Waldrop v. Southern Co. Services, Inc., 93-6230

• Decision Date: 29 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-6230,93-6230
• Citation: 24 F.3d 152
• Parties: , 3 A.D. Cases 595, 5 A.D.D. 910, 5 NDLR P 124 Barbara S. WALDROP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHERN COMPANY SERVICES, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 152

24 F.3d 152

63 USLW 2037, 3 A.D. Cases 595, 5

A.D.D. 910, 5 NDLR P 124

Barbara S. WALDROP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHERN COMPANY SERVICES, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 93-6230.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

June 29, 1994.

Richard J. Ebbinghouse, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Gordon Silverman Wiggins & Childs, Birmingham, AL, for appellant.

John R. Carrigan, T. Dwight Sloan, Harold A. Bowron, Jr., Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, AL, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before COX, Circuit Judge, JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and PAINE ^*, Senior District Judge.

JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

Barbara Waldrop appeals the district court's denial of her claim pursuant to Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Because we hold that, when requested, a jury trial is constitutionally required under Sec. 504 and that Waldrop properly sought relief of a type that triggers the requirement, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In response to being laid-off from her employment at Southern Company Services ("Appellee") one year before, Waldrop brought suit in March 1991 in the Northern District of Alabama, alleging that Appellee discharged her in violation of her rights under (1) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. Secs. 621 to 634 (West 1985 and 1993 Supp.) ("ADEA") and (2) the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Secs. 701 to 796f-6 (West 1985 & 1994 Supp.) ("Sec. 504" or "Rehabilitation Act"). Waldrop challenged Appellee's use of certain practices, policies, procedures, and criteria on both disparate impact and disparate treatment grounds. In her complaint, Waldrop sought (1) declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the ADEA and Sec. 504 and (2) "an order requiring [Appellee] to make her whole by awarding her the positions she would have occupied in the absence of age and/or handicap discrimination, by awarding him [sic] back-pay (plus interest), and by awarding her liquidated damages, lost seniority, lost pension and fringe benefit credits, costs, attorney's fees and expenses." The complaint requested a jury trial on all claims.

The district court thereafter entered a pretrial order instructing the parties to itemize all claimed damages and to show the amount and the method of computation of the damages. Pursuant to the pretrial order, Waldrop submitted her list of damages, providing in toto:

Plaintiff submits the following damages pursuant to the pretrial order entered in this case:

The plaintiff is entitled to $21,115.56 in backpay as of the date trial is set. Should the Jury find as the plaintiff contends that the termination was willful, then in that event the liquidated damages would be $42,231.12. These figures do not include pay raises which may have occurred from the date of termination which may be indicated on documents within the defendant's possession which have not yet been produced pursuant to the plaintiff's discovery request nor bonuses, overtime, attorney's fees and costs and expenses for litigation in this case as well as any change in the NLRB interest rate or the accrual of interest from this date to the time of trial.

Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this damage list after defendant has produced documents containing information relating to this issue which have not been produced to date. The amount so listed may or may not increase or decrease as a result of information in the documents requested for production, and any change in the NLRB interest rate and actual date of the trial is held for which interest would accrue.

In listing Waldrop's claims of relief, the order presented claims for "compensatory and punitive damages," including a requested back pay award. Counsel for both parties announced their readiness for trial upon the court's docket call on February 3, 1992. Before jury selection, however, the court questioned whether Waldrop had complied with the pretrial order's requirements. Specifically, the court stated: "Well, I have a concern that the parties have not raised, but apparently it's due to be raised, and that is the issue of whether the plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive damages." During a subsequent colloquy with Waldrop's counsel, the court stated: "In your statement of position in the pre-trial order, you indicated that the plaintiff was seeking, among other things, punitive and compensatory damages. And the defendant has not quarreled with your right to seek those damages and, therefore, you are entitled to a jury trial on that issue, it seems to me." Appellee's lawyer thereupon objected, stating that Waldrop had not complied with the pretrial order's requirements of specificity and itemization of damages.

Waldrop's counsel responded that the requested compensatory damages equalled the back pay and the liquidated damages. In rejecting this claim, the court held:

[I]n view of the failure of the plaintiff to itemize compensatory damages under--compensatory damages and punitive damages under Item 8 of the pre-trial order, the court concludes that the plaintiff has abandoned her claim for those items of damages. And based on that conclusion, the court concludes that the plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial on the rehabilitation claim.

The court did not, however, find that Waldrop waived her claim to back pay. The jury found in favor of Appellee on the ADEA claim, and the court rendered judgment in favor of Appellee on the Sec. 504 claim.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Waldrop asks this Court to review the district court's holding that neither Sec. 504 nor the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution afforded her the right to a jury trial on her rehabilitation claim. ¹ We subject conclusions of law to plenary review. Ledbetter v. Shalala, 986 F.2d 428, 430 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 599, 126 L.Ed.2d 564 (1993).

In determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial, we first must interpret the statute. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 1835 n. 3, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987). If the statute explicitly provides for a jury trial, then trial before a jury is merited. If the statute and its legislative history are silent regarding the right to a jury trial, then we must ask whether a jury trial is constitutionally required under the Seventh Amendment. Id.; see also Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 n. 3, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 1344 n. 3, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990).

A. Rehabilitation Act

Section 504, as amended, provides in part:

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.

29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 794(a). On its face, then, the statute does not indicate the procedures involved in suits by private parties or the remedies available for violations of the statute. Congress first addressed these questions in 1978 by borrowing the "remedies, procedures, and rights" set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ² and by making them available to plaintiffs proceeding under Sec. 504. Wood v. President & Trustees of Spring Hill College, 978 F.2d 1214, 1219 n. 10 (11th Cir.1992) (citing 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 794a(a)(2)). Further, Title VI does not discuss the procedures or penalties available to a private party alleging discrimination under the statute. Because neither Sec. 504 nor Title VI provides any guidance on the availability of a jury trial in a private action, we must inquire as to whether the Constitution provides such a right.

B. Seventh Amendment

The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial "[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars." The amendment extends the right to a jury trial to all suits where legal rights are involved, whether at common law or arising under federal legislation. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1008, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974). Thus, the Seventh Amendment applies to actions enforcing statutory rights and requires a jury trial on demand whenever the statute creates legal rights and remedies that are "enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law." Id. at 194, 94 S.Ct. at 1008. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). Compensatory damages are the classic form of legal relief. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 2068, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993) (citing Terry, 494 U.S. at 570-71, 110 S.Ct. at 1347-48). In contrast, the right to a jury trial does not extend to cases in which only equitable rights are at stake. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 198, 94 S.Ct. at 1010.

To resolve the issue of the availability of a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment when the statute does not provide the answer on its face, the Supreme Court has established a two-pronged standard. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 565, 110 S.Ct. at 1344. First, the nature of the statutory action is compared to 18th-century actions brought in the English courts prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, the remedy sought is examined to determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature. Id. (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18, 107 S.Ct. at 1835). The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the second inquiry is the "more important" of the two. Terry, 494 U.S. at 565, 110 S.Ct. at 1344 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 2790, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989)). See Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112...