Waldrop v. State, 599

• Decision Date: 24 June 1971
• Docket Number: No. 599,599
• Citation: 278 A.2d 619,12 Md.App. 371
• Parties: Ray Delmari WALDROP v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 371

12 Md.App. 371

278 A.2d 619

Ray Delmari WALDROP v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 599.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 24, 1971.

Stephen A. Tarrant, Bel Air, with whom was Henry C. Engel, Jr., Bel Air, on brief, for appellant.

Donald P. Stutman, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Edwin H. W. Harlan, Jr., State's Atty., and Florio N. Franetovich, Asst. State's Atty., for Harford County on brief, for appellee.

Argued before ORTH, THOMPSON and MOYLAN, JJ.

THOMPSON, Judge.

Ray Delmari Waldrop, the appellant, was convicted of embezzlement in a court trial before Judge Albert P. Close in the Circuit Court for Harford County. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment. On appeal, his contentions are: 1. Lack of jurisdiction in Maryland; 2. Tainted identification; and 3. Insufficient evidence. All are meritless.

Appellant worked for Arnold Gilmer, Sr., trading as Gilmer Moving and Storage, Aberdeen, Maryland, as a truck driver handling and moving furniture. His duties included collecting C.O.D. charges and returning the company truck and money to the company office. In May, 1969, appellant was assigned by Gilmer to be in charge of moving Mrs. Frank Pulli from Rising Sun, Maryland, to Hershey, Pennsylvania. He started work on this assignment on May 6, 1969 when he and two helpers went to Mrs. Pulli's house to pack the shipment. They arrived at approximately 9:00 A.M. staying until approximately 2:00 P.M. Mrs. Pulli watched appellant and his helpers while they were packing. Appellant and Mrs. Pulli were there for the full time of the packing.

On May 7, 1969, appellant was given instructions to pick up the Pulli shipment. He was advised to collect the delivery charges before unloading the truck. Appellant, with two helpers, went to the Pulli house to load the furniture while Mrs. Pulli was present. She left for Pennsylvania and next saw appellant at approximately 5:30 P.M. when he came to her Pennsylvania address to deliver the furniture. At that time, she paid him $478.75 in the form of four one hundred dollar bills, three twenty dollar bills, a ten dollar bill, a five dollar bill, three one dollar bills and three quarters. Mrs. Pulli presented a driver's weight certificate and a uniform household bill of lading signed by the appellant after she paid him. Appellant and his helpers worked at the Pulli house until approximately 9:00 P.M. with Mrs. Pulli directing the placement of the furniture. The copy of the bill of lading indicated the delivery was made on May 7, 1969, and that $478.75 C.O.D. charges were to be collected. Mr. Gilmer testified that to his knowledge the company never received the money paid by Mrs. Pulli.

The truck, in perfect operating condition, was found abandoned on Route 7 in the Perryman area of Harford County on May 8, 1969, after appellant did not show up for work and was not at his residence. The truck's location was approximately two miles from the company offices but near appellant's residence. The keys and moving papers were in the truck. When the Gilmer offices were closed, the fence around the business premises was not locked although it might appear locked to a casual observer. This system was explained to appellant so that he could return the truck after the business offices closed.

I Jurisdiction

Appellant contends his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted because the State of Maryland lacked jurisdiction. Of course, an offense against the laws of Maryland is punishable only when committed within its territory. A person cannot be convicted for crimes committed in another state. To support his contention, he cites Bowen v. State, 206 Md. 368, 111 A.2d 844 and Peddersen v. State, 223 Md. 329, 164 A.2d 539.

In Bowen v. State, supra, the defendant (the President of a Title Company), who was indicted in Montgomery County, Maryland, for embezzlement and larceny after trust, received the money in the form of checks in Bethesda, Montgomery County, Maryland, but deposited the checks in the bank account of his company in the District of Columbia, where the checks were paid, and where the money was withdrawn and appropriated by the defendant. In reversing a conviction for larceny after trust and embezzlement, the Court of Appeals held that no act of conversion nor appropriation had taken place in Maryland; therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction.

In Peddersen v. State, supra, the defendant managed, in Montgomery County, Maryland, a farm owned by another person. Defendant's duties included selling livestock whenever directed to do so by the owner, although the defendant had authority to choose the buyer, set the price, and to receive the proceeds of sale for his employer. On September 11, 1956, the defendant accompanied some cattle to Lancaster, Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania, the defendant received a check payable to himself for the sale price of the cattle. The defendant then returned to Montgomery County. On September 12, the defendant returned to Lancaster, Pennsylvania, presented the check to the drawee bank, and obtained in exchange two treasurer's checks and some cash; he then returned to Montgomery County. On September 13, the defendant went to a bank in Frederick, Maryland, cashed both of the treasurer's checks, and returned to Montgomery County. On September 14, he revisited the Frederick bank and purchased five $1,000. United States Savings Bonds made out in the name of the defendant. He then returned to Montgomery County where he learned of impending litigation against him and his wife. That evening the defendant's wife and child left Maryland; the defendant left the next day. He surrendered himself to the F.B.I. in New Orleans approximately three years later.

On the above facts, the Court of Appeals concluded the Montgomery County court had jurisdiction and venue over Peddersen. The Court concluded that where intent plus possession is shown, there is sufficient reason for a court to assume jurisdiction over the offense of embezzlement, citing Clark and Marshall, Crimes (6th Edition), § 3.02; 3 Underhill, Criminal Evidence, (5th Edition), § 582; 18 Am.Jur., Embezzlement, § 65, and several out-of-state cases.

In Peddersen, the Court explained that in Bowen, supra, neither the fraudulent intent nor the act of appropriation occurred in Maryland. In the instant case, there is evidence from which an inference could be drawn that both elements occurred in Maryland. As to the act of appropriation, the mere receiving of the C.O.D. funds by appellant in Pennsylvania on May 8 was not shown to be a conversion occurring in another state. Indeed, the contrary was shown by the fact that the defendant most probably returned to Harford County immediately after delivering the Pulli furniture.

It is a fair inference from all of the facts that the fraudulent intent was actually formed, or in any event, continued to exist, in Harford County, Maryland, particularly since it was in that county that appellant departed from his assigned duties. It may be rationally inferred that until he returned to Harford County, appellant had properly performed his duties including packing and loading the shipment, collecting the C.O.D. charges, unloading, delivering...