Walker v. City of Chicago
| Decision Date | 31 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-CV-02648 |
| Parties | Jamal WALKER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Matthew Diblich, and Police Officer Ohle, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Angela Sonia Perkins, Jarrett Adams, The Law Office of Jarrett Adams, PLLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
James Peter Fieweger, Alexius Cruz O'Malley, Brianna Jane Siebken, Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant City of Chicago.
Shneur Z. Nathan, Avi T. Kamionski, Helen Catherine O'Shaughnessy, Robin Denise Shoffner, Ryan Donald Janski, Nathan & Kamionski LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants Matthew Diblich, Police Officer Ohle.
On a late October evening in 2015, Jamal Walker decided to stay overnight at a family member's apartment in Chicago. That was a fateful decision: early the next morning, the Chicago police executed a search warrant at the apartment, which resulted in his arrest, conviction, imprisonment—and eventual reversal of the conviction, but only after spending five years in prison. He has filed this lawsuit against the City of Chicago as well as Chicago Police Officers Matthew Diblich and Darren Ohle, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 R. 1, Compl.2 The Defendants have moved to partially dismiss certain counts against the individual officers, R. 19, Partial Mot. to Dismiss, and to dismiss all of the counts against the City, R. 20, Mot. to Dismiss. For the reasons explained in this Opinion, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.
In evaluating the motions to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in Walker's favor. Hayes v. City of Chicago , 670 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2012).
In late October 2015, Chicago Police Officer Matthew Diblich obtained a search warrant to search an apartment in the building at 4249 West Jackson Boulevard in Chicago, Illinois. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 12. Relying on statements provided by a confidential informant, the search warrant targeted Pierre Walker—who is Plaintiff Jamal Walker's brother—as the person who allegedly lived in the apartment and possessed a semi-automatic gun there. Id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 17.
On October 28, 2015, Officer Diblich and Officer Darren Ohle,3 alongside around nine other officers, entered the three-bedroom apartment. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 14. They found six people there, including Plaintiff Jamal Walker. Id. ¶ 14. After searching the residence, the officers found cannabis and two boxes of bullets in the bedroom occupied by Antione Walker (another one of the Plaintiff's brothers) and Amaria Mordick. Id. ¶ 15. The bullets belonged to Antione. Id. ¶¶ 16, 28. The residents notified the officers that Pierre was absent from the apartment, id. ¶ 17, and Walker provided the officers with identification showing that he was not Pierre nor did he live in the apartment, id. ¶ 18. Nonetheless, despite obtaining no evidence linking either the cannabis or bullets to him, the officers arrested Walker on the purported basis that he admitted to owning the bullets. Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.
Walker was eventually charged with unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (the charge covers possession of ammunition by a felon). Compl. ¶ 20. At Walker's April 2016 trial, Officers Diblich and Ohle testified that Walker confessed to possessing the bullets. Id. ¶ 21. In the defense case, Keith Terrell, who was present at the search, testified that Walker did not reside in the apartment or keep any belongings there. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. Ultimately, Walker was found guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and sentenced to eight years and six months of imprisonment. Id. ¶ 26.
But after serving almost five years in prison, Walker's conviction was reversed by the Illinois Appellate Court in March 2020. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 29. The Illinois Appellate Court held that there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict. Id. ¶ 27. Later, in October 2020, the state court also granted Walker a Certificate of Innocence. Id. ¶ 29. Walker filed this lawsuit in May 2021. Compl. The Defendants have moved to dismiss certain aspects of the Fourth Amendment and due process claims (Counts 1–3) against the individual officers, as well as the Monell claims and state law claims against the City (Counts 5–8) in the Complaint. Part. Mot. to Dismiss; Mot. to Dismiss.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (cleaned up).4 The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule "reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court." Brooks v. Ross , 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 514, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) ).
"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7 , 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (cleaned up). These allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Before turning to the claims at issue, the Court notes that Walker explicitly waived any claim for an illegal search in Count 1. R 24, Pl.’s Br. at 1. Likewise, he admits that he has failed to state a claim for a Brady violation or for "concealment of exculpatory evidence" in Count 2. Pl.’s Br. at 2. Those claims are dismissed, because they were not meaningfully developed or responded to in briefing. Wagner v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. , 840 F.3d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up); see United States v. Farris , 532 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 2008) ().
In Count 1, Walker alleges that Officers Diblich and Ohle falsely arrested him by fabricating evidence—namely, that he supposedly confessed to possessing the bullets on October 28, 2015. Compl. ¶¶ 58–63. The Defendants contend that the false-arrest claim is time-barred because it runs afoul of Illinois's statute of limitations. Part. Mot. to Dismiss at 7–8; Defs.’ Reply at 4–5.5 Specifically, the officers argue that Walker was required to file suit on or before October 30, 2017, which is over three years before when he actually filed the Complaint on May 17, 2021. Part. Mot. to Dismiss at 8.
It is undisputed that "[a]lthough state law determines the length of the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim, federal law provides when that limitations period begins." Smith v. City of Chicago , 3 F.4th 332, 335 (7th Cir. 2021). In Illinois, Section 1983 civil-rights claims for personal injuries, like the claims in this case, are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. Herrera v. Cleveland , 8 F.4th 493, 495 n.2 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing 735 ILCS 5/13-202 ). A claim for false arrest accrues "at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process." Wallace v. Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 397, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) ; see also Serino v. Hensley , 735 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2013) ().
But the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1), and "a plaintiff ordinarily need not anticipate and attempt to plead around affirmative defenses." Hyson USA, Inc. v. Hyson 2U, Ltd. , 821 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2016). The exception to this rule applies where "the allegations of the complaint ... set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense." Id. (cleaned up).
Here, the allegations of the complaint are clear enough to consider the limitations defense at the pleadings stage. No one disputes that sometime shortly after the arrest on October 28, 2015, Walker was detained pursuant to legal process. The statute of limitations for a false-arrest claim begins when the plaintiff is brought before a judge pursuant to legal process. Wallace , 549 U.S. at 390, 127 S.Ct. 1091. Here, Walker failed to bring the false-arrest claim within two years of the start of legal process. Instead, he filed suit more than five years after that.
Walker resists this conclusion by relying on McDonough v. Smith , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2159, 204 L.Ed.2d 506 (2019), to contend that "any claim that threatens to impugn a criminal conviction does not accrue until the criminal proceedings are terminated in the claimant's favor." Pl.’s Br. at 9. According to Walker, because his arrest was predicated on fabricated evidence, his arrest "implicate[d] the validity of his criminal conviction." Id. at 10. That simply does not follow. It is true that, in McDonough v. Smith , the Supreme Court held that a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (not a Fourth...
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