Walker Field, Colo., Public Airport Authority v. Adams
| Decision Date | 26 September 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-1586,77-1586 |
| Citation | 606 F.2d 290 |
| Parties | WALKER FIELD, COLORADO, PUBLIC AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Hon. Brock ADAMS, as Secretary of Transportation of the United States Department of Transportation, Dr. John McLucas, as Administrator of Federal Aviation Administration, M. M. Martin, as Director, Rocky Mountain Region, Federal Aviation Administration, Edward G. Tatum, as Chief, Denver Airport District Office, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
James Spelman, Grand Junction, Colo., for plaintiff-appellant.
C. Scott Crabtree, Asst. U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo. (Joseph F. Dolan, U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo., on brief), for defendants-appellees.
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., David W. Robbins, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen. and David E. Engdahl, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, Colo., on brief for the State of Colorado as amicus curiae.
Before HOLLOWAY, DOYLE and McKAY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Walker Field Public Airport Authority ("Walker Field") brings this appeal from a dismissal of its suit against the Secretary of Transportation and others. The suit challenged the lawfulness of defendants' actions in seeking to require the County of Mesa and the City of Grand Junction, Colorado, to join the Walker Field Authority in assuming obligations for improvement of Walker Field airport for which the Federal Government offered to make a Grant Agreement. The action was dismissed for "failure to state a claim for relief within the jurisdiction of the court."
Since the complaint and action were dismissed for such defects in the complaint, we turn to the facts as alleged in that pleading and to a discussion of the general background of the controversy.
The Airport and Airway Development and Revenue Act of 1970, as amended, 49 U.S.C. Secs. 1701-1742 (1976) (the "Act"), provides for the expansion and improvement of the Nation's airport and airway system. Financing for these improvements is largely, although not exclusively, 1 provided by airport and airway user charges imposed by the Act. 2 The charges collected are paid into the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1742(b) (1976), from which they are returned to individual airports under, Inter alia, the terms of project grant agreements, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1714(a) (1976).
The complaint avers that on September 23, 1976, Walker Field, a political subdivision of the State of Colorado formed under the Colorado Public Airport Authority Law, Colo.Rev.Stat. Secs. 41-3-101 41-3-108 (1973), for the purpose of acquiring and improving airports 3 submitted to the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") 4 a Project Application for financial assistance under the Act for the construction of fire bays, fencing and a taxiway for the Walker Field airport. The estimated cost of the project was $690,480.00 (I R. 4). No other agency submitted an application.
On January 4, 1977, Edward G. Tatum, Chief of the Denver Airport District Office of the FAA transmitted an "Offer" to Walker Field, Mesa County, and the City of Grand Junction as joint sponsors of the proposed project ("joint sponsors"). The "Offer" was made on and subject to, Inter alia, the following condition (I R. 16):
16. The FAA in tendering this Grant Offer on behalf of the United States recognizes the existence of a Co-sponsorship Agreement between the City of Grand Junction, Mesa County, and Walker Field, Colorado, Public Airport Authority, entered into between the parties on August 14, 1972. By acceptance of this Grant Offer said parties assume their respective obligations as set forth in said Co-sponsorship Agreement. It is understood and agreed that said agreement will not be amended, modified or terminated without prior written approval of the FAA.
On January 10, 1977, Walker Field executed a Grant Acceptance thereby agreeing to all of the terms and conditions which had been added to the Offer. Subsequently on January 17 and 19, respectively, the Board of County Commissioners of Mesa County and the City Council of the City of Grand Junction adopted resolutions, (I R. 18-21), adverting to the Offer, declaring that they had not made application for a grant and declining to assume, on behalf of their citizens, the obligations of sponsorship under the Grant Agreement.
Walker Field alleges that between it and defendant there was an agreement constituting an obligation of the United States and of the Sponsor, Walker Field, by the terms of both the Grant Agreement and the Act. (I R. 5). Walker Field has proceeded to carry out its obligations under the agreement, incurring expenses from its own funds and had submitted, up to filing of the complaint, a request for reimbursement in the amount of $12,788.55, and was still continuing with its obligations to complete the project, continuing to incur full expense and requesting reimbursement for the federal share of the project cost owed to Walker Field. (I R. 6).
The FAA states that it has delayed reimbursement of the federal share of the project and will continue such delay, pending resolution of the execution question. The defendant has further refused to recognize the existing Grant Agreement by offering to make new grant offers for the same project. (I R. 6).
Walker Field's complaint alleged that the conduct of defendants in making the additional sponsors a condition precedent to defendants' performance of the Grant Agreement is contrary to the express procedures of the Act, which requires that a sponsor be an applicant or applicants; that defendants' conduct attempting to enlarge the political enforceability of the representations, obligations, terms and conditions on public agencies not desiring such obligations "is in excess of the defendants' discretion under the said Act and otherwise not in accordance with said law." (I R. 7).
Further the complaint claimed that if the Act is construed to permit the defendants to impose such conditions, such power would be in excess of that granted the Federal Government by the Constitution and that such power to manipulate the States and their political subdivisions with respect to authority reserved to them would violate the concept of immunities between the United States and the several States. (Id. at 7).
It was alleged that Walker Field is damaged by the delay in reimbursement of the federal share of $12,788.55 to date and would continue to be damaged by defendants' delay in meeting their obligation under the Grant Agreement to pay 90% Of the allowable project costs. (Id. at 7).
The complaint prayed for a declaratory judgment that "the Grant Agreement as executed January 10, 1977 is an agreement between the United States and Walker Field, . . . mutually obligating the said parties, and only those parties, to the terms and conditions thereof or incorporated therein . . . " In addition, Walker Field prayed for equitable relief enjoining "the defendants and each of them and their successors, agents and employees from requiring, as a condition of meeting the United States obligations under the said Grant Agreement, representations, assurances, terms or conditions of any other public agency than . . . Walker Field . . . unless such other public Agency desire to give such representations, assurances, obligations, terms or conditions." (I R. 8).
The Government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and the trial court held a hearing on that motion. At the conclusion of the hearing the trial judge granted the motion, stating that he was convinced "that there is no basis for claims for relief within the jurisdiction of this Court." (II R. 18). More specifically the court said that to the extent that the remedy for breach of contract is damages, the damages are greater than the limitation in the Tucker Act and the issue has to be in the Court of Claims; 5 that the Secretary's imposition of the requirement that the City of Grand Junction and Mesa County also assume obligations, along with Walker Field, as set forth in the earlier co-sponsorship agreement was well within the Secretary's authority and discretion in prescribing the terms and conditions of the grant; and that therefore there was no basis for claims for relief within the jurisdiction of the court. (II R. 16-18).
The trial court's formal order of dismissal similarly stated that "this complaint and civil action are dismissed for the failure to state a claim for relief within the jurisdiction of this court." This appeal followed.
First, we turn to the trial court's reasoning that "(o)bviously the damages here are greater than the limitations imposed on this court by the Tucker Act . . . and this issue has to be in the Court of Claims." (II R. 16).
We must, of course, follow the rule that a complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80. Thus we feel it was correct for the district court to analyze the complaint from different perspectives, as was done.
At the outset, it is clear that a contract a "Grant Agreement" was alleged as was the claim that the plaintiff Walker Field was damaged by the delay in reimbursement of the federal share of $12,788.55. These allegations could serve as a basis for attempting proof of actual damages for breach of contract by Walker Field. Such a case would come within 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1491 as a "claim against the United States founded . . . upon any express or implied contract with the United States . . . " and hence within jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. And such jurisdiction would be exclusive because as such a claim the complaint would also run afoul of the limitation on the concurrent jurisdiction of the district court in contract claims against the United States. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(a)(2)...
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