Walker v. England
| Decision Date | 15 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 02-1695 (CKK). |
| Citation | 590 F.Supp.2d 113 |
| Parties | Sidney L. WALKER, Plaintiff, v. Gordon R. ENGLAND, Secretary of the Department of the Navy, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Jerry Robert Goldstein, Bulman, Dunie, Burke & Feld, Chartered, Bethesda, MD, for Plaintiff.
Dorann E. Banks, Judith A. Kidwell, Karen L. Melnik, United States Department of Justice U.S. Attorney's Office, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Sidney L. Walker ("Walker"), an African-American male who was formerly employed at the Navy Public Works Center ("NPWC") in Washington, D.C., filed this suit against Defendant Gordon R. England in his official capacity as Secretary of the Navy, alleging various claims of employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. This is not the first suit between these parties. In the course of his employment at NPWC, Walker filed numerous administrative complaints and three prior lawsuits alleging various discriminatory employment actions, all of which were settled by the parties in May 2000. The instant lawsuit involves claims arising after the parties' settlement.
Following the Court's Order and Memorandum Opinion granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in this case, four claims remain: (1) discrimination and retaliation based on Walker's non-selection for a Mechanical Engineering Technician position; (2) retaliation based on Walker's supervisors having denied him overtime work; (3) retaliation based on the rejection of Walker's application to a Leadership Development Initiative Program; and (4) retaliation based on Walker's non-selection for an Electronic Industrial Controls Mechanic Supervisor position.1 Defendant has filed a[54] Motion for Summary Judgment on the four remaining claims, which Walker has opposed.
After thoroughly reviewing all of the parties' submissions, including the attachments thereto, applicable case law and statutory authority, and the entire record of the case as a whole, the Court shall GRANT-IN-PART Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Walker's retaliation claims based on the Leadership Development Initiative Program and non-selection for an Electronic Industrial Controls Mechanic Supervisor position (claims 3 and 4 above), and DENY-IN-PART Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Walker's discrimination and retaliation claim based on his non-selection for a Mechanical Engineering Technician position and retaliation claim based on Walker's supervisors having denied him overtime work (claims 1 and 2 above), for the reasons that follow.
Walker began his employment with NPWC in 1991.2 Pl.'s Stmt. ¶ 2(a). He filed his first EEO complaint against Defendant in 1993, alleging that he was not selected for two positions to which he had applied because of racial discrimination.3 Id. ¶ 2(b). These allegations were heard by an Administrative Law Judge who, in 1995, determined that Defendant had racially discriminated against Walker by not selecting him for one of the two positions. Id. ¶ 2(c). On December 22, 1995, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy issued a final agency decision accepting the conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and agreeing to certain "make whole" relief that included a promotion to a position that was substantially similar to the one that Walker was discriminatorily denied. Id. ¶ 2(d); Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 4 at 2 (12/22/95 Letter from D. Meletike to S. Walker).
Defendant failed to place Walker in a substantially similar position and took other actions that Walker alleged were discriminatory and retaliatory. Pl.'s Stmt. ¶¶ 2(e), 2(f). These actions led Walker to file three separate lawsuits in this Court. Id. ¶ 2(g). On September 10, 1998, Judge Harold H. Greene held a hearing and issued an order finding that "the Secretary has failed to promote Mr. Walker to a position that is substantially similar to the position he was denied [and] the Secretary has failed to remedy the Navy's discrimination against Mr. Walker." Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 5 at 1-2 (9/10/98 Order). Judge Greene ordered the Commanding Officer of NPWC to place Walker "in an employment position that is substantially similar to the Maintenance Supervisor position as it existed at the time of the discrimination," and further ordered the Secretary to "provide [the] Court with the name of the Commanding Officer responsible for implementing and ensuring compliance with this Order." Id. at 2.
Judge Greene's hearing and order gave rise to an article in the Washington Post titled "Navy Accused of Not Obeying Federal Order." Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 6 at 1 (12/11/98 Washington Post Article). The article featured a picture of Walker and a description of how Judge Greene "excoriated the Navy for failing to follow [the] Equal Employment Opportunities Commission order to give [Walker] a job equal to the one that he was illegally denied in 1993." Id. The article also described how Judge Greene "denounced the agency's behavior as `an outrage,'" and how he "demanded that the Navy provide him with the name of the officer responsible for implementing the EEOC order `so [he] know[s] whom to put in jail.'" Id. After subsequent court proceedings related to Walker's lawsuits, the parties reached a court-approved monetary settlement on May 12, 2000. Id. ¶ 12(i).
Walker's discrimination complaints against Defendant became known to many of the persons employed at NPWC, in large measure because of the Washington Post article describing Judge Green's hearing and order. Id. ¶ 12(j). All twelve individuals working at NPWC who were deposed by Walker in this case testified that they had knowledge of Walker's complaints against Defendant or the Washington Post article, or both. Id. Several of the persons employed in the NPWC Maintenance Department even submitted declarations stating that Walker's discrimination complaints against Defendant were "a matter of common knowledge in the workplace." Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 10, ¶ 6 (Decl. of B. Pickens); id., Ex. 11 ¶ 4 (Decl. of B. Chase) (same); id., Ex. 12 ¶ 4 (Decl. of F. Young) (same).
Against this backdrop, the Court sets forth the specific facts pertaining to each of Walker's four remaining claims.
On May 8, 2001, Theron Houston, the Supervisory General Engineer, and John Verde, the Chief Engineer, approved a position description for a GS-11 Mechanical Engineering Technician position. Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 3; Pl.'s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 3; Def.'s Mot., Ex. 12 at 113 (5/8/01 Position Description). Because a lengthy description of the duties, responsibilities, and knowledge required for a GS-12 Mechanical Engineering Technician position already existed, Houston and Verde created a "Statement of Differences" to accompany the position description, explaining that the GS-11 position was "similar" to the GS-12 position but "requires more supervision and guidance" because it is a "training position." Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 3 n. 1; Pl.'s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 3; Def.'s Mot., Ex. 12 at 114 (Statement of Differences).
Verde acted as the selecting official for the new position, and he designated David Capozolli, the Assistant Deputy Chief Engineer, as the evaluating official. Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 6. In the course of advertising the position and selecting applicants, Capozolli and Verde decided to hire two applicants for the position at either the GS-11 or GS-12 level, or one of each. See Def.'s Mot., Ex. 6 at 18:6-18:9 (Depo. Tr. of D. Capozolli) ( ); id. at 19:5-19:10 ( ).
On May 29, 2001, NPWC posted the vacancy announcement, titled "Mechanical Engineering Technician (HVAC)." Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 7. The vacancy announcement described the duties of the position, including () the ability to monitor and control "Heating and Air Conditioning and Ventilation systems" (i.e., HVAC) and supervising and tracking "HVAC preventative maintenance checks." Def.'s Mot., Ex. 12 at 123 (5/29/01 Vacancy Announcement). According to the vacancy announcement, applicants would be ranked according to their knowledge, skills, and abilities corresponding to the following six evaluation criteria:
Walker applied for the Mechanical Engineer Technician Position along with six other individuals. Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 9. All but one person were deemed eligible for the position. Id. Capozolli reviewed the eligible candidates using a crediting plan, assigning each applicant between one and four points for each of the six evaluation criteria (the higher the point total, the more qualified the candidate). Id. ¶ 10. See also Def.'s Mot., Ex. 12 at 237-49 (Mechanical Engineering Technician Crediting Plan). Three applicants, including William Schank, tied for the highest score of 18 points. Def.'s Mot., Ex. 12 at 250 (7/10/01 Scoring Sheet). George Altenbach had next highest score with 16 points. Id. Ross Fife received 15 points and Walker received 13 points.4 Id. Capozolli recommended to Verde that he select Schank as a GS-12...
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