Walker v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.
| Decision Date | 25 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19 CV 4115 |
| Parties | Chimika Walker, as Parent and Next Friend of Z.R., a Minor Plaintiff, v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Legal Prep Charter Academies, and Jamel M. Helaire-Jones Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Chimika Walker sues Defendants the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Legal Prep Charter Academies, and Jamel M. Helaire-Jones on behalf of her daughter, Z.R., who attended Legal Prep. She claims that Helaire-Jones, Legal Prep's basketball coach and dean, sexually assaulted Z.R., and that Legal Prep and the Board violated various federal and state laws by failing to protect her. Plaintiff sues Defendants pursuant to Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, (Count I); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts II-IV); and Illinois law for negligence and willful and wanton conduct (Counts V-VIII). The Board and Legal Prep both move to dismiss the counts against them. [67]; [69]. For the reasons stated below, this Court grants the Board's motion [67], and grants in part and denies in part Legal Prep's motion [69].
Plaintiff is the mother of Z.R., a minor. [52] at ¶ 5. The Board is a "body politic and corporate" under the laws of the State of Illinois, id. at ¶ 7, and Legal Prep operates a charter school that receives federal funds, id. at ¶¶ 9-10, 63. At all relevant times, Legal Prep employed or employs Helaire-Jones as a dean/disciplinarian and basketball coach. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.
The Board and Legal Prep entered a charter school agreement (Agreement) for a five-year term commencing on July 1, 2012, which they renewed for a second term ending on June 30, 2022. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15. The Agreement required the Board to conduct criminal history background checks on all of Legal Prep's existing and prospective employees, in accordance with the Illinois State Code and other state laws, and to perform a check of eligibility for rehiring from the Board's Do Not Hire (DNH) records. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. For its part, Legal Prep maintained a contractual obligation to obtain and provide the Board with a signed copy of the Board-approved release and consent from each of its prospective and current employees to facilitate the Board's background checks. Id. at ¶ 22.
Per the Agreement, the Board could either reject a prospective employee or terminate a current employee who had been convicted of any one of the enumerated offenses set forth in the Illinois School Code, or require additional information from a current or prospective employee whose background check showed a conviction of anon-enumerated offense or whose conviction status was not known. Id. at ¶¶ 19-20. After it completed a background check, the Board—as required under the Agreement—would inform Legal Prep whether the Board recommended: (1) hiring the prospective employee or continuing to employ the current employee; (2) conditionally hiring the prospective employee or continuing to employ the current employee pending a final adjudication; or (3) not hiring the prospective employee or terminating the current employee. Id. at ¶ 21.
The Agreement required Legal Prep to prohibit any prospective employee from having contact with students pending the results of the background check. Id. at ¶ 23.
Without first securing a background check, Legal Prep hired Helaire-Jones on or before October 15, 2017 to head the girls' basketball team. Id. at ¶ 30. About two months after his hire, on December 26, 2017, Helaire-Jones authorized his background check. Id. at ¶ 31. Pursuant to this background check, the Board learned that Helaire-Jones had previously been arrested and accused of abduction and attempted sexual assault of an eighteen year-old female in Battle Creek, Michigan. Id. at ¶ 32. The Board thereafter notified Legal Prep's business manager, Melissa Almazan, of this incident. Id. at ¶¶ 33, 45. Although the Board requested additional information from Helaire-Jones, Helaire-Jones failed to submit the requested documentation on time. Id. ¶¶ 33-35. Accordingly, the Board notified Legal Prep that Helaire-Jones was not eligible for employment. Id. at ¶ 35.
Despite learning this information, Legal Prep hired and retained Helaire-Jones as a full-time employee, to serve as dean/disciplinarian and varsity girls' basketball coach. Id. at ¶ 36.
Z.R. was a student and member of the girls' basketball team at Legal Prep. Id. at ¶¶ 37, 39. Between August 2017 and November 2018, Helaire-Jones initiated a sexual relationship with Z.R., involving sexual grooming and engagement in numerous sexual acts at Legal Prep. Id. at ¶¶ 39-40. In particular, Helaire-Jones continuously made Z.R. perform acts of sexual contact and penetration with him in the locker room and gymnasium. Id. at ¶ 41. At all times, Z.R. was a minor—and at least fifteen years Helaire-Jones' junior—without the legal ability to consent to sex. Id. at ¶¶ 38-39. Upon learning of the sexual relationship with Z.R., law enforcement arrested and charged Helaire-Jones with criminal sexual assault; his case remains pending in Cook County. Id. ¶ 42.
Plaintiff filed this action on June 19, 2019. [1]. During a motion hearing on January 23, 2020, this Court denied without prejudice the Board's and Legal Prep's first motions to dismiss, and granted Plaintiff's oral motion for leave to amend. [43]. This Court also entered default against Helaire-Jones, who has failed to appear or answer the complaint. Id.
Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint on March 12, 2020. [52]. The amended complaint brings claims against Legal Prep for violations of Title IX (CountI), id. at ¶¶ 60-71; and against both Defendants for violation of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, id. at ¶¶ 72-86 (Count II against Legal Prep), ¶¶ 87-97 (Count III against the Board); negligence, id. at ¶¶ 104-14 (Count V against Legal Prep), ¶¶ 115-25 (Count VI against the Board); and willful and wanton conduct, id. at ¶¶ 126-41 (Count VII against Legal Prep), ¶¶ 142-56 (Count VIII against the Board). The Board and Legal Prep have renewed their motions to dismiss. [67]; [69].
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must provide a "short and plain statement of the claim" showing that the pleader merits relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), so the defendant has "fair notice" of the claim "and the grounds upon which it rests," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint must also contain "sufficient factual matter" to state a facially plausible claim to relief—one that "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility" that a defendant acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action" and mere conclusory statements will not suffice. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In evaluating a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Each Defendant moves to dismiss the claims against it on various grounds. [67]; [69]. This Court addresses each challenged claim in turn below.
Title IX provides, in relevant part: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Title IX's ban on "discrimination" prohibits a school's employee from sexually harassing or abusing a student. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992); Hansen v. Bd. of Trs. of Hamilton Se. Sch. Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 604-05 (7th Cir. 2008). Title IX, however, does not permit recovery under a respondeat superior theory. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287-90 (1998). Rather, where, as here, the Title IX claim "is based on a teacher's conduct, the plaintiff must prove that 'an official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective measures . . . has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct.'" Hansen, 551 F.3d at 605 (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277); see also Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 257 (2009) ().
Legal Prep contends that Plaintiff fails to satisfy this "actual notice" requirement because the amended complaint does not allege that it had knowledgeof Helaire-Jones' conduct toward Z.R. [76] at 2-3. But "a school district need not possess actual knowledge of a teacher's acts directed at a particular plaintiff," as long as it has actual knowledge of misconduct that would create risks "so great that they are almost certain to materialize if nothing is done." Hansen, 551 F.3d at 605 (emphasis in original) (quoting Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2004)). For instance, a school district might have "actual notice" if it knows that a teacher is a serial harasser. Id. at 606.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Board learned of Helaire-Jones' past arrest for abduction and attempted sexual assault and informed Melissa...
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