Waldron v. Waldron

• Decision Date: 04 March 1895
• Docket Number: No. 97,97
• Citation: 39 L.Ed. 453,156 U.S. 361,15 S.Ct. 383
• Parties: WALDRON v. WALDRON
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

156 U.S. 361

15 S.Ct. 383

39 L.Ed. 453

WALDRON

v WALDRON.

No. 97.

March 4, 1895.

Mary Russell Beauchamp was married in September, 1865, to E. H. Waldron. They lived in Lafayette, Ind., from the date of their marriage until 1875, when they removed to St. Louis, the employment of the husband calling him there. In 1877 they left St. Louis, and returned to Indiana, where they continued to live as husband and wife until June, 1886. At that date the husband abandoned his marital relations, and fixed his permanent residence in Chicago. For 12 or 15 years, prior to June, 1886, the husband, Waldron, had friendly relations with E. S. Alexander and wife, who lived in Chicago; Waldron dealing with Alexander in a business way, and also calling socially at his residence, and Alexander visiting Waldron when he came to Lafayette. In February, 1886, E. S. Alexander died, leaving a widow. Subsequently, Mrs. Waldron filed in the superior court of Tippecanoe county, Ind., a suit for divorce against her husband, which ripened, in June, 1887, into a decree granting the divorce, and giving her $10,000 alimony. In October, 1887, E. H. Waldron married Mrs. Josephine P. Alexander, the widow of E. S. Alexander. In June, 1888, Mary Russell, the divorced wife of E. H. Waldron, sued Mrs. Josephine P. Waldron, the former Mrs. Alexander, in the circuit court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois. The grounds of this action are stated in her complaint

(1) 'Whereas, the said defendant, countriving, and wrong- fully, wickedly, and unjustly intending, to injure the said plaintiff, and to deprive her of the comfort, fellowship, society, aid, and assistance of Edwin H. Waldron, the then husband of the said plaintiff, and to alienate and destroy his affection for said plaintiff, on, to wit, the 6th day of June, A. D. 1886, and on divers other days and times between said 6th day of June, A. D. 1886, to the 21st day of June, A. D. 1887, at,' etc., 'wrongfully, wickedly, and unjustly debauched and carnally knew the said Edwin H. Waldron, then and there still being the husband of the said plaintiff; and thereby the affection of the said Edwin H. Waldron for the said plaintiff was then and there alienated and destroyed, and also, by reason of the premises, the said plaintiff from thence hitherto wholly lost and was deprived of the comfort, fellowship, society, and assistance of the said Edwin H. Waldron, her said husband, in her domestic affairs, which the said plaintiff during all that time ought to have had, and otherwise might and would have had,' etc., 'aforesaid.'

(2) 'Whereas, the said defendant, contriving, and wrongfully, wickedly, and unjustly intending, to injure the said plaintiff, and to deprive her of the comfort, fellowship, society, aid, and assistance of Edwin H. Waldron, the then husband of the said plaintiff, and to alienate and destroy his affection for the said plaintiff, on, to wit, the 6th day of June, A. D. 1886, and on divers other days and times between said 6th day of June, A. D. 1886, and the 21st day of June, A. D. 1887, at,' etc., 'wrongfully and unjustly sought and made the acquaintance of Edwin H. Waldron, the husband of the said plaintiff, and then and there, well knowing that said Edwin H. Waldron was the husband of said plaintiff, wrongfully, wickedly, and unjustly besought, persuaded, and allured the said Edwin H. Waldron to desert and abandon the said plaintiff; and thereby the affection of said Edward H. Waldron for the plaintiff was alienated and destroyed, and also, by reason of the premises, the plaintiff has from thence hitherto been wholly deprived of the affection, society, aid, and assistance of her said husband in her domestic affairs, which the plaintiff during all that time ought to have had, and otherwise might and would have had, and also, by reason of the premises, the said plaintiff, during all said time from thence hitherto, suffered great mental anguish and loss of social reputation at,' etc., 'aforesaid, to the damages of said plaintiff of one hundred thousand dollars, and therefore she brings her suit,' etc.

The defendant pleaded that inasmuch as the relation of husband and wife, which formerly existed between the plaintiff and defendant's present husband, had been terminated by a decree of divorce, granted at plaintiff's own demand, the action was not maintainable. She further pleaded the general issue.

The case came to trial in January, 1890. In the opening statement, foreshadowing the case which it was proposed to prove, one of the counsel for plaintiff read to the jury extracts from the divorce proceedings, and commented thereon in a manner which clearly indicated that they were links in a chain of evidence which plaintiff proposed to offer in order to establish the adultery of the defendant. Thereafter, during the progress of the trial, the record of the divorce suit was offered in evidence by the plaintiff, for the general purposes of the case; and its admission was objected to by the defense on the ground that it was res inter alios, and that the plaintiff could not make proof for herself by offering her own petition as evidence in her favor, and thus asperse the character of the defendant. The court admitted the record to prove the fact of the divorce alone, and, while thus admitting it, repeatedly declared that it could only be used for that one purpose, and that the averments in the petition and other matters reflecting on the defendant were not to be disclosed or read to the jury. The defendant excepted to the admission of the record for any purpose whatever.

The plaintiff then offered the statute of Indiana relative to divorce, and this was also admitted, in spite of objection, as evidence of the Indiana law on that subject. The testimony of the judge before whom the divorce proceeding was had was then admitted. Wilson, who appeared as attorney for Waldron in the divorce proceeding, was also allowed, over objection, to testify as to his connection therewith. Davie, the witness on the strength of whose testimony the decree of divorce had been mainly based, was also allowed to testify. In the closing argument to the jury, Mr. Aldrich, of counsel for the plaintiff, used the following language:

"The divorce law of Indiana provides that * * * a divorce may be decreed * * * for the following causes, and no other: Adultery, except as hereinafter provided; impotency existing at the time of the marriage; abandonment for two years; cruel and inhuman treatment of either party by the other; habitual drunkenness of either party; the failure of the husband to make reasonable provision for his family for a period of two years; the conviction subsequent to the marriage, in any country, of either party, of an infamous crime. * * *

"The only two that are referred to in this bill for divorce the record is not here. I shall state it, and if it is challenged I shall read it when it comes—are these: That he had abandoned her. Is there any conflict in the evidence in this case that that abandonment only extended from the 6th day of June up until the time this decree was entered, the 21st day of June, 1887,—a year. Is that a compliance with the statute calling for abandonment for two years? Nothing of the kind. Cruel and inhuman treatment? Hasn't Edward H. Waldron testified upon the stand in this case, and is there any dispute upon this subject, that there was no cruel and inhuman treatment upon his part in this case; that he had never been guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment? And has the statement been challenged that cruel and inhuman treatment, under the laws of the state of Indiana, only means acts or cruelty coupled with personal violence? * * *

"There has been no cruelty, or anything of the kind. They say there is no charge of adultery in this case. The record says that there was no cruel and inhuman treatment, and that he was enamored of Josephine P. Alexander, in this case. * * * Mr. Davie was the only witness upon this subject, * * * and he has said * * * that he * * * did not know Edward H. Waldron until he came to Chicago, and Edward H. Waldron * * * has testified * * * that up to the time he came to Chicago he had no acquaintance with Robert Davie. * * * He was the agent—the paid agent—or Edward H. Waldron. Edward H. Waldron is too able a man, he has too much brains, he is too cute, he is too slick, gentlemen of the jury, not to apply any other terms but those that are fitting to him, to suppose that a decree could be obtained in Indiana for abandonment or for curelty or for inhuman treatment. Edward H. Waldron knew as well as you know that he could only get a divorce, and it could only be procured on the ground of his adultery with somebody. * * * Robert Davie knew it. By reason of this nonacquaintance at that time, Robert Davie could not have testified to any of the acts of cruelty. How did Robert Davie acquire his information? By these innumerable visits to Chicago. * * * In view of the testimony in this case, in view of the relations of the parties, in view of the fact that Edward H. Waldron has testified that he had talked with the defendant on two occasions about these divorce matters, and the fact that he was living at this house at that time, with that fact before you, you cannot believe, that it was unpremeditated, that it was unknown, or anything of that kind.'

'Mr. McCoy, for the defendant, excepted to the statement of counsel that Robert Davie had obtained the information to which he testified in the divorce proceeding in Chicago, or from Edward H. Waldron, on the ground that the court had excluded the evidence of Robert Davie on that subject.

'Mr. McCoy: 'I read a question here as to whether or not, Mr. Davie obtained his information in Chicago, and he replied that he did not, and that extra question and answer was stricken out as being within the character of the evidence excluded by the court. Therefore, I do not think it is proper to comment...