Waldrop v. State

Decision Date23 October 1984
Docket Number1 Div. 784
CitationWaldrop v. State, 462 So.2d 1021 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984)
PartiesDavid Lee WALDROP v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

John Bertolotti, Jr., Mobile, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen. and William D. Little, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PATTERSON, Judge.

AppellantDavid Lee Waldrop was indicted in a two-count indictment by the Mobile County Grand Jury in May 1980, one count charging murder in the first degree of two persons by one act or a series of acts, and one charging a killing incident to a robbery or attempt to rob.Ala.Code 1975, § 13-11-2(a)(2) and (10)(1975)(repealed 1980).Appellant was found "guilty of the capital felony as set out in the indictment", and that conviction was subsequently reversed by this court in Waldrop v. State, 424 So.2d 1345, 1346(Ala.Crim.App.1982), cert. denied, No. 82-226and82-227(Ala.1983).Appellant was retried pursuant to the original indictment on January 9, 1984; he was found "guilty of the capital felony as charged in the indictment", and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.It is from this second conviction that Waldrop now appeals.

On the afternoon of July 11, 1977, Richard Hacker, assistant manager of Delchamps StoreNo. 10, and Terry Stainback, a part-time cashier, left the store with the afternoon bank deposit.Thirteen days later their partially decomposed bodies were discovered in a remote, wooded area in west Mobile County.Each victim had been killed by a single shotgun wound to the head.

Police authorities in Mobile had no leads on this double homicide for over two years.On December 12, 1979, Detective Willie Estes received a call from Lance Delaney of the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department in Tampa, Florida.Delaney informed Estes that he had some information, from an informant, regarding a double homicide in which two people were taken some distance from a store, robbed, and killed with a shotgun.Delaney further inquired from Estes as to whether there was a reward connected with the case, to which Estes replied in the affirmative.Estes requested additional information on the matter and asked Delaney to call back if such was obtained.Delaney called back a few days later with a more detailed account of the informant's knowledge.According to Delaney the "confidential informant" said that two people were involved in the Delchamps killings.One person was named Larry Stahl, 1 and the other person's name was not known by Delaney.Delaney, however, did state that the second person lived on Roderick Street in Mobile next door to a Mr. Millwood and that this second person's mother was employed by Delchamps.The informant also told Delaney that the two individuals involved in the crime used the vehicle and gun belonging to the second person's father.Upon investigation of this information, the police focused their investigation upon appellant.It was ascertained that appellant lived at the address stated and that appellant's mother was employed at the same Delchamps store as that at which the homicide victims had been employed.

On January 2, 1980, Detective Estes and three other officers flew to Tampa to meet with the informant, Roy Reynolds.Reynolds, in turn, took the officers to one Charles Roberts, who had given Reynolds the information he knew about the Delchamps killings.Roberts verified the information Reynolds had told the authorities.

Roberts told the investigators that he and Luke Stahl had been in the military together and were roommates in Mobile around the time of the Delchamps killings.Luke Stahl is the brother of Larry Stahl, whom Reynolds had implicated in the killings.Roberts stated that one night between the time of the robbery and the time the bodies were discovered he and Luke were in a bar in Mobile; that Luke told Roberts that Larry Stahl and appellant had abducted the two people from Delchamps and had killed them.According to Roberts, Luke said that appellant did the actual killing; that the vehicle and gun used belonged to appellant's father; and that appellant's mother and father were on vacation at the time of the incident.The investigators learned from Roberts that Luke and Larry lived in Larkin, Kansas.

On January 4, 1980, Estes and the other three officers flew to Larkin, Kansas, where they talked to Larry Stahl.Larry Stahl denied any participation in the crime.The investigators also spoke with Luke Stahl, who claimed appellant's gun had been used and that his brother, Larry, was not the killer.Luke refused to tell the investigators how he knew these facts.After talking with both Luke and Larry, Estes called Detective Driggers in Mobile and told Driggers to "pick up"appellant.

Detective Driggers and two other officers proceeded, without a warrant, to appellant's residence at approximately 9:30 p.m. on January 4, 1980.Upon their arrival appellant answered the door and the officers identified themselves as law enforcement officers.Appellant was requested to accompany the officers downtown, because they needed to talk with him.Appellant asked to get his coat and stepped back in the house; the officers, one on each side of appellant, followed him into the house.While inside, appellant attempted to use the telephone; however, Driggers put his finger on the cut-off button of the telephone, preventing appellant from using the phone, and told appellanthe could make any calls he wanted from the Sheriff's Office downtown.Appellant was then escorted outside his home, with officers on each side.Appellant asked if the officers thought he needed a lawyer, and was told he could call one if he thought he would need one.

Appellant was taken to the Sheriff's Office.After his arrival he apparently asked if he had to stay there.Officer Baker testified at the preliminary hearing that appellant was told "in a sense" that if he tried to leave "we'll probably arrest you."At trial Officer Baker did not remember saying this; however, his testimony produced from the preliminary hearing was used to refresh the officer's vague memory.At no time was appellant told he was under arrest nor was he told that he was free to go or that he did not have to accompany the officers.

Appellant was then given a form listing his Miranda rights, which he appeared to read and understand; appellant then signed a waiver of these rights.Initially appellant denied any participation in the Delchamps killings.After about twenty minutes appellant asked, "Well, what's going to happen to me?What's going to happen to me if I tell you about it?", to which Officer Driggers advised, "It's just according to whether you pulled the trigger or not".At that point appellant gave an oral statement.The detectives then contacted District Attorney Galanos, who, upon arrival, re-read appellant his Miranda rights, had appellant sign a second waiver form, and proceeded to take a written statement from appellant.

In this statement, which was read to the jury, appellant related in detail the circumstances of the murder and robbery, stating that he and Larry Stahl had abducted Hacker and Stainback from the parking lot of DelchampsNo. 10 and taken them to a secluded area where appellant tied the victims' arms together.Stahl burned the bank bag and its contents except the cash.Appellant stated that as he was entering the vehicle Stahl shot Hacker and then Stainback with a shotgun that appellant had illegally purchased some months before.Appellant stated that these events occurred while his parents were on vacation and that they had used his father's car.Appellant further stated that his mother worked for DelchampsNo. 10, and that he also worked there for a while.He was familiar with the store's deposit procedure and had heard his mother tell his father about it before.Finally, appellant disclosed that the shotgun had been disposed of at a land fill and that shortly thereafter appellant left for North Carolina.

I

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow individual voir dire of the jury necessitated by adverse pretrial publicity.Appellant maintains that, because many of the prospective jurors indicated they had heard or seen something about the case, appellant should have been allowed to individually determine which jurors were aware of his previous reversed conviction.Appellant offered no evidence of the extent of any prejudicial pretrial publicity, nor has he asserted any in brief, other than the fact that many jurors had heard or seen something about the case.

As a general rule, it is within the trial court's discretion to allow individual voir dire of prospective jurors.SeeDuncan v. State, 436 So.2d 883, 900(Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, (Ala.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047, 104 S.Ct. 720, 79 L.Ed.2d 182(1983), and cases cited therein.Additionally, this court has recently stated:

"Prospective jurors who have heard of a previous conviction on the same charges need not be automatically excluded from the venire....A prospective juror with knowledge of a previous conviction need not be dismissed for cause, if the trial court determines that the juror does not have a fixed opinion of appellant's guilt, but rather can lay aside any preconceived notions or opinions and render a verdict based solely upon the evidence presented in court."

Beck v. State [Ms. 7 Div. 909, March 20, 1984]--- So.2d ----(Ala.Crim.App.1984)(citations omitted)(emphasis in original).The mere fact that prospective jurors know something about a case, at the time of empaneling, is not unusual, nor is it sufficient to invoke individual voir dire where the trial court takes the necessary steps to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial by a panel of impartial and indifferent jurors.We expect that citizens of this state will take an interest in the affairs of their community, and where a criminal act occurs...

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58 cases
  • State v. Calhoun
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • Enero 28, 1986
    ...probability relates to the suspect's commission of a crime rather than the probability of finding the object of the search. Probable cause to make a warrantless arrest is the same as would justify the issuance of a warrant to arrest. Knight v. State, 346 So.2d 478 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte ex rel. Attorney General, 346 So.2d 483 (Ala.1977), appeal after remand Knight v. State, 356 So.2d 765 (Ala.Crim.App.1978); Waldrop v. State, 462 So.2d 1021commission of a crime rather than the probability of finding the object of the search. Probable cause to make a warrantless arrest is the same as would justify the issuance of a warrant to arrest. Knight v. State, 346 So.2d 478 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte ex rel. Attorney General, 346 So.2d 483 (Ala.1977), appeal after remand Knight v. State, 356 So.2d 765 (Ala.Crim.App.1978); Waldrop v. State, 462 So.2d 1021 (Ala.Crim.App.1984); cert. denied, 462481 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte State ex rel. Attorney General, 346 So.2d 483 (Ala.1977), appeal after remand, Knight v. State, 356 So.2d 765 (Ala.Crim.App.1978); Waldrop v. State, 462 So.2d 1021 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 462 So.2d 1021 (Ala.1985). Mere suspicion in the officer's mind that an offense has been committed is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest. Tice v. State, 386 So.2d 1180 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert....
  • Wilson v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • Septiembre 20, 2013
    ...individually or collectively is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Walker v. State, 932 So.2d 140, 156 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (quoting Haney v. State, 603 So.2d 368 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), citing in turn, Waldrop v. State, 462 So.2d 1021, 1025 (Ala.Crim.App.1984)). Here, Wilson has not shown the that circuit court abused its discretion, much less committed plain error, by allowing the prosecutor to question the venire as a whole regarding potential jurors'...
  • Walker v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • Octubre 01, 2004
    ...462 So.2d 1021 (Ala.Cr. App.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988). This discretion is limited, however, by the requirements of due process. United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.1981); Waldrop v. State. Individual questioning may be necessary under some circumstances to ensure that all prejudice has been exposed. States v. Hurley, 746 F.2d 725 (11th Cir.1984). We have reviewed the record of the voir dire examinations andinstances but otherwise the jurors were questioned by panels. As a general rule, the decision whether to voir dire prospective jurors individually or collectively is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Waldrop v. State, 462 So.2d 1021 (Ala.Cr. App.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988). This discretion is limited, however, by the requirements of due process. United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.1981); Waldrop v....
  • State v. Phillips
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • Noviembre 10, 1987
    ...it was not discovered as a result of a "search and seizure." The first question that must be addressed is: When was the appellee arrested? The point in time of an arrest is usually a question of fact. Waldrop v. State, 462 So.2d 1021 (Ala.Cr.App.1984),; Foy v. State, 387 So.2d 321 (Ala.Cr.App.1980). Generally, an arrest occurs when one's freedom of movement has been curtailed such that a reasonable, ordinary person in the defendant's or suspect's position would believe he...
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