Walker Macy LLC v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.

• Decision Date: 17 March 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:16–cv–995–SI
• Parties: WALKER MACY LLC and Xiaoyang Zhu, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES and Lori Scialabba, Acting Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Oregon

243 F.Supp.3d 1156

WALKER MACY LLC and Xiaoyang Zhu, Plaintiffs,

v.UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES and Lori Scialabba, Acting Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Defendants.

Case No. 3:16–cv–995–SI

United States District Court, D. Oregon.

Signed March 17, 2017

Brent W. Renison, Parrilli Renison LLC, 610 SW Broadway, Suite 505, Portland, OR 97205. Of Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; William C. Peachey, Director; Glenn M. Girdharry, Assistant Director; and Joshua S. Press, Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation , District Court Section, P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044. Of Attorneys for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Walker Macy LLC ("Walker Macy") and Xiaoyang Zhu¹ bring this putative class action against U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") and its Acting Director, Lori Scialabba, in her official capacity.² Plaintiffs allege that USCIS improperly administers its H–1B specialty occupation nonimmigrant visa worker program in violation of federal law.³ The parties cross-move for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied, and Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Administrative Procedure Act

Plaintiffs bring their claims under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").⁴ Under the APA, "an agency action must be upheld on review unless it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’ " San Luis & Delta–Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell , 747 F.3d 581, 601 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) ). A reviewing court "must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The reviewing court's inquiry must be "thorough," but "the standard of review is highly deferential; the agency's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity, and [the court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although a court's review is deferential, the court "must engage in a careful, searching review to ensure that the agency has made a rational analysis and decision on the record before it." Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv. , 524 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2008).

B. Summary Judgment

A party is entitled to summary judgment if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Clicks Billiards , Inc. v. Sixshooters , Inc. , 251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). Although "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge ... ruling on a motion for summary judgment," the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position [is] insufficient ...." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Where parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the court "evaluate[s] each motion separately, giving the nonmoving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences." A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas , 466 F.3d 784, 790–91 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n , 605 F.3d 665, 674 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Cross-motions for summary judgment are evaluated separately under [the] same standard."). In evaluating the motions, "the court must consider each party's evidence, regardless under which motion the evidence is offered." Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme , 632 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2011). "Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig. , 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). Thereafter, the non-moving party bears the burden of designating "specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial." Id. "This burden is not a light one." Id. The Supreme Court has directed that in such a situation, the non-moving party must do more than raise a "metaphysical doubt" as to the material facts at issue. Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

C. Principles of Statutory Interpretation

"The purpose of statutory construction is to discern the intent of Congress in enacting a particular statute." Robinson v. United States , 586 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). "When interpreting a statute, the court begins with the statutory text and interprets statutory terms in accordance with their ordinary meaning, unless the statute clearly expresses an intention to the contrary." I.R. ex rel. E.N. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. , 805 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The plain meaning of the statute controls, unless such a reading would result in unreasonable or impracticable results. Robinson , 586 F.3d at 687.

" ‘A statute is ambiguous if it gives rise to more than one reasonable interpretation.’ " Woods v. Carey , 722 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting DeGeorge v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal. , 219 F.3d 930, 939 (9th Cir. 2000) ). " ‘The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but also by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’ " Yates v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1081–82, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (noting that courts cannot rely on dictionary definitions alone) (alterations in original) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) ). A court should "not [be] guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am. , 494 U.S. 26, 35, 110 S.Ct. 929, 108 L.Ed.2d 23 (1990) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "[i]t is a cardinal canon of statutory construction that statutes should be interpreted harmoniously with their dominant legislative purpose." Valladolid v. Pac. Operations Offshore, LLP , 604 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Gallenardo , 579 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009) ); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States , 461 U.S. 574, 586, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) ("It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute."); I.R. , 805 F.3d at 1167 ("[W]e must read the words [of a statute] in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. Particular phrases must be construed in light of the overall purpose and structure of the whole statutory scheme." (quotation marks omitted; alterations in original)). In construing an ambiguous statute or term, a court may also look to legislative history to illuminate the intent of Congress. See Woods , 722 F.3d at 1181.

BACKGROUND

A. H–1B Visa Program and Associated Legislative Actions

Employers in the United States may petition for a nonimmigrant work visa under the H–1B program when they seek to employ foreign workers in specialty occupations that require theoretical or practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, including but not limited to architecture, engineering, medicine, law, and other fields that require the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 1184(i)(1) ; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). To petition for an H–1B visa, the employer must submit a Form I–129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker. The employer also must file a Labor Condition Application that has been certified by the Department of Labor ("DOL"). See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(1).

Congress has limited the number of H–1B visa petitions that may be granted in any given fiscal year (or "FY").⁵ This is commonly referred to as the H–1B "cap." The current annual limit for H–1B visa petitions subject to the cap is 85,000. Of these, 65,000 visa petitions are subject to the "regular cap," with an exemption for the first 20,000 workers who have earned a master's or higher degree from a United States institution of higher education (the "master's cap"). See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g).⁶

The H–1B visa is a temporary visa with a maximum duration of six years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4). It is designed so that U.S. companies can employ citizens of another country. This is in comparison to employer-sponsored "immigrant" visas, which allow persons to come and work in the United States as permanent residents.

"H" visas have existed since 1952. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA") subdivided the H visa category into: (1) H–1 visas for persons of "distinguished merit and ability," such as professionals, artists, athletes, entertainers, and prominent business people who lack professional credentials; (2) H–2A for temporary workers...