Walker v. Converse
| Decision Date | 16 January 1894 |
| Citation | 36 N.E. 202,148 Ill. 622 |
| Parties | WALKER v. CONVERSE. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from circuit court, Cook county; M. F. Tuley, Judge.
Bill to quiet title, brought by James W. Converse against Henry H. Walker and others. Complainant obtained a decree. Defendant Walker appeals. Affirmed.
Woolfolk & Browning, for appellant.
W. R. Plum and H. S. Mecartney, for appellee.
This was a bill in chancery, brought by James W. Converse against Henry H. Walker and others, alleging that the complainant is the owner in fee of lot 5, block 5, Brand's addition to Chicago; that his title was acquired under any by virtue of certain tax deeds, constituting claim and color of title made in good faith, and the payment of all taxes on the premises for seven successive years, the lot being during all that time vacant and unoccupied; that since the last payment of taxes the complainant has taken possession of the premises, and is now in possession thereof by his tenant; that certain conveyances to the defendants constitute a cloud on the complainant's title; and praying that the complainant's title may be confirmed, established, and quieted in him, and that the title and claim of the defendants be declared void, and the deeds to them be held for naught; and a general prayer for relief. Defendant Henry H. Walker answered the bill, the other defendants being defaulted for want of an answer; and, a replication being filed, the cause was heard on pleadings and proofs, and at such hearing the complainant, among other things, read in evidence a tax deed dated March 2, 1882, executed by the proper officer, and purporting to convey the lot in question to the complaint. He also gave evidence tending to show that from the date of the tax deed to some time in the year 1889-a period of seven years-the lot was vacant and unoccupied, and that during all that time the complainant paid all taxes thereon; that some time in 1889, and after the expiration of the seven years, the complaint took possession of the lot, and inclosed it and leased it to a tenant, and is now in possession thereof by his tenant. The question whether the lot was unoccupied during he entire seven years was contested by the defendant, and evidence was introduced by him tending to show certain acts by one Weimers, which it is claimed constituted an occupancy of the lot during a portion of that time. The court found that the tax deed of March 2, 1882, constituted color of title made in good faith to the lot in question; that the lot was then vacant and unoccupied, and continued vacant and unoccupied for seven sucessive years thereafter, and that during that time the complainant paid all taxes and assessments thereon; and he was therefore adjudged to be the legal owner of the lot in fee simple, according to the purport of his paper title. And it was further decreed that the deeds purporting to convey the lot to the defendants were clouds on the complainant's title; that the defendants had no right in or to the lot, and they were perpetually enjoined from asserting any right, title, or interest in or to the same, and the title of the complainant was decreed to be quieted. From that decree defendant Walker has appealed to this court.
The first point raised is that the case made by the bill is not one which entitles the complainant to a decree established and quieting his title, and declaring it paramount to the title of the defendants. The contention is that a title by limitation, under which a party is in possession of land, though admitted to be capable of being used by the owner of it for the purposes both of attack and defense, does not entitle him to maintain a bill in equity for the purpose of having the former paramount title removed as a cloud upon his title, or for the purpose of having his title ascertained, declared, and quieted, as against the owners of such former paramount title. We are of the opinion that this contention cannot be sustained. In McDuffee v. Sinnott, 119 Ill. 449, 10 N. E. 385, we held it to be the settled rule in this state that whenever the bar of the statute has become absolute, and the party entitled is in possession under it, it is thereafter just as available for attacking as for defensive purposes, and may be successfully asserted against all the world, including the owner of the former paramount title. The case of City of Chicago v. Middlebrooke, 143 Ill. 265, 32 N. E. 457, was in all its essential features like the present. There Middlebrooke, who was in possession of real property under a title acquired by the payment of taxes for seven successive years, under claim and color of title made in good faith, and while the land was vacant and unoccupied, and had subsequently taken possession, brought his bill to have the paramount or patent title removed as a cloud upon his title, and a decree in accordance with the prayer of his bill was sustained. In reaching that conclusion we said: ‘The last point relied upon-that a bill to remove a cloud upon a title cannot be maintained by a party who claims title under a tax deed, with seven years' payment of taxes and possession-is not tenable. In order to maintain a bill, the complainant must show title to the property. This may be done by proving color of title, seven successive years' payment of taxes while the property is vacant, and possession taken after the completion of the tax payment, as well as by showing a regular chain of title from the government. The case of Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 12 Sup. Ct. 720, is precisely in point. That was a suit in equity, by a party who was in possession of land under a title acquired by limitation, to establish his title as a matter of record, and to enjoin the defendants from asserting title thereto as heirs of the former owner. A decree in favor of the complainant in accordance with the prayer of the bill was sustained, the court holding that adverse possession of real estate for the period designated by the statute of limitations...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Peabody v. Burri
...form, obtained in good faith, is good color of title under this statute. Taylor v. Hamilton, 173 Ill. 392, 50 N. E. 1064;Walker v. Converse, 148 Ill. 622, 36 N. E. 202. Good faith on the part of the holder of color of title will be presumed. Bad faith must be established by proof to defeat ......
-
St. Louis Refrigerator & Wooden Gutter Co. v. Thornton
...on the strength of his own title. 37 Ark. 644; 24 Ark. 402; 56 S.W. 873; 66 Miss. 100; 20 F. 339; 109 Cal. 12; 78 Wis. 584; 121 U.S. 556; 148 Ill. 622; 47 Miss. 144, 229; 51 166. C. V. Murry and J. B. Moore, for appellee. Appellee's donation deeds are valid upon their face, and are evidence......
-
Kelly v. Galbraith
...worked no injury to appellants. There was no error in the allowance of interest upon the overdue installments of rent. Walker v. Converse, 148 Ill. 622, 36 N. E. 202;Worrall v. Munn, 38 N. Y. 148. We discover no error in the record which would justify us in reversing the judgment of the app......
-
Kenealy v. Glos
...that the complainant seeking to have the cloud removed has title to the property (Hutchinson v. Howe, 100 Ill. 11;Walker v. Converse, 148 Ill. 622, 36 N. E. 202;Glos v. Goodrich, 175 Ill. 20, 51 N. E. 643), although, where the cloud sought to be removed is a tax deed, proof that the complai......