Walker Intern. Corp. v. United States
Decision Date | 12 May 1977 |
Docket Number | Customs Appeal No. 76-25. |
Citation | 554 F.2d 464 |
Parties | WALKER INTERNATIONAL CORP., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
David Serko, Gerald B. Horn, Serko & Simon, New York City, attorneys of record, for appellant.
Carla A. Hills, Barbara Allen Babcock, Asst. Attys. Gen., Washington, D. C., David M. Cohen, Alan L. Langus, New York City, for the United States.
Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and MILLER, Judges and SCOVEL RICHARDSON, Judge, United States Customs Court.
This appeal is from orders of the Customs Court dismissing the above-entitled action and denying plaintiff-appellant's motion for rehearing. The appeal turns on whether there was a manifest or gross abuse of discretion by the Customs Court. Quigley & Manard, Inc. v. United States, C.A.D. 1121, 496 F.2d 1214, 61 CCPA 65 (1974); Reynolds Trading Corp. v. United States, C.A.D. 1120, 496 F.2d 1228, 61 CCPA 57 (1974). We affirm.
Dismissal was pursuant to Rule 8.3(b)(2) of the Customs Court, which provides for involuntary dismissal as follows:
(2) An action in which issue has been joined, but no further proceedings have been instituted for a period of 1 year, may be dismissed by the court on its own motion for lack of prosecution unless good cause is shown for such delay.
On November 20, 1975, the Customs Court issued the following order:
On January 23, 1976, the following Order of Dismissal was entered by the Clerk:
It appearing that a motion for substitution of counsel has not been filed in accordance with an Order of this Court entered on November 20, 1975, the above entitled action is dismissed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 8.3(b)(2).
On February 23, 1976, "PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REHEARING" was filed by Serko & Simon, noting that they were "Attorneys for Plaintiff." The grounds for the motion were set forth in an attached affidavit by an associate of the firm of Serko & Simon. Pertinent to the order of dismissal is the following recitation:
That all reasonable efforts were taken to communicate with plaintiff in order to arrange for the Substitution of Attorneys, including numerous letters and telephone calls over a period of more than six months, extending up to the present time; all such communications remain unanswered.
Appellant argues, in effect, that the Customs Court's order of November 20, 1975, was in error because, under the partnership law of the State of New York, the firm of Serko & Sklaroff, although dissolved, had not terminated but was continuing with respect to winding up its unfinished business (including litigation) and other affairs; also, because ethical considerations precluded Serko & Sklaroff from abandoning its obligations to appellant upon the partnership's dissolution; further, because, without objection by the client or by former counsel, the statement of an attorney, a member of the Bar admitted to practice before the Customs Court, is sufficient to establish that attorney's right to appear on behalf of a particular litigant.
We are unpersuaded by these arguments. Although such a statement by an attorney may ordinarily be sufficient to establish his right to appear on behalf of a litigant, that right is subject to the "diligent supervision" of the court in the management of its business. See Sweeney v. Anderson, 129 F.2d 756, 758 (CA 10 1942).1 So, too, are the rights and duties of a law partnership winding up its unfinished litigation before the court. As appellee points out, without contravention by appellant, after the dissolution of Serko & Sklaroff there were three separate law firms: Serko & Sklaroff, winding up the partnership's unfinished business and other affairs; Serko & Simon; and Murray Sklaroff, Esq. Since the action was joined in July 1974 and no further proceedings had occurred for some sixteen months, it was within the court's discretion to determine which firm, if any, was authorized to represent appellant. Appellant was given a reasonable period of sixty days to comply with the court's order and, under Rule 8.3(b)(2), to otherwise show good cause for failure to prosecute. Although the aforementioned affidavit recites that "all reasonable efforts were taken to communicate with plaintiff," the court was never so advised during the sixty-day period, and seemingly its order was simply ignored. Accordingly, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion, much less a manifest or gross abuse of discretion, in the court's dismissal.
The affidavit filed in support of the motion for rehearing also contained the following recitations:
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