Waldron v. Voorhies
| Decision Date | 15 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:07 CV 01916. |
| Citation | 626 F.Supp.2d 739 |
| Parties | Douglas WALDRON, Petitioner, v. Edwin VOORHIES, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Sarah M. Schregardus, Office of the Ohio Public Defender, Columbus, OH, for Petitioner.
Stephanie L. Watson, Office of the Attorney General, Columbus, OH, for Respondent.
On 27 June 2007, Petitioner Douglas Waldron ("Mr. Waldron" or Petitioner) filed this timely habeas, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, setting forth the following single ground for relief:
Ground for Relief No. 1: A defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when counsel fails to object to the admission of prejudicial, inadmissible other-acts evidence at trial.
(Doc. 1). Respondent filed a return of writ on 4 September 2007 (Doc. 8) to which Mr. Waldron responded in traverse on 5 November 2007 (Doc. 10). The matter was assigned to Magistrate Judge James S. Gallas (Doc. 4) for a Report and Recommendation ("R & R"). Magistrate Judge Gallas submitted his R & R denying Petitioner's writ on 6 November 2008 (Doc. 11), to which Mr. Waldron filed timely objections. (Doc. 12).
In his R & R, Magistrate Judge Gallas recommends the Court deny Mr. Waldron's petition for relief because he failed to show an unreasonable application by the state court of clearly established federal law. (Doc. 11, R & R, p. 5). The R & R, first, concludes that Mr. Waldron's trial counsel could not be found "ineffective," under the test as applied in Strickland, for abstaining from objecting to the testimony of two witnesses—B.F. and K.F.—presenting "other acts" evidence when that evidence was "inextricably related to the indicted criminal acts" and, thus, within the ambit of Ohio Evid. Rule 404(B). (Doc. 11, R & R, pp. 9, 10). Performing an independent review of the record which "establishes that there was overwhelming evidence of guilt," Magistrate Judge Gallas, further, concluded the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland in finding no actual prejudice in Mr. Waldron's counsel's failure to object to the other-acts testimony at trial. (Doc. 11, R & R, pp. 10-12). See Hicks v. Collins, 384 F.3d 204, 215 (6th Cir.2004). Finally, Magistrate Judge Gallas concludes that Mr. Waldron's claim, raised for the first time in his traverse, that the state appellate court made an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented," see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), becomes moot in light of the Petitioner's sole claim for review concerning the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 11, R & R, pp. 12, 13).
In his objections to the R & R, Mr. Waldron contends the habeas writ should be granted because, in examining the Ohio Rules of Evidence, the state appellate court rendered a decision contrary to federal law. (Doc. 12, p. 6). The Petitioner also maintains the habeas writ should be granted because the state appellate court's analysis of the other-acts evidence given by B.F. and K.F.: (1) was an unreasonable application of Strickland where the testimony was separate and unrelated, thereby illuminating the Petitioner's counsel's alleged deficient performance (Doc. 12, pp. 6-8); and, (2) was an unreasonable application where the admitted testimony prejudiced Mr. Waldron so seriously as to deprive him of a fair trial. (Doc. 12, pp. 8-9). Finally, in consideration of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2), Mr. Waldron contends the state appellate court made an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented where it determined that the testimony of K.F. and B.F. exhibited a "common plan" to engage in sexual activity with young boys. (Doc. 12, pp. 9-11).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will both affirm and reach beyond the Magistrate Judge's R & R to deny Mr. Waldron's § 2254 habeas petition.
The Federal Magistrates Act requires a district court to conduct a de novo review only of those portions of the R & R to which the parties have made an objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Moreover, the factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct. A federal court may only diverge from a state court's factual findings if the petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that the findings are erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The Court of Appeals, Eighth Appellate District, Cuyahoga County, Ohio delineated the facts of this case on direct appeal. Because Mr. Waldron has not rebutted these factual findings by clear and convincing evidence,1 the Court presumes they are correct and, accordingly, recites the following facts:
{¶ 1} Douglas Waldron ("Waldron") appeals his conviction and sentence from Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. Waldron argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, that the jury verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that his sentence was contrary to law. For the following reasons, we affirm Waldron's conviction, vacate the imposed sentence, and remand for resentencing.
{¶ 2} In 1997, twelve-year-old victim E.L. lived with his family on the near west side of Cleveland. Waldron lived in the same neighborhood as E.L. and had even taken the child to a Cavaliers game on a prior occasion. E.L. admitted that he knew Waldron was a homosexual, and further admitted that he had heard rumors that Waldron engaged in sexual activity with other boys in the neighborhood.
{¶ 3} In November, 1997, Waldron approached E.L. and friend D.W. outside of a corner store. Waldron offered E.L. money in exchange for allowing Waldron to perform fellatio on E.L. E.L. agreed to Waldron's proposition and he and D.W. followed Waldron to his one-bedroom apartment.
{¶ 4} Once inside the apartment, D.W. sat on a chair, E.L. sat on the bed, and Waldron sat on the floor in front of E.L. Waldron told E.L. to pull down his pants and underwear and E.L. complied, pulling his pants and underwear to his knees. Waldron proceeded to perform fellatio on E.L. while masturbating. After Waldron finished, he asked D.W. if he was next, and D.W. responded in the negative. Waldron gave D.W. five dollars and gave E.L. either forty or sixty dollars. Both boys then left the apartment.
{¶ 5} E.L. admitted that he returned to Waldron's apartment a second time in November. Once inside the apartment, Waldron told E.L., "I'll give you seventy-five dollars if you let me do it again." Waldron also told E.L. that he didn't have the money at the present time, that E.L. would have to wait until Waldron received his paycheck. E.L. agreed, and allowed Waldron to perform fellatio on him for the second time. Waldron later paid E.L. seventy-five dollars.
{¶ 6} D.W., who was not present for the second incident, stated that he observed E.L. on the street with some money, and that E.L. said he received the money from Waldron.
{¶ 7} In late November, Waldron approached B.F. and K.F., two brothers who were twelve and fourteen years of age. Waldron handed each brother a scrap of paper with his name, address, and phone number and asked each brother if they wanted to make any money. Both B.F. and K.F. testified that they recognized Waldron's name, and further stated that they had heard about the sexual encounter between Waldron and E.L. The brothers returned home and informed their grandmother about the encounter. The grandmother contacted the police, who responded to the residence. After speaking with the brothers and their grandmother, officers learned that Waldron had engaged in sexual contact with E.L.
{¶ 8} When officers first interviewed E.L about the alleged incident, E.L. initially denied any sexual contact. However, after police reinterviewed B.F., K.F., and interviewed D.W., E.L. told police about Waldron's actions. Officers then responded to Waldron's residence and placed him under arrest.
{¶ 9} A Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Waldron with two counts of rape and two counts of compelling prostitution. Both rape charges contained sexually violent predator specifications and repeat violent offender specifications. The trial court severed the specifications from the main counts of the indictment and Waldron waived his right to a jury trial on those specifications. After deliberating, the jury found Waldron guilty of all four charges. The trial court then held a hearing on the specifications and found Waldron guilty of the repeat violent offender specifications and adjudged him to be a sexually violent predator. The trial court sentenced Waldron to a maximum sentence of ten years on each rape count, with an additional nine-year sentence for the repeat violent offender specification, and seven years on each count of compelling prostitution. The trial court ordered all sentences to be served consecutively.
{¶ 11} In his first assignment of error, Waldron argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to object to the admission of "other acts" evidence. Specifically, Waldron argues that the testimony of B.F. and K.F. constituted impermissible "other acts" evidence that had an impact on the outcome of his trial. We disagree.
{¶ 12} In order to prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show first, that counsel's performance was deficient, and second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. Counsel's performance may be found to be deficient if counsel "made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth...
To continue reading
Request your trial