Wales v. State
| Decision Date | 28 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 31A01-0107-CR-279.,31A01-0107-CR-279. |
| Citation | 768 N.E.2d 513 |
| Parties | Eric L. WALES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Matthew Jon McGovern, Louisville, Kentucky, Attorney For Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Arthur Thaddeus Perry, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Following a jury trial, Eric Wales was convicted of Robbery, as a Class C Felony, and of being an Habitual Offender. The trial court sentenced Wales to serve an aggregate term of twelve years. Wales now appeals.
We affirm.
Wales presents the following issues for review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of Wales' 1985 robbery conviction?
2. Whether the officers' initial seizure of Wales violated the Fourth
3. Whether Wales' counsel was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
4. Whether the pretrial identification of Wales violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
In November of 2000, Deanna Sheets was working behind the counter at the Holiday Inn Express in Corydon, Harrison County. At approximately 10:00 p.m., a black male entered the hotel, walked to the counter, showed Sheets a handgun and stated, "This is a robbery." Sheets took cash out of the register and gave it to the man. The perpetrator warned Sheets not to go to the door or window in an attempt to see his vehicle and then left. Sheets called 911 and described the perpetrator as a black male of large build wearing a baseball cap with a Tommy Hilfiger logo, an olive green shirt, blue jeans, new brown work boots, and a black leather coat.
Officer Jeffrey Firkins and Sergeant Doug Standiford of the Floyd County Police Department heard a dispatch describing the robbery of the Holiday Inn Express in Harrison County. The dispatch described the suspect as a heavy set, black male wearing a Tommy Hilfiger baseball cap, a black leather coat and blue jeans. Officer Firkins and Sergeant Standiford positioned themselves along Interstate 64 and observed traffic coming out of Harrison County. The officers estimated it would take ten to fifteen minutes for a vehicle to reach their location from the Corydon area. The officers observed several black persons driving vehicles past them, but none fit the dispatch description. They eventually stopped Wales, who was driving a yellow Cadillac. Officer Firkins testified that they stopped Wales because he was a black male, had a "round face," and appeared to be wearing a black leather jacket. In addition, Officer Firkins recalled hearing a dispatch from the previous day where a robbery suspect in another county was observed leaving the scene in a yellow Cadillac.
After the officers apprehended Wales, Captain Todd Heavrin of the Floyd County Police Department arrived at the scene and decided to have Sheets come to the scene for a possible identification. Detective Roy Wiseman of the Harrison County Police Department transported Sheets to the scene. In route, Detective Wiseman told Sheets the police had detained a suspect that matched her description. He also informed Sheets that if she could not identify Wales as the perpetrator, he would be let go. Sheets positively identified Wales, and the officers arrested him. The officers' subsequent search of Wales revealed a large amount of cash and a handgun.1 Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Wales first asserts that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to impeach him with evidence of a 1985 robbery conviction in violation of Indiana Rule of Evidence 609(b). Specifically, Wales argues that: (1) contrary to the court's ruling, he did not open the door to admission of his previous conviction; (2) the State failed to provide him with prior notice of its intent to use the evidence as required by Rule 609(b); and (3) the trial court failed to engage in a balancing of the evidence's probative value against its potential prejudicial effect in violation of Rule 609(b). Wales further claims that his conviction should be reversed because evidence of his 1985 robbery conviction influenced the jury's verdict. We address these arguments in turn.
Indiana Rule of Evidence 609 provides, in relevant part:
Unlike Indiana Rule of Evidence 403, which favors the admissibility of evidence, Rule 609(b) "presumes the exclusion of convictions more than ten years old." Scalissi v. State, 759 N.E.2d 618, 624 (Ind. 2001) (citing 13 ROBERT LOWELL MILLER, JR., INDIANA PRACTICE, § 609.202, 170 (1991)). As our supreme court explained in Scalissi:
[T]he party seeking to admit such convictions must support the argument for probative value with specific facts and circumstances upon which the trial court may base a finding of admissibility. In addition, the trial court must balance the probative value against the prejudicial effect of the old convictions on the record. We review this ruling under Rule 609(b) for an abuse of discretion.
759 N.E.2d at 624 (quotations and citations omitted).
In this case, during direct examination Wales' counsel asked him to talk about his "past record."2 Wales explained that in 1990 he had a drug problem that caused him to commit a series of armed robberies over a period of a few days. Wales testified that he was "high" when he committed those crimes. He further stated that he felt guilty after committing the crimes and turned himself in to the police once he realized he was a suspect. Wales stated that he spent time in prison for those crimes and received drug counseling in prison.
On cross-examination, the State questioned Wales about his drug problem that caused him to commit the crimes in 1990 and asked Wales specific questions about each charge of robbery that resulted from the crime spree. Thereafter, the following exchange occurred:
At that point, Wales' counsel objected, and the State argued that Wales had opened the door to evidence of a crime Wales had committed in 1985.
During argument outside the presence of the jury, Wales' counsel admitted that she had no knowledge of Wales' 1985 robbery conviction, and the State admitted that it had failed to provide defense counsel with notice of intent to use the 1985 conviction prior to trial. The State explained that it did not include the 1985 conviction when it notified the defendant of its intent to introduce his 1991 convictions because the State "never dreamed" Wales would open the door to evidence of his earlier conviction. After argument on the issue, the court ruled in relevant part:
Under the circumstances, it appears to me that the notice requirement [of] 609(b) is intended to require provision of notice that you've got to use a criminal conviction for impeachment purposes under the more than ten years old and it appears to the Court and the Court so finds that it could not have reasonably been calculated that this would have come up, and in addition, obviously, the Defendant knows his own criminal history. So, the Defendant's own criminal history couldn't possibly have been a surprise to him. In addition, the Court finds that the Defendant has opened the door and made it appear that he only commits robberies because of problems with drugs. He also specifically testified that he never had a drug problem that would cause him to commit robberies until 1990, sometime in 1990, the same year prior to the commission of the five or six robberies or whatever it was. Therefore, it appears to me an appropriate question on cross examination to allow the Prosecuting Attorney to ask questions about this other robbery conviction, if in fact you are able to show there's a certified document.
It is well settled that a defendant may open the door to questions otherwise not admissible under Rule 609. Moffatt v. State, 542 N.E.2d 971, 974 (Ind.1989); Allen v. State, 495 N.E.2d 180, 181 (Ind. 1986). In addition, a defendant who, through direct testimony, leaves the trier of fact with a false or incomplete impression of his criminal record may open the door to inquiries into his complete criminal history. 13 ROBERT LOWELL MILLER, JR., INDIANA PRACTICE § 609.107, 166 (1995); see also Allen, 495 N.E.2d at 181 (). In this case, Wales' direct testimony left the jury...
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