a pervasive split that had developed among the courts of appeals over the proper application of the scheme established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), for allocating the burdens of production and presentation of proof in cases involving allegations of discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under the familiar shifting burdens analysis of McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must initially establish a minimal prima facie case--essentially, that he or she is a member of a protected class and was qualified for an employment position, but that he or she was either not hired for that position or was fired from it "under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). ³ Once the plaintiff establishes his or her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate one or more legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its employment decision. If one or more such reasons are proffered, the presumption of discrimination created by establishment of the prima facie case is dispelled, and the plaintiff must prove that the employer's proffered reason or reasons were pretextual--that is, that they are false and that the real reason for the employment decision was discriminatory.

It was the meaning of this last phase of the McDonnell Douglas scheme that had caused dissention among the courts of appeals: if a plaintiff proved that an employer's proffered reasons were unworthy of credence, must the jury return a verdict in his or her favor, or was it still required to find that discriminatory animus more likely than not caused the employment decision? In Hicks, resolving a circuit conflict, the Court decided that although "[t]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant ... may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination," so that if an employer's proffered reasons for the employment decision are rejected, "no additional proof of discrimination is required," nevertheless the ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff throughout the case. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. Thus, "a plaintiff's proof of his or her prima facie case and proof that the employer's proffered reasons are false does not compel a judgment in the plaintiff's favor." Id.

Although Hicks resolved the issue of whether a plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law at trial if he or she establishes a prima facie case and discredits an employer's justifications for the employment decision, it did not address the standard by which summary judgment should be assessed in a pretext case under the ADEA. ⁴ The district court in this case noted that we had not yet ruled on this issue, but predicted that we would side with those courts of appeals that had required plaintiffs at summary judgment to produce evidence of "pretext-plus." Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc., 849 F.Supp. 996, 1004 n. 11 (D. N.J.1994). That is, the district court predicted that at summary judgment we would require plaintiffs to demonstrate "both that the employer's reasons are false and that the real reasons were discriminatory...." Id.

Contrary to the district court's prediction, however, in Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir.1994), we joined those of our sister circuits who have read Hicks to require at summary judgment "pretext-only." Judge Becker noted in Fuentes that,

[b]ecause the factfinder may infer from the combination of the plaintiff's prima facie case and its own rejection of the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff and was merely trying to conceal its illegal act with the articulated reasons, see Hicks, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749, a plaintiff who has made out a prima facie case may defeat a motion for summary judgment by either (i) discrediting the proffered reasons, either circumstantially or directly, or (ii) adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.

Thus, we clarified that "if the plaintiff has pointed to evidence sufficient[ ] to discredit the defendant's proffered...