Walker v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp.

Decision Date02 June 2021
Docket NumberNo. 1487,1487
PartiesJAMES T. WALKER et al., v. CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE CORP.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Circuit Court for Prince George's County

Case No. CAL17-12248

UNREPORTED

Graeff, Leahy, Sharer, J. Frederick (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Graeff, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

In 2003, James T. Walker and Olivia A. Walker, appellants and self-represented litigants, received $145,000 in "platinum endorsement" insurance proceeds as part of a settlement agreement to assist in the cost to rebuild their home after it was destroyed by a tornado in La Plata, Maryland in 2002. That money was placed in a restricted escrow account managed by their mortgage company, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JP Morgan"), appellee.1 In 2013, the Walkers' insurance company requested that JP Morgan return the unused $145,000, and JP Morgan complied. In 2017, the Walkers filed a complaint against JP Morgan in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, requesting damages related to various tort and contract claims relating to this transfer.

In 2019, JP Morgan filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the statute of limitations had run. It also filed a motion for dismissal for failure to comply with discovery requests. The circuit court issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of JP Morgan and dismissing the Walkers' amended complaint with prejudice.

The Walkers present the following questions for our review, which we have consolidated and rephrased as follows:2

1. Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment in favor of JPMorgan on the basis that the Walkers' amended complaint was barred by Maryland's three-year statute of limitations?
2. Did the circuit court err in granting JP Morgan's motion to dismiss as a discovery sanction?
3. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in dismissing the Walkers' motions for orders of default and default judgment against JP Morgan?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.Factual History

The Walkers owned a home located in La Plata, Maryland. They obtained a mortgage loan from First Union Mortgage Corporation, which subsequently was purchased by Chase Manhattan Mortgage Company, a.k.a., JP Morgan, as explained infra.

The Walkers' home was insured by a policy underwritten by Centre Insurance Company ("CIC") for up to $290,000. The policy also included a "platinum endorsement" rider, which obligated CIC to pay up to an additional $145,000 ("endorsement proceeds") in the event that the replacement cost of the property exceeded the coverage limit of $290,000.

On April 28, 2002, the Walkers' home was destroyed by a tornado. Although CIC paid the dwelling coverage limit of $290,000 to the Walkers, a dispute subsequently arose between the Walkers and CIC relating to the endorsement proceeds coverage of $145,000.

On October 22, 2002, the Walkers filed a complaint against CIC with the Maryland Insurance Administration, alleging various violations of Maryland insurance law. The parties reached a settlement agreement in June 2003. Pursuant to that agreement, CIC agreed to pay $145,000 into a restricted escrow account managed by JP Morgan, acting as an "escrow agent" for the Walkers.

The settlement agreement stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

[CIC] will pay to [JP Morgan], as escrow agent for the [Walkers], pursuant to the [Walkers'] mortgage, the remaining sum of $145,000.00 for coverage of the Dwelling ($290,000.00 having previously been paid.). . . . Thesepayments are intended to resolve all claims as to Dwelling, Separate Structures and Personal Property. . . . The [Walkers] waive and release [CIC] and all agents and assigns from all but the specifically excluded sums referred to on page 4 of the Settlement Agreement and withdraw their appeal in the Office of Administrative Hearings, OAH Case No. MIA-INS-33-200300078. [CIC] will make all of the agreed upon payments to the [Walkers] and [JP Morgan] within thirty days of the date of this Agreement, except the hold back amounts on the personal property loss, which payment is due on receipt of evidence of replacement.

Along with the settlement proceeds, CIC sent JP Morgan a letter that stated:

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement . . . the proceeds of this check are to be disbursed upon the presentation of bills in excess of $290,000.00 for the construction of a new residence at 136 Quail Lane, La Plata, Maryland 20646. Upon the presentation of documentation evidencing that the construction bills incurred by the Walkers for the reconstruction of the La Plata, Maryland residence are received, [JP Morgan] is permitted to disburse the $145,000.00 either incrementally or all at once, up to the amount of construction invoices submitted until the funds are exhausted.

Mr. Walker subsequently filed numerous unsuccessful complaints against CIC with the Maryland Insurance Administration.3 This Court held that CIC "satisfied the settlement agreement when it sent the $145,000 endorsement proceeds directly to [JP Morgan], and that any claims arguing otherwise were barred by accord and satisfaction." Walker v. Centre Insur. Co., No. 1036, Sept. Term, 2018 (filed Nov. 14, 2019) (citing Walker v. Centre Insur. Co., No. 352 Sept. Term, 2006 (filed October 3, 2007)).

On January 9, 2013, counsel for CIC sent a letter to JP Morgan requesting the return of the $145,000. It explained that the $145,000 was a recoverable holdback, and a condition precedent for distribution of this recoverable holdback was that construction ofa new residence exceeded the $290,000 paid pursuant to the dwelling coverage limit. Counsel asserted that the Walkers never constructed a new residence at the property address, and therefore, CIC was requesting a return of the funds. On March 6, 2013, JP Morgan transferred the $145,000 held in escrow back to CIC.

On March 26, 2013, Mr. Walker sent a letter to JP Morgan stating that his March 14, 2013 mortgage loan statement indicated that "$145,000 was taken from [his] restricted escrow account and a disbursement paid."4 He further stated that he did not authorize this disbursement and requested further information from JP Morgan about the transfer.

On March 29, 2013, JP Morgan sent a reply letter to Mr. Walker stating as follows:5

[JP Morgan] was contacted by the law office of Godwin, Erlandson, MacLaughlin, Vernon & Darcy, LLC representing ZC Sterling Insurance Agency, Inc[.] as Program Manager for [CIC].
The correspondence indicated that the check received in the amount of $145,000.00 was issued for recoverable holdback. Your access to these funds was contingent upon our receipt of construction bills and invoices once the $290,000.00 policy limit was exceeded.
As these requirements were not met, [CIC] formally requested the return of the recoverable holdback in the amount of $145,000, which was approved by [JP Morgan] to be issued payable to [CIC] and mailed to the law office of Godwin, Erlandson, MacLaughlin, Vernon & Darcy, LLC.
Our records indicate that you were notified of this disbursement as you were copied on the March 8, 2013 disbursement letter of these funds.

During the following year, Mr. Walker sought, unsuccessfully, to have the funds returned from CIC. In May 2014, he sent a letter to JP Morgan requesting that the funds be returned. JP Morgan responded that it could not honor his "request for compensation." The Walkers allege that, on October 6, 2014, Mr. Walker suffered a stroke that caused visual loss in his right visual field and restricted his "ability to see, read and use his computer" until the fall of 2015.

II.Procedural History

On May 12, 2017, Mr. Walker filed a pro se complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County against "Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation," alleging: (1) breach of the escrow agreement; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) severe negligence; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). Mr. Walker stated that he "discovered that the $145,000 was sent back to CIC" on April 20, 2013, "after reading [the] mortgage statement."

On July 25, 2017, JP Morgan filed a motion to extend its time to file an answer. In that motion, the company noted that it had been "incorrectly sued" as "Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation," rather than "JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A."6 On July 31, 2017, Mr. Walker filed a motion for an order of default and default judgment on the basis thatthe "Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation" had failed to file its answer within 60 days. The circuit court denied that motion.7

On August 28, 2017, JP Morgan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. It argued that dismissal was appropriate because, among other things, Mr. Walker's claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. It asserted that the alleged injury, i.e., the transfer of the $145,000 back to CIC, occurred on March 4, 2013, and the complaint filed on May 12, 2017, more than four years later, exceeded the limitations period.

In a response motion filed on September 12, 2017, Mr. Walker argued that none of his claims were time-barred because, although he had "knowledge of the harm" on April 20, 2013, the statute of limitations was tolled as a result of his incapacity following his stroke on October 6, 2014. He asserted that his disability was removed on December 21, 2015, and therefore, he had until June 21, 2017, to file, thereby making his May 12, 2017, complaint timely. The court denied the motion to dismiss.

On November 13, 2017, JP Morgan filed its answer, asserting numerous affirmative defenses, including...

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