Walker v. Briley

• Decision Date: 18 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. CV 00-BU-2145-E.,CV 00-BU-2145-E.
• Parties: John WALKER, Plaintiff, v. Kevin BRILEY and the City of Anniston, Alabama, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

140 F.Supp.2d 1249

John WALKER, Plaintiff, v. Kevin BRILEY and the City of Anniston, Alabama, Defendants.

No. CV 00-BU-2145-E.

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Eastern Division.

April 18, 2001.

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James M Sims, Anniston, AL, for John Walker, plaintiff.

C David Stubbs, Stubbs Sills & Frye PC, Anniston, AL, for Kevin Briley, City of Anniston, defendant.

Memorandum Opinion

BUTTRAM, District Judge.

In the above-styled action, John Walker claims that Kevin Briley, a municipal police officer, and his employer, the City of Anniston, Alabama (the "City") (collectively "Defendants"), are liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Walker's constitutional rights and pursuant to Alabama law for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Walker also claims that the City is liable under Alabama law for allegedly failing to properly train and supervise Briley. Now before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims, filed February 23, 2001. (Doc. 11). The parties have filed evidence and briefs in support of their respective positions on the motion, which is now ripe for decision. Upon careful consideration of the record and the arguments of counsel, the Court concludes that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 11) is due to be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. It is due to be GRANTED as to all claims, both state and federal, asserted against the Defendant City. However, the motion is due to be DENIED insofar as it seeks dismissal of claims against the officer, Defendant Briley, in his individual capacity.¹

I. BACKGROUND

At about 6:15 p.m. on March 20, 1999, Plaintiff Walker was riding in the front passenger seat of an automobile driven by an acquaintance of his, Ausey Sumlin. At that same time, Defendant Briley and his partner, Brent Shane Denham, were riding on patrol in their capacity as police officers for the Defendant City. Briley, who was driving the police vehicle, saw Sumlin execute a right turn without activating his turn signal. Briley directed Sumlin to pull over by turning on the police vehicle's emergency lights and parked behind Sumlin in the 2100 block of Moore Avenue in Anniston.

Briley and Denham had a practice of taking alternate turns talking to any driver they pulled over for a routine traffic stop. Since it was his turn, Denham went to the driver's side of the vehicle where Sumlin was seated while Briley reported the stop to the dispatcher. Denham advised Sumlin that he had been pulled over for failure to activate his turn signal and asked Sumlin for his license. Sumlin complied, and Denham told him that he was not going to issue him a citation and that he should be more careful in the future.

Meanwhile, during the time Denham was speaking with Sumlin, Briley exited the police vehicle and approached the passenger side of the vehicle where Walker was seated. According to Walker the events occurring immediately thereafter are these: Briley shined a flashlight in his face and asked him, "You got any ID?" Walker replied that he did, and Briley demanded that he produce it. Walker inquired why he was being told to provide identification. Briley allegedly answered, "[The] Supreme Court give (sic) me a probable cause to ask you for your ID." Walker asked, "What is your probable cause," to which Briley's rejoinder was to order Walker out of the car. Walker obeyed and gave Briley his identification but told Briley he wanted his name and badge number. Briley allegedly asked why Walker wanted that information, and Walker advised him that it was because he felt he was being "harassed." Briley, according to Walker, told him to "shut up." Walker claims he answered, "Sir, as long as I am not belligerent with you or cussing you out you don't have the right to tell me to shut up. I have got as much freedom of speech as you do." Briley reportedly responded by warning, "If you say another word I am going to take you to jail, do you see those kids standing on the sidewalk over there?" Walker alleges that when he looked in the direction towards which Briley had gestured when asking that question, no one was there. He asked Briley what kids he was talking about and again requested Briley's name and badge number. Briley then told Walker to turn around and that he was going to jail, and Briley placed Walker under arrest.

Defendants, on the other hand, adhere to a distinctly different version of events, although some common elements are clearly recognizable. Defendants contend that when Briley asked Walker to produce his identification, Walker became upset and accused the police of harassing him because of his race.² Briley says he told Walker that the Supreme Court had said he, Briley, had the right to identify anyone in the vehicle. Briley claims that Walker then exited Sumlin's vehicle of his own accord, not because he was ordered to do so, and demanded Briley's name and badge number. Defendants aver that Walker continued to speak to Briley in a very loud and aggressive manner—to the point of shouting—although Walker expressly denies that such was the case. Defendants also assert that Walker used profanity a number of times during his exchange with Briley. However, neither Briley nor Denham was able to recall anything specific on that front aside from one instance: Briley allegedly warned Walker several times to "quit cussing" and calm down or he would have to take him to jail because there were a number of children present across the street. Briley and Denham recall that in response, Walker snapped either "Fu* * the children" or "I don't give a fu* * about the kids." At that point, Briley claims, he placed Walker under arrest, and took him into custody, where Walker remained until he was released on bond later that same night. Walker and Sumlin, however, expressly deny that the former ever used profanity or that any children were present at the scene, as Defendants claim.

On March 22, 1999, a criminal complaint was filed in the Anniston Municipal Court, alleging that Walker had committed the offense of disorderly conduct under § 13A-7-11, with Briley listed as the complainant. On July 21, 1999, Walker was prosecuted in that court for that offense, a Class C misdemeanor. At the trial, the State introduced into evidence a videotape showing the events surrounding the traffic stop of Sumlin's automobile. This recording was made using a front-facing, stationary video camera mounted in Briley and Denham's patrol vehicle. However, the videotape, which is also in evidence in this Court, lacks any audio component.³ After viewing the videotape and considering the other testimony presented, the municipal court judge found Walker not guilty of disorderly conduct.

On August 2, 2000, Walker filed the instant action seeking an award of damages against the City and Briley, claiming that they are both liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983") for violations of Walker's Fourth Amendment rights, based on allegations that he was arrested, detained, and prosecuted without probable cause. Walker also claims that both Briley and the City are liable under Alabama law for the torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Finally, Walker maintains that the City alone is liable for failing to properly supervise and train Briley. Following discovery, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment on all claims.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

On a motion for summary judgment, the court assesses all of the proof the parties can bring to bear in order to ascertain whether a genuine need for trial is present. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Summary judgment is weighed heavily in favor of the non-movant; it is appropriate only if the court concludes that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the grounds for its motion and specifically identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and any affidavits that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. See also Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the non-moving party "must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of each essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Howard v. BP Oil Company, 32 F.3d 520, 523 (11th Cir.1994). In resolving whether a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury, a district court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Rooney v. Watson, 101 F.3d 1378, 1380 (11th Cir.1996) (citing Hale v. Tallapoosa Co., 50 F.3d 1579, 1581 (11th Cir.1995)). "That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that `evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted or unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2529, p. 299).

III. CONTENTIONS & ANALYSIS

A. The Claims Against the City

After Defendants filed evidence and briefs in support of their motion for summary judgment, Walker did likewise in opposition. However, in his brief Walker offers no argument...