Walker v. Commissioner of Correction
Decision Date | 04 September 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 27072.,27072. |
Citation | 930 A.2d 65,103 Conn.App. 485 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Michael WALKER v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION. |
James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).
Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, Michael E. O'Hare, supervisory assistant state's attorney, and Jo Anne Sulik, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
SCHALLER, DiPENTIMA and WEST, Js.
The petitioner, Michael Walker, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that he failed to prove that the state, at his criminal trial, had suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), (2) excluded evidence at the habeas hearing that might have revealed a Brady violation, (3) found that one of the state's primary witnesses testified truthfully in all material respects at the criminal trial and (4) excluded certain police reports from evidence in the habeas hearing. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The facts underlying the petitioner's conviction were recounted in the decision of our Supreme Court disposing of his direct appeal:
State v. Walker, 214 Conn. 122, 124-25, 571 A.2d 686 (1990). Following Brown's direct testimony, the petitioner extensively cross-examined him regarding his motivation for testifying against the petitioner.
The petitioner received a total effective sentence of eighty years incarceration. Id., at 123, 571 A.2d 686. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Id., at 124, 571 A.2d 686.
On January 16, 1996, Brown signed an affidavit recanting his trial testimony. The petitioner then instituted a habeas corpus proceeding on December 4, 1996,1 claiming that Brown had committed perjury during the petitioner's trial, which the state either knew or should have known. The habeas court held hearings from September 27 through 29, 2004, and then again on October 15 and 26, 2004. During the hearings, on October 15, the habeas court allowed the petitioner to amend his petition to add an allegation that the state had failed to disclose material, exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194.
The habeas court issued a written memorandum of decision, filed November 24, 2004, concluding that the state did not knowingly present perjured testimony and that there was no Brady violation. The court based those conclusions on its factual findings that Brown had testified truthfully in all material respects at the petitioner's criminal trial and that there never was any agreement between Brown and the state that should have been disclosed pursuant to Brady. Thus, the court declined to issue the petitioner a writ of habeas corpus. On October 17, 2005, the court granted the petitioner certification to appeal. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the petitioner first claims that he was denied due process of law and his right to a fair trial because the habeas court improperly concluded that he failed to prove that the state had suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Specifically, the petitioner contends that the prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense that Brown, who was in police custody on charges related to a robbery, had his bond reduced to a written promise to appear in exchange for a written statement against the petitioner. The respondent, the commissioner of correction, responds that the court correctly concluded that the petitioner failed to prove the existence of such an agreement with Brown. We agree with the commissioner.
At the outset, we state the standards by which we review the petitioner's claims. The question of whether there existed an agreement between Brown and the state is a question of fact, which we review under the clearly erroneous standard. See State v. Floyd, 253 Conn. 700, 737, 756 A.2d 799 (2000). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reid v. Commissioner of Correction, 100 Conn.App. 59, 62-63, 917 A.2d 1001, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 907, 920 A.2d 309 (2007).
Whether the petitioner was deprived of his due process rights due to a Brady violation is a question of law, to which we grant plenary review. See Quintana v. Commissioner of Correction, 55 Conn.App. 426, 435-36, 739 A.2d 701, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 904, 743 A.2d 614 (1999). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilson v. Office of Adult Probation, 67 Conn.App. 142, 145, 786 A.2d 1120 (2001).
The following relevant testimony was elicited at the hearing on the petitioner's habeas petition. Brown recanted the testimony he had given in the petitioner's criminal trial. He also testified that once he had provided the police with a statement incriminating the petitioner, the charges against Brown "miraculously disappeared." Brown, however, did not refer to anything specific that was offered or said, instead claiming that "nothing was said in direct fashion, everything was indirect." Attorney Thomas R. Gerarde, who had represented Brown, testified that his goal would have been to ensure that once Brown gave a statement, he did not return to jail and that he must have received consent to that, but he was just not sure how it happened. He further testified that he had a specific memory of not getting a promise from then state's attorney, James E. Thomas, for favorable treatment on the criminal charges against Brown. Gerarde also stated that his notes indicated, "no promises from JET," which he said referred to Thomas.2 Detective Clyde Mitchell, the police officer who had interviewed Brown, also testified that the police had made no specific promises to Brown. Thomas testified that he could not recall whether he had entered into an agreement with Brown to recommend a written promise to appear in return for his cooperation.
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