Walker v. County of Los Angeles

Decision Date04 August 1960
PartiesBetty WALKER, Anna Woodward, Arthur Perlenfein, Jasper Tucker and Ernest Smith, Petitioners and Respondents, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a public corporation; the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles, Burton W. Chace, Warren M. Dorn, John Anson Ford, Kenneth Hahn and Frank G. Bonelli, as members of said Board of Supervisors, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 24114.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Wm. E. Lamoreaux, Assistant County Counsel, Joel R. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, by Joel R. Bennett, Los Angeles, for appellants.

Joseph A. Ball, Long Beach, Milton L. Most, Los Angeles, Sidney A. Cherniss, El Monte, Cy H. Lemaire, Los Angeles, and Ball, Hunt & Hart, by Joseph A. Ball, Long Beach, for respondents.

ASHBURN, Justice.

Appeal from judgment in favor of petitioners in an action for mandamus and declaratory relief.

Section 47 of the Charter of the County of Los Angeles provides: 'In fixing compensation to be paid to persons under the classified civil service, the Board, of Supervisors shall, in each instance, provide a salary or wage at least equal to the prevailing salary or wage for the same quality of service rendered to private persons, firms or corporations under similar employment in case such prevailing salary or wage can be ascertained.'

Five county employees brought this representative suit seeking by their original petition a writ of mandate requiring the Board of Supervisors to ascertain and declare the prevailing salary or wage for the same quality of service rendered to private employers under similar employment etc., and, having ascertained the same, to adopt an ordinance providing for payment to each person in the classified civil service found to be receiving less than the prevailing wage a sum, commencing on July 1, 1958, sufficient to make his salary at least equal to the said prevailing wage. By amendment a second count was added seeking declaratory relief. Both prayers were granted, the court adopting petitioners' basic theory that section 47 creates a mandatory duty upon the board which involves a preliminary 'quasi-judicial, non-legislative, fact-finding function;' that this fact-finding must be made before a salary ordinance is passed, and that in making such finding the board must disregard such matters as fringe benefits, must adhere to the court's definition of quality of service, similar employment, and further consider or reject other factors mentioned in the judgment. The judgment, after making these declaratory guides for further action, directs a peremptory writ of mandate requiring the board to proceed at once to ascertain and declare the prevailing salary or wage as of July 1, 1958, and 'in so doing that they adhere to their duties as declared by the Court under Section 47 of the Charter of the County of Los Angeles; and adopt an ordinance to pay to each person in the classified civil service of the County of Los Angeles found thereby to be receiving less than the prevailing salary or wage in his or her instance of employment a sum commencing on July 1, 1958, sufficient to make his or her salary or wage at least equal to said prevailing salary or wage in his or her instance of employment.' One of these duties mentioned in the quoted matter is, as declared by court, a 'quasi-judicial, non-legislative, fact-finding function preceding the performance of the indicated legislative act.'

Petitioners' attack is directed at a salary ordinance passed by the Board of Supervisors on May 27, 1958 fixing salaries and wages for the fiscal year beginning on July 1, 1958. The complaint contains no factual allegations of fraud or bad faith--only conclusionary averments to the effect that the board's action 'was arbitrary and capricious and was so palpably unreasonable as to demonstrate an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.' Moreover, there is no averment, no finding and no basis for a finding that the ordinance which was passed did not provide salaries and wages 'at least equal to the prevailing salary or wage.' The pertinent portions of the judgment are quoted in the margin. 1

It is immediately apparent that the court not only has commanded the legislative body to adopt a law, but has also prescribed what it may consider and what it must reject in so doing, one of the requirements being that it engage in a 'quasi-judicial, fact-finding function' which can mean nothing other than a fact-finding hearing, the taking of evidence and the making of findings--'to ascertain and declare the prevailing salary or wage' and then adopt an ordinance effectuating the same.

This proceeds upon three basic misconceptions: (1) That a subordinate legislative body must hold a fact-finding hearing as a condition precedent to legislating; (2) that the courts can command legislative action; and (3) that they can prescribe in advance the proper interpretation of existing charter law which the legislative body is to pursue in their further legislation.

It is firmly established, and by respondents conceded, that the fixing of salaries or wages is a strictly legislative prerogative and duty. City & County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal.2d 685, 689, 692, 140 P.2d 666; Allen v. Bowron, 64 Cal.App.2d 311, 313, 148 P.2d 673; Carrier v. Robbins, 112 Cal.App.2d 32, 35, 245 P.2d 676; Banks v. Civil Service Commission, 10 Cal.2d 435, 442, 74 P.2d 741; Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127, 60 S.Ct. 869, 84 L.Ed. 1108, 1114; Collins v. City & Co. of S. F., 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 729-730, 247 P.2d 362. It is equally clear that the determination of the question of what are prevailing wages as an incident to fixing compensation of employees is also quasi-legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial.

Collins v. City & Co. of S. F., supra, 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 247 P.2d 362 involved the question of whether the fixing of salaries by the Board of Supervisors pursuant to § 151 of the San Francisco Charter was legislative, and, hence, subject to referendum, or whether, on the other hand, it was merely administrative. That section of the charter provides that the Civil Service Commission shall prepare and submit to the board and the board shall adopt a schedule of salaries and wages which shall include all classifications and be in accord with generally prevailing rates of wages; the Civil Service Commission is required to make a comprehensive investigation and survey, record its findings as to the prevailing wage for each class of employment and recommend a rate of pay for each classification in accordance therewith. (No such provision appears in the Los Angeles County Charter.) The board may approve, amend or reject the schedule proposed by the Civil Service Commission, but in case of amendment must have a new report from the commission as to the effect of the proposed change in the schedule. The court concluded that the function of the supervisors in passing a salary ordinance under these conditions is strictly legislative and the ordinance therefore subject to referendum. At page 731 of 112 Cal.App.2d, at page 370 of 247 P.2d it is said: 'Under section 151 the board exercises some legislative discretion as to the standardization process. Since the board has the power to reject the schedules submitted by the commission and to amend them, although it must then await additional data from the commission, it is obvious that the board exercises considerable discretion in the process. The factual determination of such difficult questions as 'prevailing rates' and 'comparable service and working conditions,' and 'comparable training and experience,' and what constitutes 'consistent' compensation, clearly involves a discretionary fact finding process, and is therefore legislative in character. City and County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal.2d 685, 140 P.2d 666.'

The Boyd case, cited in the foregoing quotation, arose under the same San Francisco Charter. The Civil Service Commission, after making appropriate investigation, proposed a schedule of wages and submitted same to the Board of Supervisors. The board adopted it except as to rates proposed for bus drivers, and in passing a salary stabilization ordinance fixed their rate at five cents per hour in excess of the recommended schedule. The controller refused to audit and approve wage claims based upon this ordinance. The proceeding was one in mandamus seeking to compel him to do his duty. He resisted upon the ground that the ordinance was void as being in contravention of § 151 of the charter. At page 690 of 22 Cal.2d, at page 668 of 140 P.2d the court said: 'The determination whether proposed rates of compensation are in accord or in harmony with generally prevailing rates is within the discretion of the rate-making authority. The courts will not interfere with that determination unless the action is fraudulent or so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to indicate an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.'

Carrier v. Robbins, supra, 112 Cal.App.2d 32, 245 P.2d 676, was an action for declaratory relief growing out of § 40 of the San Diego County Charter (quoted at page 33 of the report) which in terms is a substantial equivalent of Los Angeles § 47. The complaint sought a declaration that the Board of Supervisors in ascertaining the prevailing rate should accept or disregard certain specified considerations (112 Cal.App.2d at pages 33-34, 245 P.2d 676). In upholding the sustaining of a demurrer without leave, the court said in 112 Cal.App.2d at page 35, 245 P.2d at page 678: 'The fixing of salaries of county and municipal employees is a legislative function.' Touching upon the propriety of declaratory relief such as there sought and as granted in the case before us, it was also said on the same page: 'It is apparent from the record before...

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